From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Mon Nov 10 2003 - 19:51:20 GMT
DMB & Matt
Here is another quote from Rorty that may help:
"Philosophers, like everybody else, should seek to justify their beliefs.
'True' is the commendatory adjective we apply to beliefs we think better
justified than their competitors. So in an obvious sense we could not cease
to seek for truth as long as we seek to justify our beliefs to one another.
I do not want to replace the philosophical aim of finding truth with the
pragmatist aim of acquiring the intellectual habits which best assist us in
coping. The pragmatist's point is that 'finding truth' just is, and always
was, the process of acquiring such habits. What is to be replaced is a topic
of philosophical discussion, not a social practice" (Richard Rorty, Critical
Dialogues, edited by Festenstein and Thompson, Polity Press, 2001, p201)
To me truth is as conceptuially elusive as DQ, in the spirit of DQ the best
idea is to keep the conversation going.
The sort of philosophy that seeks a final grasp of what truth is is a
philosphy of closure and the death of DQ.
DMB:it would be just as easy
> to say, "if truth is a noun, the SUBJECT of our investigations", and
thereby
> misconstrue Pirsig's truth as subjective. It would be just as easy, and
just
> as absurd.
By the way the words subject and object have almost swapped meaning since
the middle ages, at least according
to my intellectual history professor. A very SOM dance indeed!
regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Buchanan" < >
To: < >
Sent: Monday, November 10, 2003 12:03 AM
Subject: RE: MD Two theories of truth
> Matt and all:
>
> DMB said:
> Can you tell me the difference between intersubjectively agreed upon
> attributes and subjective qualities?
>
> Last week, Matt didn't answer with:
> Various degrees of intersubjectivity is all that is left after you give up
> on the poles of "objective" and "subjective," as Pirsig himself does. To
> shunt "intersubjective agreement" under the old label of "subjective" is
to
> miss the point.
>
> One week later, Matt didn't answer with:
> DMB, as usual, was right when he said that I evaded the question. My
point,
> which I said DMB missed, was that those questions are bad questions.
Pirsig
> says in ZMM that sometimes people ask bad questions, questions that are
too
> small in scope. He says that a legitimate answer to those bad questions
is
> "mu": unask the question. He says that we should enlarge our scope, such
as
> asking, "Who would ask that question?" My answer was, "Only somebody who
> bought into the opposing poles of subject and object." Pirsig denies
these
> poles, so I figure this is a keen place to say he and anyone else denying
> the poles, are denying SOM.
>
> dmb says:
> Huh? I don't understand how I'm asking a bad question. If that's your
point,
> you've still failed to explain it. You're insisting that intersubjectivity
> is not the same as collective subjectivity, but at the same time insisting
> that such a question can't be answered. But you have answered, by saying
> that they are different, but not how or why they are different. You can't
> have it both ways. And while I'd certainly agree that there are bad
> questions, you've failed to explain why mine is one of them. I think
> everybody here can plainly see that Rorty uses the terms "intersubjective
> agreement" and that Pirsig is critical of SOM because it relegates things
> like truth to the merely subjective, making them not quite real. I'm
asking
> you to explain the difference.
>
> DMB had said:
> Never denied this point of divergence? But, but, but, I've made this same
> point many times in recent weeks and you denied it almost every time.
>
> Matt replied:
> No you didn't. You didn't once bring up the adjective/noun difference.
>
> dmb says:
> Hmmm. I think you lack a certain kind of lucidity with words. I mean,
don't
> you see how I've been expressing the same idea in lots of different ways?
> Turth as a property of something else IS truth as an adjective. Truth as
> intellectual patterns as real as rocks and trees IS truth as a known. Its
> the same idea. Only the terms are different. (English is really great that
> way.) So it might be true that the adjective/noun distinction from the
> start, but that was always the idea. And this is exactly the same
> distinction that has prompted the question. Put another way, how is Rorty
> theory of truth different from the subjectivity that Pirsig rejects in the
> first place?
>
> Matt said:
> Roughly, if truth is a noun, an object of inquiry, then why would people
> inquire into it unless they wanted their own idea of truth to converge
with
> the object, truth. Thus the desire to get our truth to correspond with
the
> Truth.
>
> dmb says:
> No way. The correspondence between truth and Truth is just another way to
> describe SOM. It hardly different from the correspondence subjective
beliefs
> and objective reality. This is exactly what Pirsig is rejecting. By your
> logic Pirsig ends Lila with a re-assertion of SOM, which is pretty clearly
> an absurd
> assertion. Further, your equation of truth as a noun with truth as an
object
> of inquiry seems to make the absurd assertion that high quality
intellectual
> descriptions ARE objective reality. Clearly, this is not what Pirsig is
> saying. In fact, the idea of truth as a noun is a refutation of its lowly
> status as a subjective opinion and the assertion of those descriptions as
> real in and of themselves, are things that need not correspond with
anything
> because they are just as real as anything. I mean, it would be just as
easy
> to say, "if truth is a noun, the SUBJECT of our investigations", and
thereby
> misconstrue Pirsig's truth as subjective. It would be just as easy, and
just
> as absurd.
>
> Matt said:
> But its funny. You took that quote as a clear indication of Rorty's
theory
> of truth, whilst I read it as a series of slogans, slogans meant to make
it
> look silly for us to ask for a theory of truth. Hmh, that's kinda' funny.
> Because, naturally Rorty would reply that to say that he has any theory of
> truth at all is to miss the point of what was in the quote that was taken
> from the very beginning of the introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism.
> Rorty says somewhere that the point of James' theory of truth was to point
> out that theories of truth are pointless. That's really all Rorty is
> reiterating. This is all to say that what Rorty and I will answer when
> asked what our theory of truth is is: mu.
>
> dmb says:
> Slogan. noun. 1. A war cry 2. A word or phrase used to express a
> characteristic position or stand. 3. A brief attention-getting phrase used
> in advertising.
>
> Thought I'd include that definition because you seem to need it. In any
> case, Yes, I can see that Rorty's theory of truth basically says there is
no
> such thing. However, I think its dishonest and evasive to suggest that
this
> means we can't talk about his assertions concerning truth.
>
> Again, I'm asking how his assertions are different than the mere
> subjectivity that Pirsig attacks in the first place. I understand that you
> think Rorty is saved from this because he rejects both poles in SOM, but
> this is exactly what I'm asking about. His quote seems to contradict that
> assertion. So the question at the top still stands. You seem to readily
> admit that truth as a noun is very different than truth as an adjective,
but
> then turn around and insist that a discussion of this difference is not
> possible, that asking about that difference is asking a bad question.
Having
> it both ways is logically inconsistant, self-contradictory and way too
easy
> for you. Whistles are blowing wildly and there are flags down all over the
> field, my friend.
>
>
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