From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sat Nov 01 2003 - 21:27:11 GMT
Matt, Andy and all truth seekers:
Richard Rorty:
"For pragmatists, "truth" is just the name of a property which all true
statements share. ...Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said for
this common feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that
there is much to be said about the common feature shared by praiseworthy
actions... They see certain acts as good ones to perform, under the
circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general and useful to say
about what makes them all good."
DMB interpreted the quote:
Truth is a common feature of true statements. There is little to be said
about this common feature, nothing general or useful. True statements and
morally praisworthy acts are just a common features of things about which we
have some intersubjective agreement about truth and morality. Truth and
morality are not things in themselves, but are attributes of particular
statements and acts.
Matt approved up to a point:
This is all well and good. An accurate reflection of what a pragmatist
would say. What follows in the rest of the paragraph, however, is not what
a pragmatist would say, nor are the consequences of his position.
DMB said:
Truth and morality, in and of themselves, don't really exist. They are
subjective qualities.
Matt replied:
Pragmatists don't say that "truth" and "morality" do not exist. We don't
say they are subjective qualities. You only fall into this mess if you
accept the SOM supposition that things are either objective or subjective.
Pragmatists steer clear of this debacle. We think the entire notion of
"truth" and "morality" as objects that can be inquired into, in and of
themselves, is itself an remenant of SOM thinking. We see it as a swing
from the subjective to the objective. ...Pragmatists readily accept that
morality and truth are as real as rocks and trees. We just don't give any
of them any ontological status because pragmatists don't do ontology.
dmb says:
As far as characterizing Rorty's position, you agree when I say "truth and
morality are not things in themselves, but are attributes of particular
statements and facts". But you disagree when I say "truth and morality, in
and of themselves, don't really exist. They are subjective qualities". As
the author of those two sentences, let me assure that both of them were
intended to express the same idea.
Praggys might not actually say that truth and morality are only subjective
qualities, but does it really express a different idea to say they are only
attributes based on intersubjective agreement? Hardly at all. SOM stances
vary widely from materialism to idealism and everything in between. It seems
pretty clear to me that Rorty's stance is just one variation on this theme.
Maybe he doesn't call to call it ontology, but to assert that there is
nothing to be said about truth, to assert there is nothing general or useful
or philosophically interesting, and then assert that truth is a propery, a
quality, an attribute of some other thing... Well, one might as well deny
its existence. As you might like to put it, that's how it cashes out. It
treats truth and morality as merely subjective, which is the problem that
got Pirsig started in the first place. How can you honestly claim that Rorty
paints a picture of truth as something as real as rocks and trees? How can
you say that without doing ontology? How can keep a traight face? ;-)
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