From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sun Nov 02 2003 - 22:53:42 GMT
DMB:where even the progress of science is a matter of linguistic practices.
well, most well read scientists now think this so you're out of date I'm
afraid.
Everything exists-vague! What sort of stuff do you want to talk about that
doesn't exist then!
Does anything exist that is not an attribute? Only in some in-itself not up
for experience
fantasy land.
good night
DM
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Buchanan" <DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2003 8:03 PM
Subject: RE: MD What makes an idea dangerous?
> David M and all:
>
> DMB had said:
> ...to assert that there is nothing to be said about truth, to assert there
> is nothing general or useful or philosophically interesting, and then
assert
> that truth is a propery, a quality, an attribute of some other thing...
>
> David M added:
> (YES QUALITY IS ALL THERE IS=REALITY=EXISTS)
>
> dmb says:
> You're inserting a Pirsigian definition into a paraphrase of Rorty's
theory
> of truth. Its pretty clear from his description that he was not using the
> word "attribute" to refer to "all there is" or anything like that. In this
> case, I only used quality in the same way that Rorty uses words like
> "attribute" and "property". As Rorty uses it, we're talking about features
> and aspects of particulars, not all of reality.
>
> David M said:
> But DMB this is the whole deal, pragmatism is as post-SOM
> as MOQ is. Reality=exists=quality. truth is a quality therefore it exists
> things have a quality therefore they exist, everything exists, you have
> the SOM hang ups about what is real/not real, not us pragmatists.
> Idealism/materialism is SOM with one of the poles more or less
> suppressed. MOQ and pragmatism are two ways of trying to give
> up dualism, this is all very much like the trots fighting the Leninists,
> same side and fighting the wrong enemy.
>
> dmb says:
> Everything exists? Isn't that a bit vague? I'm trying to make a
distinction
> between the kind of status given to truth in the two theories. Of course
> attritbutes exist, but in what sense? As I understand it, Rorty's attack
on
> SOM consists in denying that objective knowledge of things like truth is
> impossible and hands the whole thing over to intersubjective agreement,
> where even the progress of science is a matter of linguistic practices.
> Pirsig does not reject one end of the pole for the other, as Rorty seems
to
> be doing. He includes both subjects and objects in a larger framework. In
> the same way, he doesn't reject empiricism, he expands it. One of Pirsig's
> main problems with SOM is that it treats words like "good", true and
> beautiful" as adjectives, as descriptive, which seems to be what Rorty is
> doing when he says truth is an attribute. These are very different
> solutions.
>
>
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