RE: MD When is an interpretation not an interpretation?

From: Paul Turner (paulj.turner@ntlworld.com)
Date: Mon Nov 03 2003 - 10:45:01 GMT

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    Hi Matt

    Paul said:
    Does this create a reality/Reality distinction?

    Matt replied:
    Sure, but this distinction is between two kinds of books with Plato to
    Kant to Husserl and Russell on one side and Protagoras to Hume to
    Nietzsche and James on the other.

    Paul:
    Is it fair to say that pragmatists replace metaphysical distinctions
    with philosophological distinctions? For example, reality is only
    "ideal" and "material" because there are idealists and materialists and
    there is no way of deciding which is correct. Does this therefore extend
    outside of metaphysical writing and into other types of literature? For
    example, is Tolkien's middle-earth as "real" as Plato's forms, Kant's
    noumena and James' flux?

    Paul said:
    Does this create a description/reality distinction or is "a
    description," for all intents and purposes, what pragmatists mean by
    reality? If so, does it follow that describing produces reality?

    Matt replied:
    No, there is no description/reality distinction because pragmatists
    don't think we can pull off our descriptions of reality and look at
    reality bare and naked. But neither is "a description" what we mean by
    "reality". That would be idealism. Pragmatists agree with realists
    that there is a world "out there," we just think that it affects us
    causally.

    Paul:
    I'm not convinced. If you believe that there is a world out there
    (reality) that descriptions don't represent, then the two (reality and
    descriptions) are not the same and surely you have made a
    description/reality distinction?

    If this is not the case, then all there is to "cause" a description is
    another description then another description and so on, therefore it is
    not possible for you to hold that there is a reality outside of
    description which pushes you around, and as you say, this is linguistic
    idealism.

    On the other hand, descriptions can be considered as *part of* the
    "reality that pushes us around," but this is not what the realists that
    you agree with are saying.

    The only other way out of it, as far as I can see, is to shrug off the
    distinction along with the rejection of metaphysics and treat philosophy
    as a form of fiction that is mainly concerned with writing a "good
    story" about a fictional place called "reality." It is then up to
    pragmatists to convince everyone who is interested that metaphysics (and
    physics, chemistry, biology, sociology and so on?) is also a form of
    fiction and no better at getting at reality than their "story."

    Is this a fair conclusion?

    Paul

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