Re: MD Self-consciousness

From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sat Nov 01 2003 - 21:27:07 GMT

  • Next message: David MOREY: "Re: MD Self-consciousness"

    Scott

    I think you are very wrong here. Pirsig is clearly
    saying to treat something as ONLY/exclusively an abstraction is
    inadequate. Pirsig wants to talk about reality-quality and as soon
    as this happens you have to start using abstract concepts, he knows
    this well, he talks about how SOM cuts things up one way, how this dominates
    out thinking, and he suggests the MOQ as a different way to analyse our
    experience.
    If something is just abstract and has no effect on
    reality-experience-existence why
    would it interest us? DQ has to be linked to
    creativity/mysticism/imagination if we
    are going to move from an SQ/DQ distinction to talk about how the two
    interact
    to produce this existence-world. Whilst I think what you have to say can add
    to
    our understanding of the MOQ I do not see that it either goes beyond it or
    contradicts
    it, rather it fleshes it out. What do you think abstraction has to offer us
    that contradicts the
    MOQ, I can't see it, maybe if we can get to grips with this I can change
    your mind or
    you can change mine.

    regards
    David M

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 5:50 PM
    Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness

    > Andy
    >
    > > Hi Paul and Scott,
    > >
    > > Paul said to Scott: "The reification of Dynamic Quality is something I
    > think Pirsig tries to avoid throughout Lila e.g. when he discusses
    latching
    > and degeneracy in several contexts."
    > >
    > > While reading Antmcwatts thesis, Pirsig says in an email to Mcwatt
    (2001)
    > anwering former moq_discuss member John Beasley's criticisms of the MOQ
    > which are similar to Scott's (as far as I can tell). Beasley said:
    > >
    > > "[Pirsig]loses the value of his core term, 'quality', by equating it
    with
    > too many other terms, and ultimately reifying it; while at the same time
    > asserting that quality cannot be defined, and ignoring the paradox."
    > >
    > > To which Pirsig replies (to Mcwatt):
    > >
    > > "To reify means to regard an abstraction as if it had a concrete or
    > material existence. You don't lose the value of quality by treating it as
    > if it had a concrete or material existence. You lose the value of quality
    > by treating it as if it had only an abstract existence. That is a
    > fundamental point of the MOQ. Beasley's unease is caused by an inability
    to
    > understand this basic assertion of the MOQ. He assumes it is in error
    > because it contradicts his prejudices but never explains why his
    prejudices
    > are superior."
    > >
    > > >From the above quote it does NOT seem like the reification of quality
    is
    > something Pirsig is trying to avoid. I am not sure how exactly this
    relates
    > to your discussion, but I would be interested in your comments on the
    above
    > quote. One comment I would make is that Pirsig might have been better
    > served by using Rorty or Matts terminology for the last sentence.
    "Begging
    > the question" seems to be a better phrase than calling another's
    assumptions
    > "his prejudices." But, of course, the discussion is always open on whose
    > assumptions are superior.
    >
    > My objection to Pirsig's response is his treating "an abstraction" as
    > somehow inferior to "concrete". This is the nominalism of Pirsig that I
    > object to. Basically, Pirsig is adopting the basic nominalist orientation
    > that the more "sense perceptible" something is, the more real it is, in
    the
    > style of Dr. Johnson refuting Berkeley by kicking a stone. Now he (Pirsig}
    > would expand that orientation to argue that "art and morality and even
    > religious mysticism" belong in the concrete, and hence "more real" (and so
    > distinguishes the MOQ from materialism), but would deny that to
    > "abstraction".
    >
    > You should note that what I am saying is orthogonal to both Pirsig and
    John
    > Beasley. In fact, I used to debate John on this matter as well.
    >
    > - Scott
    >
    >
    >
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