From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Mon Nov 10 2003 - 00:03:33 GMT
Matt and all:
DMB said:
Can you tell me the difference between intersubjectively agreed upon
attributes and subjective qualities?
Last week, Matt didn't answer with:
Various degrees of intersubjectivity is all that is left after you give up
on the poles of "objective" and "subjective," as Pirsig himself does. To
shunt "intersubjective agreement" under the old label of "subjective" is to
miss the point.
One week later, Matt didn't answer with:
DMB, as usual, was right when he said that I evaded the question. My point,
which I said DMB missed, was that those questions are bad questions. Pirsig
says in ZMM that sometimes people ask bad questions, questions that are too
small in scope. He says that a legitimate answer to those bad questions is
"mu": unask the question. He says that we should enlarge our scope, such as
asking, "Who would ask that question?" My answer was, "Only somebody who
bought into the opposing poles of subject and object." Pirsig denies these
poles, so I figure this is a keen place to say he and anyone else denying
the poles, are denying SOM.
dmb says:
Huh? I don't understand how I'm asking a bad question. If that's your point,
you've still failed to explain it. You're insisting that intersubjectivity
is not the same as collective subjectivity, but at the same time insisting
that such a question can't be answered. But you have answered, by saying
that they are different, but not how or why they are different. You can't
have it both ways. And while I'd certainly agree that there are bad
questions, you've failed to explain why mine is one of them. I think
everybody here can plainly see that Rorty uses the terms "intersubjective
agreement" and that Pirsig is critical of SOM because it relegates things
like truth to the merely subjective, making them not quite real. I'm asking
you to explain the difference.
DMB had said:
Never denied this point of divergence? But, but, but, I've made this same
point many times in recent weeks and you denied it almost every time.
Matt replied:
No you didn't. You didn't once bring up the adjective/noun difference.
dmb says:
Hmmm. I think you lack a certain kind of lucidity with words. I mean, don't
you see how I've been expressing the same idea in lots of different ways?
Turth as a property of something else IS truth as an adjective. Truth as
intellectual patterns as real as rocks and trees IS truth as a known. Its
the same idea. Only the terms are different. (English is really great that
way.) So it might be true that the adjective/noun distinction from the
start, but that was always the idea. And this is exactly the same
distinction that has prompted the question. Put another way, how is Rorty
theory of truth different from the subjectivity that Pirsig rejects in the
first place?
Matt said:
Roughly, if truth is a noun, an object of inquiry, then why would people
inquire into it unless they wanted their own idea of truth to converge with
the object, truth. Thus the desire to get our truth to correspond with the
Truth.
dmb says:
No way. The correspondence between truth and Truth is just another way to
describe SOM. It hardly different from the correspondence subjective beliefs
and objective reality. This is exactly what Pirsig is rejecting. By your
logic Pirsig ends Lila with a re-assertion of SOM, which is pretty clearly
an absurd
assertion. Further, your equation of truth as a noun with truth as an object
of inquiry seems to make the absurd assertion that high quality intellectual
descriptions ARE objective reality. Clearly, this is not what Pirsig is
saying. In fact, the idea of truth as a noun is a refutation of its lowly
status as a subjective opinion and the assertion of those descriptions as
real in and of themselves, are things that need not correspond with anything
because they are just as real as anything. I mean, it would be just as easy
to say, "if truth is a noun, the SUBJECT of our investigations", and thereby
misconstrue Pirsig's truth as subjective. It would be just as easy, and just
as absurd.
Matt said:
But its funny. You took that quote as a clear indication of Rorty's theory
of truth, whilst I read it as a series of slogans, slogans meant to make it
look silly for us to ask for a theory of truth. Hmh, that's kinda' funny.
Because, naturally Rorty would reply that to say that he has any theory of
truth at all is to miss the point of what was in the quote that was taken
from the very beginning of the introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism.
Rorty says somewhere that the point of James' theory of truth was to point
out that theories of truth are pointless. That's really all Rorty is
reiterating. This is all to say that what Rorty and I will answer when
asked what our theory of truth is is: mu.
dmb says:
Slogan. noun. 1. A war cry 2. A word or phrase used to express a
characteristic position or stand. 3. A brief attention-getting phrase used
in advertising.
Thought I'd include that definition because you seem to need it. In any
case, Yes, I can see that Rorty's theory of truth basically says there is no
such thing. However, I think its dishonest and evasive to suggest that this
means we can't talk about his assertions concerning truth.
Again, I'm asking how his assertions are different than the mere
subjectivity that Pirsig attacks in the first place. I understand that you
think Rorty is saved from this because he rejects both poles in SOM, but
this is exactly what I'm asking about. His quote seems to contradict that
assertion. So the question at the top still stands. You seem to readily
admit that truth as a noun is very different than truth as an adjective, but
then turn around and insist that a discussion of this difference is not
possible, that asking about that difference is asking a bad question. Having
it both ways is logically inconsistant, self-contradictory and way too easy
for you. Whistles are blowing wildly and there are flags down all over the
field, my friend.
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