From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Mon Nov 03 2003 - 20:11:16 GMT
Scott
Perhaps your problem is that perception is entirely
a form of visual language and therefore has all the qualities
of using universal/particular net/item in net schema that
is also true of linguistic language. Also there is a very big question
with regard to the development of this visual language, from
the society of dynamic quanta called the Body Nietzsche would
suggest, which is not a material form either for Nietzsche.
Kicking something is a feeling of course, it is odd, says Nietzsche,
to derive a theory of causality via the nature of our nervous system.
regards
DM
----- Original Message -----
From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2003 10:45 PM
Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness
> DMB,
>
> > Scott said:
> > My objection to Pirsig's response is his treating "an abstraction" as
> > somehow inferior to "concrete". This is the nominalism of Pirsig that I
> > object to. Basically, Pirsig is adopting the basic nominalist
orientation
> > that the more "sense perceptible" something is, the more real it is, in
> the
> > style of Dr. Johnson refuting Berkeley by kicking a stone. Now he
(Pirsig}
> > would expand that orientation to argue that "art and morality and even
> > religious mysticism" belong in the concrete, and hence "more real" (and
so
> > distinguishes the MOQ from materialism), but would deny that to
> > "abstraction".
> >
> > dmb says:
> > As I understand it, nominalism is the denial of the existence of
> universals.
> > It says things like truth and beauty do not exist excepts as an abstract
> > feature of all true and beautiful things, apart from the particular
forms
> of
> > the natural world. I think this is exactly what Pirsig is NOT saying. He
> > saying we ought not treat them as abstractions, but as real things. He's
> not
> > even coming close to saying they are material things, only that they are
> no
> > less real. And of course, he's only how we ought to TREAT them, that we
> > should act AS IF they were real.
>
> "He [is] saying we ought not treat them as abstractions, but as real
> things." I want to say that we should treat them *as* abstractions and
> *therefore* as real things. "He's not even coming close to saying they are
> material things." I want to say that the more material something is the
less
> real it is (not ultimately, but to shake you all out of your nominalist
> bias).
>
> >
> > On Wednesday, Scott said:
> > I think you're correct on this, though Pirsig first defines empiricism
as
> > "[empiricism] claims that all legitimate human knowledge arises from the
> > senses or by thinking about what the senses provide." [Ch. 8], though he
> > goes on to include art and morality and "even religious mysticism" as
> > "verifiable". Nevertheless, this attitude seems to me to more than a
> little
> > nominalist, since it looks to that which comes from the outside as
> > privileged over that which comes from the inside.
> >
> > dmb says:
> > The outside is privileged in the MOQ? Again, I think this is exactly
what
> > Pirsig is NOT saying. The traditional empiricism that Pirsig describes
> above
> > is yer standard SOM position and pretty much defines what objectivity
is.
> > This is the kind of empiricism that priviledges the outside. This is one
> of
> > the main problems with SOM, especially the dominant variety: scientific
> > materialism. Pirsig's expanded empiricism seeks to overcome this
problem.
> > Not only does he add a sense of value, there is also the insistence that
> > legitimate intellectual knowledge not only comes through, is mediated
by,
> > our biological senses, but also that it should be mediated through the
> > social level, that we shouldn't even pretend our ideas are produced by
> > biological brains and nothing more. And unlike SOM it treats the
"inside"
> as
> > real as the "outside", if you will.
>
> By assigning the intellect as a fourth level of SQ, Pirsig loses the
> distinction between inside and outside which, though ultimately (that is,
> with transcendence) may be overcome is nevertheless very much present in
us
> now. SOM folks, when faced by the impossiblity of dealing with two sets of
> reality (res cogitans and res extensa), tend to treat one as real and the
> other as illusory. Pirsig avoids this with respect to Quality, but fails
> with respect to the sense of self, which he deems illusory. That is, he
> makes out that it is an idea, and hence a static pattern. In doing so he
> ignores the difference we feel between what we experience as coming from
> outside (sense perceptions) and what we feel comes from inside (our
> thoughts). In effect, he calls the latter feeling an illusion, and hence
> does no better than SOM materialists in this regard, in that he ignores
the
> actual feeling of being a self in a world of non-self, just as
materialists
> do.
>
> - Scott
>
>
>
>
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