From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Thu Nov 06 2003 - 17:06:34 GMT
Scott
Thanks for clarification. I have no real arguments
with the below.
Thanks
David Morey
----- Original Message -----
From: "Scott R" < >
To: < >
Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 4:54 AM
Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness
> David,
>
> Several posts back you objected to my use of the terms "inside" and
> "outside". Since then I have only been trying to correct the
misapprehension
> that you made then that I was using these terms as something real, as
> something fundamental to my philosophical position. All I was using them
for
> was to refer to how we think before we get philosophical. The tree exists
> independently of me. My thoughts are within me. That sort of thing. Where
we
> go from that point is, of course, what is being debated.
>
> I am not saying the "natural attitude" is primordial, but it is just where
> we start from, once we have grown up enough to speak the language well
> enough to be able to read philosophy or anything mildly intellectual. We
are
> natural dualists, not because that is how "things really are" but because
> that is the framework in which we live our lives and speak our language.
>
> But when we start thinking about it, *then* we question this dualism.
Which,
> of course is what every philosopher after Descartes has done. What most
have
> done is to deny one or the other of the SOM categories, either the subject
> or the object, but that has failed because the concept of subject cannot
> subsume the concept of object, and vice versa. That is, to claim that mind
> is "just" atoms moving in the void does not satisfy our pre-philosophical
> experience, and neither does saying "it's all in your mind".
>
> The MOQ starts to deal with this in a different way, by introducing
Quality
> as "prior" to the division into subject and object, but then fails when it
> in turn subsumes subject under object, though this is disguised by the
DQ/SQ
> terminology. The DQ/SQ distinction is a good one, until it is misapplied
to
> human thinking. Since Pirsig places thinking -- not just thoughts -- under
> SQ, he is effectively repeating the mistake made by materialists. What I
> propose instead is to say that thinking (as opposed to thoughts) and
> perception (as opposed to what is perceived) be treated as variations on
> DQ/SQ, not just as SQ. One avoids dualism by treating DQ/SQ as a polarity,
> not as two independent realms. With the MOQ and with materialism there is
no
> accounting for the sense of self. With the concept of polarity. the sense
of
> self is recognized as a pole of a polarity, that is, as absolutely
dependent
> on its opposite (the sense of non-self), and so one avoids its (the
self's)
> reification (and the reification of non-self).
>
> - Scott
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "David MOREY" < >
> To: < >
> Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2003 12:35 PM
> Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness
>
>
> > Scott
> >
> > Your Problem? I am trying to work out which
> > of your assumptions are making you think there
> > is something primordial about the distinction
> > this is me, that is not. Are you saying this distinction
> > occurs as soon as one becomes two at the birth of the cosmos?
> >
> > regards
> > DM
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Scott R" < >
> > To: < >
> > Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2003 2:12 AM
> > Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness
> >
> >
> > > David,
> > >
> > > > Perhaps your problem is that perception is entirely
> > > > a form of visual language and therefore has all the qualities
> > > > of using universal/particular net/item in net schema that
> > > > is also true of linguistic language.
> > >
> > > Since I (following Barfield and Georg Kuhlewind) have been expounding
> this
> > > idea (actually, all perception, not just visual), I don't know why you
> are
> > > calling it "my problem".
> > >
> > > > Also there is a very big question
> > > > with regard to the development of this visual language, from
> > > > the society of dynamic quanta called the Body Nietzsche would
> > > > suggest, which is not a material form either for Nietzsche.
> > > > Kicking something is a feeling of course, it is odd, says Nietzsche,
> > > > to derive a theory of causality via the nature of our nervous
system.
> > >
> > > I don't understand this, in particular, how it is relevant to what
I've
> > been
> > > talking about.
> > >
> > > - Scott
> > >
> > >
> > >
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