RE: MD What makes an idea dangerous?

From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sun Nov 02 2003 - 20:03:25 GMT

  • Next message: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT: "Re: MD Two theories of truth"

    David M and all:

    DMB had said:
    ...to assert that there is nothing to be said about truth, to assert there
    is nothing general or useful or philosophically interesting, and then assert
    that truth is a propery, a quality, an attribute of some other thing...

    David M added:
    (YES QUALITY IS ALL THERE IS=REALITY=EXISTS)

    dmb says:
    You're inserting a Pirsigian definition into a paraphrase of Rorty's theory
    of truth. Its pretty clear from his description that he was not using the
    word "attribute" to refer to "all there is" or anything like that. In this
    case, I only used quality in the same way that Rorty uses words like
    "attribute" and "property". As Rorty uses it, we're talking about features
    and aspects of particulars, not all of reality.

    David M said:
    But DMB this is the whole deal, pragmatism is as post-SOM
    as MOQ is. Reality=exists=quality. truth is a quality therefore it exists
    things have a quality therefore they exist, everything exists, you have
    the SOM hang ups about what is real/not real, not us pragmatists.
    Idealism/materialism is SOM with one of the poles more or less
    suppressed. MOQ and pragmatism are two ways of trying to give
    up dualism, this is all very much like the trots fighting the Leninists,
    same side and fighting the wrong enemy.

    dmb says:
    Everything exists? Isn't that a bit vague? I'm trying to make a distinction
    between the kind of status given to truth in the two theories. Of course
    attritbutes exist, but in what sense? As I understand it, Rorty's attack on
    SOM consists in denying that objective knowledge of things like truth is
    impossible and hands the whole thing over to intersubjective agreement,
    where even the progress of science is a matter of linguistic practices.
    Pirsig does not reject one end of the pole for the other, as Rorty seems to
    be doing. He includes both subjects and objects in a larger framework. In
    the same way, he doesn't reject empiricism, he expands it. One of Pirsig's
    main problems with SOM is that it treats words like "good", true and
    beautiful" as adjectives, as descriptive, which seems to be what Rorty is
    doing when he says truth is an attribute. These are very different
    solutions.

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