From: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Tue Oct 28 2003 - 01:54:08 GMT
DMB said:
I think Matt was about right.
Matt:
I think DMB meant either that I was wrong, or that somebody else was right, because what follows isn't what I said. Quite the opposite.
DMB said:
The neo-prag wouldn't judge the cultures and would insist that nobody can rightly do so. [Right, that wasn't what I said. --Matt] Pirsig's MOQ says there is a way to make the call and that we should do so. Big difference. And surely it has to do with the fact that they are operating on two different, and incompatible, theories of truth. That was definately one of the points I hoped you'd notice. Will you take another look at it and respond? The heart of it is only two paragraphs long, and one of them is Rorty....
Matt:
Why not, for old times sake.
"For pragmatists, "truth" is just the name of a property which all true statements share. ...Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said for this common feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that there is much to be said about the common feature shared by praiseworthy actions... They see certain acts as good ones to perform, under the circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general and useful to say about what makes them all good." [Rorty, Intro to CP]
DMB said:
Truth is a common feature of true statements. There is little to be said about this common feature, nothing general or useful. True statements and morally praisworthy acts are just a common features of things about which we have some intersubjective agreement about truth and morality. Truth and morality are not things in themselves, but are attributes of particular statements and acts.
Matt:
This is all well and good. An accurate reflection of what a pragmatist would say. What follows in the rest of the paragraph, however, is not what a pragmatist would say, nor are the consequences of his position (as far as I can tell).
DMB said:
Truth and morality, in and of themselves, don't really exist. They are subjective qualities. Ha! Isn't this the very mess Pirsig starts with? I realize that post-modern linguistic espistemology isn't the same thing as teaching freshman composition, but the point remains, no? In MOQ terms, truth and morality are not just subjective attributes of objective realities, they are just as real as rocks and trees.
Matt:
Pragmatists don't say that "truth" and "morality" do not exist. We don't say they are subjective qualities. You only fall into this mess if you accept the SOM supposition that things are either objective or subjective. Pragmatists steer clear of this debacle. We think the entire notion of "truth" and "morality" as objects that can be inquired into, in and of themselves, is itself an remenant of SOM thinking. We see it as a swing from the subjective to the objective. I tried suggesting a long time ago that Pirsig can sometimes be seen as trying to collapse everything into the objective realm, and I think this comes out most when he tries to suggest that everything is scientific and that this gives it better precision. Pragmatists readily accept that morality and truth are as real as rocks and trees. We just don't give any of them any ontological status because pragmatists don't do ontology.
Is Pirsig trying to do ontology? I think yes, and I think it unfortunate. I think doing ontology leads you down dead-end roads. But does this, then, mean that Pirsig and Rorty have nothing or little in common? No, I think that is a bit brash. I don't think the image of Pirsig doing ontology is necessary to agree with over 4/5's of what he says. I find it easy to eject and still accept much of his philosophy.
Matt
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