From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Fri Oct 31 2003 - 18:34:17 GMT
[Paul:]
The reification of Dynamic Quality is something I think Pirsig tries to
avoid throughout Lila e.g. when he discusses latching and degeneracy in
several contexts. However, I think you are right to draw out some of the
conclusions from a metaphysical system which gives moral superiority to
mystic understanding. I think the MOQ would say that it is in the
contexts and circumstances of life that we avoid such outright
reification and subsequent rejection of static patterns. After all,
those static patterns include our families, partners, children and
friends.
Agree strongly with this, we value DQ/freedom highly, but we also
value static patterns too, no SPs no world, and if you want to know why
DQ sacrifices its freedom so that we can have static patterns, then making
the world
is surely the answer. No point being free and having noone or nothing to
play with.
I think the freedom exhibited in quantum theory shows how DQ sacrifices its
freedom
to create the world, so that it evetually reaches macro-reality that is very
constrained
in terms of freedom, and this is the things world of Newton's mechanics, DQ
then reasserts
itself at this life in the form of life.
regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "Paul Turner" <paulj.turner@ntlworld.com>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 12:31 PM
Subject: RE: MD Self-consciousness
> Hi Scott
>
> > Paul:
> > Yes, sense perception refers to the creation of biological patterns
> and
> > limits what is meant by "static patterns emerging from Dynamic
> Quality."
> > I think I see what you are getting at. Whilst the MOQ is an empirical
> > philosophy, its empirical reality is value, not just biological sense
> > data. This quote from ZMM..
>
> [Scott:]
> I think you're correct on this, though Pirsig first defines empiricism
> as
> "[empiricism] claims that all legitimate human knowledge arises from the
> senses or by thinking about what the senses provide." [Ch. 8], though he
> goes on to include art and morality and "even religious mysticism" as
> "verifiable". Nevertheless, this attitude seems to me to [be] more than
> a little
> nominalist, since it looks to that which comes from the outside as
> privileged over that which comes from the inside.
>
> [Paul:]
> From a Dynamic point of view, the MOQ can be called nominalist. There is
> nothing fixed and eternal that intellectual patterns stand for. From a
> static point of view, intellectual patterns help produce and stand for
> structured reality, therefore the MOQ cannot be called nominalist.
>
> [Paul prev:]
> > "In the language of everyday life, reality and intellect are
> different.
> > >From the language of the Buddha's world, they are the same, since
> there
> > is no intellectual division that governs the Buddha's world." [Lila's
> > Child p.567]
> >
> > It seems to me that thinking in "the world of everyday affairs" is
> > entirely different from thinking "in Buddha's world," and as such, I
> > prefer to restrict intellect to the former - conscious, deliberate
> > activity such as planning, predicting, calculating, reasoning etc.
> This
> > is perhaps where our disagreement about intellect lies.
>
> [Scott:]
> Yes. My objection to your preference is that we are doing metaphysics
> here,
> which requires us to leave behind the "world of everyday affairs". To
> carry
> that notion of thinking into one's metaphysics is the problem.
>
> [Paul:]
> I'm not sure I agree that metaphysics requires us to leave behind
> everyday affairs; I think the MOQ tries to ground metaphysics back in
> [static and Dynamic] everyday experience whilst providing a rational
> framework in which to incorporate more exceptional [Dynamic] experience,
> such as mystic understanding. As such, I think it is important to
> distinguish between the types of intellect/mind we are discussing and I
> think the MOQ is right to use the static/Dynamic distinction as its
> primary division to point towards non-verbal, immediately apprehended
> awareness and not have it become pinned down with limiting definitions.
> I also think it is right to limit a static definition of intellect and
> mind - one of my biggest problems with the many different schools of
> Buddhism is the varying and confusing use of "mind" [or at least in
> western translations of Buddhism].
>
> Of course, I think there is an overlap in one's overall experience,
> there is no road sign saying "You are now leaving static reality, come
> back soon," but I think Pirsig acknowledges this inherent problem of
> combining mystical and metaphysical terms...
>
> "Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense that
> there is a knower and a known, but a metaphysics can be none of these
> things. A metaphysics must be divisible, definable, and knowable, or
> there isn't any metaphysics. Since a metaphysics is essentially a kind
> of dialectical definition and since Quality is essentially outside
> definition, this means that a "Metaphysics of Quality" is essentially a
> contradiction in terms, a logical absurdity." Lila p.73
>
> ...and goes on and does it anyway.
>
> [Scott to Matt prev:]
> Hence my adoption of the logic of contradictory identity, and why I
> think
> that the MOQ is ultimately a failure. Again, I want to refer to Robert
> Magliola's distinction between 'centric' and 'differential' mystical
> "explanations". Centric explanations are like those you refer to above,
> and
> Pirsig's Quality, DQ, and SQ terminology is a perfect example. As such
> it
> leads the MOQ into error, by stating that mystical experience is "pure
> DQ",
> which leads to the gnostic consequence that SQ is evil, since it gets in
> the
> way of experiencing pure DQ..
>
> Now I don't really think that that (SQ is evil) is what Pirsig thinks,
> but
> why not? Differential mystical philosophy avoids this from the get-go by
> *starting* with contradictory identity. It doesn't allow the reification
> of
> anything (and hence avoids what Rorty doesn't like about metaphysics) in
> one's terminology.
>
> [Paul:]
> The reification of Dynamic Quality is something I think Pirsig tries to
> avoid throughout Lila e.g. when he discusses latching and degeneracy in
> several contexts. However, I think you are right to draw out some of the
> conclusions from a metaphysical system which gives moral superiority to
> mystic understanding. I think the MOQ would say that it is in the
> contexts and circumstances of life that we avoid such outright
> reification and subsequent rejection of static patterns. After all,
> those static patterns include our families, partners, children and
> friends.
>
> Cheers
>
> Paul
>
>
>
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