From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Mon Nov 03 2003 - 00:58:55 GMT
Andy and all:
Andy Responds to DMB:
Sorry, but Pirsig is talking about quality here and not truth. Two
different discussions. I am probably a little dense for not recognizing
that quality has a concrete and material existence, but Pirsig never says
this about truth. In the Mcwatt thesis, he makes the point that Pirsig
subscribes to a pragmatic theory of truth. This is what I meant when I said
that you wish to make truth a primary reality with quality. I think this is
a mistake.
dmb says:
Yes, we can look to Lila for a discussion of Pirsig's pragmatic theory of
truth. That would be good. But my beef is with Rorty, which is a much more
specific version of neo-pragmatism. Pirsig even distinguishes himself from
William James because there was no way to prevent the NAZIs from using it.
But more to the point, it only seems like two different discussions. Its
true that Pirsig is talking about quality when he talks about treating it AS
IF it had a concrete existence, but his theory asserts that truth is quality
of a particular kind; intellectual static quality. And that should be
treated as real too, just as all static patterns are. This is how the mere
subjectivity of SOM is turned into something more real in the MOQ. There is
nothing very grandiose about Pirsig's theory of truth and it is provisional
too, but ideas and explanations attain an ontological status not granted
under SOM, or under Rorty. Further, since the primary reality (DQ) is
pre-intellectual, it does not figure into this theory of truth. In the MOQ
truth is a particular species of static quality.
Andy said:
...since truth is a property of language one, such as Pirsig, can hold a
pragmatic theory of truth and still develop a MOQ.
dmb says:
I'm pretty sure Pirsig would not agree that truth is a property of true
statements, as Rorty asserts. Rorty's truth is an adjective, Pirsig's is a
noun. A more general sense of the word "pragmatic" applies well enough to
Pirsig's theory, which is subject to revision, allows for many sets of truth
and measures the value of intellectual discriptions in terms of usefulness
and explanatory power, but again, my beef is more specific than that. Its
aimed at the idea that truth is an attribute of something else, without an
independent existence of its own. I can't see how one can escape the
conclusion that Rorty is saying that truth is merely subjective. He uses
different terms, much fancier terms than that, but the idea is the same. Can
you tell me the difference between intersubjectively agreed upon attributes
and subjective qualities?
DMB had said:
Rorty's truth is such a flimsy and arbitrary kind of truth, but Pirsig
insists there is something that holds it all together, just as there is
something that holds the glass together and lets you drink. There is a
rightness that holds
"sanity" together, and its the same force that holds everything together. He
even asserts that this is the oldest idea known to man. (Mythology expressed
it before there were such things as ideas.)
Andy replied:
Right, I think. Rorty says that intersubjective agreement holds truth
together. Pirsig points toward quality holding truth together.
dmb says:
I want to interject a point here because might actually agree. Or maybe not.
As I see it, the quality that holds static patterns together is very
different than intersubjective agreement. For Pirsig this rightness is a
cosmic order, and it works as well for drinking glasses as it does for
truth. Pirsig's theory of truth fixes those intellectual patterns into a
larger structure. For Rorty, there is little else but intersubjective
agreements, analogies all the way down, as the neo-prag might say. This is
why I pointed to "Rht", the "oldest idea known to man" and Anthony's opening
quote.
Andy continued:
...But the "matter of fact evolutionary relationship" between qualtiy and
truth will be subverted if we don't allow a democratic process for
determining which "truths" in the marketplace of ideas are "better" to live
by at each moment in time. This democratic process is what Rorty means when
he talks of intersubective agreement. And this is why truth is secondary to
quality.
dmb says:
Democracy, freedom in the marketplace of ideas, hope in progress. None of
this is in dispute. Lots of people having nothing to do with metaphysics or
philosophy would go along with us on that. But I wanted to take issue with
the "matter-of-fact evolutionary relationship". Sure, intellectual truth
evolves and changes dynamically, as a result of DQ and static latching and
all that. That's a movement toward an undefined betterness and we are right
to give it the space and freedom for that growth. But I was NOT talking
about the relationship between DQ and intellectual truth. I was talking
about the relationship between social static quality and intellectual static
quality, between the 3rd and 4th levels, as was Pirsig. Naturally, the point
here is to show that Rorty and Pirsig are different. Let me elaborate...
The evolutionary relationship asserts that intellect is impossbile without
language as a pre-requisite. There is no such thing as an idea without words
in the same way that there is no such thing as a wolf-less pack or an
organism without atoms. It may seem like Rorty is saying the same thing with
respect to language and truth, but he doesn't draw that line between the
third and fourth levels. This leads him to the theory that the latter is a
property of the former. Pirsig says they are completely different levels and
exist in an evolutionary relationship. Remember the particulars Rorty used
to describe his theory of truth? I nixed 'em long ago for the sake of
brevity, but you may recall that his examples included widely different true
statements like "E=mc2" and "It was good that Jack left Jill". This is just
short of an outright denial that there are distinctions to be made between
true statements, as if Dear Abby and Albert Einstien had something in
common. :-)
DMB had said:
"He paints a picture of reality such that excellence in human life is
achieved when one is somehow in harmony with this cosmic rightness. The
static patterns are variously mastered, extinquished, or otherwise put to
sleep. ...He's always been looking for the Buddha in one way or another and
so the MOQ is much, MUCH more comparable to Eastern Philosophy and mysticism
than it is to anything like neo-pragmatism."
Andy replied:
The Onus is on you to persuade us why we do need it. I am not ignoring the
spiritual aspect of Pirsig's work any more than I ignore this aspect in my
own life. However, this spiritual pursuit described by the Buddha and
Campbell is an individual pursuit. Campbell went through some pains to
explain that the western world does not necessarily need more of this
spirituality. Our individualistic culture has a much greater need for
emphasis upon cooperative ideals that are needed to hold a society together.
Rorty addresses these needs and doesn't think a metaphysics is going to help
us acheive these societal goals. In other words the MOQ is not going to
save the world from ourselves, only we can.
dmb says:
Whew! Lots to take issue with there. I don't know who ever said the MOQ was
going to save the world, but let's talk about abondoning metaphysics for
political reform some other time. Campbell too. Suffice it to say that this
approach only marks another difference between Pirsig and Rorty. Pirsig is
convinced that we need his improved metaphysics to grasp the political
conflicts of our time. It does the only thing an idea CAN do; it explains
things. And there is certainly nothing that prevents us from acting on an
MOQ understanding in public life. It works for me. But the reason I think
the MOQ is more comparable to Eastern philosophies than neo-pragmatism is
not just that it says we ought to do this or that spiritual practice or
believe in this or that doctrine, but because it describes a reality that is
fundamentally spiritual. The primary empirical reality (DQ) drives the whole
she-bang. Its the heart and soul of the MOQ. Its where we come from and
where we are headed. Its the father of all static forms. In a very real
sense, the MOQ was born during a mystical experience and describes a
mystical reality. So in the MOQ, it doesn't really make any sense to say
spirituality is a problem of hyper-individuality, that it should remain in
the private sphere, or anything like that. Its an inherent part of the total
picture of how everything hangs together.
I don't know if I can convince you of this if Pirsig hasn't already. But it
seems beside the point I was trying to make. I certainly do think Pirsig's
picture is better than Rorty's, but so far my only hope is to point out the
differences, to show where they don't agree. First things first, you know?
Thanks'
dmb
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