From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Tue Oct 28 2003 - 18:48:46 GMT
Matt:Kuhnian philosophers can't make heads or tails of what science's
special method is.
Matt: If all "scientific method" pans out to be for Pirsig is, say, his
three tests of truth, then I don't see anything specific to it to call it
"scientific".
Looks like a contradiction above to me, does science have a definable method
or not, looks like Pirsig wants
to change what we mean by science, don't think Kuhn would have any problem
with this, yet sometimes
you do seem to, please explain.... I think you are confused, I think Pirsig
offends your common-sense
physicalism, but if you are not committed to SOM you have no grounds for
your physicalism, what is so
special about rocks and lumps that science only has something useful to say
about these aspects of our
experience, interesting science started with aspects of experience that have
been theorised into being things.
I find science being philosophically naive very unacceptable, mainly because
of its pretentions as a form
of knowledge. The dilemma is very important, it demonstrates the limitations
of an SOM form of science.
Regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2003 1:31 AM
Subject: Re: MD What makes an idea dangerous?
> Anthony,
>
> Anthony said:
> Moreover, I think the argument of Pirsig's in the specific section of LILA
(in Chapter 24) that Matt is referring to here, is more subtle than he is
suggesting. Pirsig is not just stating that the moral question of
scientists being honest with each other is a scientific question. Rather,
Pirsig is revealing the dilemma of scientists concerning the scientific
status (or otherwise) of morals because if morals are outside the remit of
science then this is an acknowledgement that there is part of the world that
science can not comprehend though essential if such issues as the faking of
scientific data are of any concern. In other words, scientists can't have
it both ways.
>
> Matt:
> I accept that Pirsig is trying to pin philosophically naive scientists in
a needless dilemma, one that can be escaped. Its the same thing that Pirsig
wriggled free of in ZMM. However, that's not my problem. My problem is the
way in which Pirsig treats the (dis)solution. Instead of saying that
science should stick to lumps and rocks, and other areas of inquiry, like
morals, should be left to their own devices, Pirsig tries to co-opt the
language of science, tries to get everything to fit under the moniker of
"scientific inquiry". I think this leads to some unneeded problems and
interpretations. The one interpretation I've tried to suggest that lends
itself is what I've called the Kantian reading of Pirsig, for which I've
found various people taking part in at various times. You reach a Kantian
reading by following this line of thought: if everything is "scientific
inquiry," that means that everything should be able to fit under the
"scientific method". If there is a "
> scientific method" that can arbitrate all problems, then there is one
method that can be used to discover the truth. Therefore, we should use
this one method in tracking truth.
>
> If all "scientific method" pans out to be for Pirsig is, say, his three
tests of truth, then I don't see anything specific to it to call it
"scientific". It appears to be the same general thing that every person
does in everyday normal life. I don't see how it adds any precision, as
Pirsig seems to think.
>
> Matt said previously:
> Pragmatists don't think Galileo and Newton were doing anything all that
different from what Plato, Aristotle, and Ptolemy did. The only difference
was that Galileo and Newton came up with and used a better and more useful
vocabulary than their predecessors did.
>
> Anthony said:
> I don't think this assertion is completely accurate. The essential
difference between Ancient Greek science and the science of the Renaissance
is in the methodology used.
>
> Matt:
> Accuracy is out of point in this case. Kuhnian philosophers of science
like Feyerabend and Mary Hesse aren't out to be accurate, they are out to
redescribe what is thought to be accurate. Accuracy assumes an established
reference point with which we can refer and check, like Galileo's birthday.
>
> Kuhn and his followers are in the business of suggesting a different way
of looking at things. To say that there was a switch in methodology between
Ancient Greek science and Renaissance science begs the crucial question
because Kuhnian philosophers can't make heads or tails of what science's
special method is. What you did is offer a re-redescription. Its as out of
point as is a philosopher pointing out to Pirsig that "inorganic static
patterns of value" is an inaccurate description of rocks.
>
> Matt
>
>
>
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