From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Tue Nov 11 2003 - 19:50:09 GMT
Matt
Nice Pirsig quote, I look forward to DMB's reply.
DMB
You seem to have ignored my challenge to put forward
some true statemants and how they are justified/objective in
a non social way.
regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2003 3:32 AM
Subject: Re: MD Two theories of truth
> DMB continued:
> I think everybody here can plainly see that Rorty uses the terms
"intersubjective agreement" and that Pirsig is critical of SOM because it
relegates things like truth to the merely subjective, making them not quite
real. I'm asking you to explain the difference.
>
> Matt:
> "Subjective" only gains its philosophical significance (and its evil tag
"merely") by contrasting to "objective". Saying that somebody is being
"subjective" means you are implying that what he is asserting is only _his_
opinion. By contrast, when somebody is being "objective," they are
asserting the _world's_ opinion. And because the world is the ultimate
arbiter, the world's opinion is as good as gold.
>
> But Rorty and Pirsig reject these contrasting terms, do they not? So
what's left?
>
> Come to think of it, what do _you_ think is left after we've diced
"objective"?
>
> Rorty's answer is that, yes, we have collective subjectivity (never have I
really denied it as you seem to imply). But Rorty's not sure what more we
are supposed to hope for. After all, its only our opinions, our assertions,
our statements about truth and falsity. The world doesn't make statements
or have opinions.
>
> Collective subjectivity doesn't leave us in a pit of despair, no more than
Pirsig's redescription of causation into pre-conditional valuation changes
what rocks do. At the level of generality that philosophers play at, all we
can try and come up with are descriptions of the way we behave. Pragmatists
are just betting that our description, ridding itself of the image of Nature
having Opinions, works better and causes fewer descriptive problems. Its
not the case that Rorty is saying that nobody's opinion is real, are all
_merely_ subjective, but rather that everybody's opinion is real, its just
that some people's opinions are more justified than others.
>
> And since I read this next quote as Pirsig endorsing intersubjective
agreement, what do you think it means?
>
> The quote, from Lila's Child, note 97, p. 526:
> "It is important for an understanding of the MOQ to see that although
'common sense' dictates that inorganic nature came first, actually 'common
sense' which is A SET OF IDEAS, has to come first. This 'common sense' is
arrived at through a web of SOCIALLY APPROVED EVALUATIONS of various
alternatives. The key term here is 'evaluation', i.e. quality decisions. The
fundamental reality is not the common sense or the objects and laws approved
of by common sense but the approval itself and the quality that leads to
it."
>
> Matt
>
>
>
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