From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Tue Oct 28 2003 - 18:15:28 GMT
Hi Matt
I see your position as perfectly plausible and
self-consistent. If you want to reject ontology-metaphysics
you can produce a 4/5ths pragmatists Pirsig and treat him as an
ally. Pirsig even hints at the problems with doing metaphysics-ontology,
and he has a point. But I agree with Pirsig that the difference between MOQ
and SOM in outlook is so great that we have to discuss metaphysical
differences.
Where Pirsig talks about doing science with respect to aspects of reality
that
science does not nornmally discuss, he is certainly not swinging in an
objectivist
direction, he is altering what we usually consider the confines of science
to be.
Your interpretation implies a SOM outlook because it is assuming that
science
has some special type of entity to study, i.e. objects. Pirsig wants a
science that studies
patterns of quality, and this could be done about atoms or metals or
behaviour or
social structures, and this would then connect human and natural science as
having
a common methodology. I suggest there are aspects of Pirsig you have yet to
flesh
out the full implications of.
regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2003 1:54 AM
Subject: Re: MD What makes an idea dangerous?
> DMB said:
> I think Matt was about right.
>
> Matt:
> I think DMB meant either that I was wrong, or that somebody else was
right, because what follows isn't what I said. Quite the opposite.
>
> DMB said:
> The neo-prag wouldn't judge the cultures and would insist that nobody can
rightly do so. [Right, that wasn't what I said. --Matt] Pirsig's MOQ says
there is a way to make the call and that we should do so. Big difference.
And surely it has to do with the fact that they are operating on two
different, and incompatible, theories of truth. That was definately one of
the points I hoped you'd notice. Will you take another look at it and
respond? The heart of it is only two paragraphs long, and one of them is
Rorty....
>
> Matt:
> Why not, for old times sake.
>
> "For pragmatists, "truth" is just the name of a property which all true
statements share. ...Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said for
this common feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that
there is much to be said about the common feature shared by praiseworthy
actions... They see certain acts as good ones to perform, under the
circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general and useful to say
about what makes them all good." [Rorty, Intro to CP]
>
> DMB said:
> Truth is a common feature of true statements. There is little to be said
about this common feature, nothing general or useful. True statements and
morally praisworthy acts are just a common features of things about which we
have some intersubjective agreement about truth and morality. Truth and
morality are not things in themselves, but are attributes of particular
statements and acts.
>
> Matt:
> This is all well and good. An accurate reflection of what a pragmatist
would say. What follows in the rest of the paragraph, however, is not what
a pragmatist would say, nor are the consequences of his position (as far as
I can tell).
>
> DMB said:
> Truth and morality, in and of themselves, don't really exist. They are
subjective qualities. Ha! Isn't this the very mess Pirsig starts with? I
realize that post-modern linguistic espistemology isn't the same thing as
teaching freshman composition, but the point remains, no? In MOQ terms,
truth and morality are not just subjective attributes of objective
realities, they are just as real as rocks and trees.
>
> Matt:
> Pragmatists don't say that "truth" and "morality" do not exist. We don't
say they are subjective qualities. You only fall into this mess if you
accept the SOM supposition that things are either objective or subjective.
Pragmatists steer clear of this debacle. We think the entire notion of
"truth" and "morality" as objects that can be inquired into, in and of
themselves, is itself an remenant of SOM thinking. We see it as a swing
from the subjective to the objective. I tried suggesting a long time ago
that Pirsig can sometimes be seen as trying to collapse everything into the
objective realm, and I think this comes out most when he tries to suggest
that everything is scientific and that this gives it better precision.
Pragmatists readily accept that morality and truth are as real as rocks and
trees. We just don't give any of them any ontological status because
pragmatists don't do ontology.
>
> Is Pirsig trying to do ontology? I think yes, and I think it unfortunate.
I think doing ontology leads you down dead-end roads. But does this, then,
mean that Pirsig and Rorty have nothing or little in common? No, I think
that is a bit brash. I don't think the image of Pirsig doing ontology is
necessary to agree with over 4/5's of what he says. I find it easy to eject
and still accept much of his philosophy.
>
> Matt
>
>
>
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