From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Tue Nov 11 2003 - 22:17:05 GMT
Dear Platt,
Let's keep in mind that we agreed that social changes are slower than
intellectual ones (and yes, also that biological changes are even slower and
inorganical changes are slowest).
My reference to your example of European immigration into the USA (as
supposed quick social change) as 'changing participation in unchanging
social patterns of value' meant no 'separation of social patterns from
"participation"' (as you state 11 Nov 2003 08:24:28 -0500). 'People
participate in patterns of value' is just a general way to describe how
people relate to patterns of value for me, not just to social patterns of
value.
Falling when lacking support, we participate in gravitation. Procreating we
participate in maintaining our species. Writing English, I participate in
that language as a social pattern of value. Maar ik kan ook in het
nederlands schrijven and that doesn't mean that English as a social pattern
of value ceases to exist. Patterns of value cease to exist when nobody
participates, but most exist regardless of any particular individual's
participation. So, European immigrants starting to participate in American
social patterns of value did not automatically imply changing social
patterns of value.
Yes, social patterns can change and a new economic paradigm can be a factor
in changing social patterns of value for the better. Inventing a new
economic paradigm (as in my 'economics of want and greed') is primarily
aimed at changing intellectual patterns of value of course. Once a new
intellectual pattern of value has gained enough stability, it can (motivate
people to) change (the small part of their) behavior (that is voluntary). If
enough people do so, the changed behavior can become a pattern that is
copied also by people who don't participate in the original (changed)
intellectual pattern of value that motivated changing behavior. That's a
long and slow process...
I agree that 'hominids' includes 'humans'. So I should have written: 'I
would write [that language is] A linking pin [between the social and the
intellectual level] and I would specify that SYMBOLIC language may have
separated humans from other HOMINIDS. (It's social patterns of value like
stronger group solidarity and the incest taboo that separated hominids from
other animals between 1 and 2 million years ago.)'
Do you agree with that?
I don't know enough about homo neanderthalensis to say whether 'humans'
includes or excludes it.
Regarding Rorty you write:
'I haven't come across anything that suggests Rorty would advocate
resistance to "intersubjective agreement" or what I call "groupthink." ...
But, I ask you: Is not Rorty's "Truth is a matter of intersubjective
agreement" a
fundamental premise of his philosophy? Further, I hope you will address my
question about "Who are these inter-subjects?"'
My point was not that Rorty would advocate such resistance (I only guess
that he would advocate resistance against some "group-think", e.g. -being
considered leftist by you- rightist "group-think"). My point was that he
doesn't defend "group-think" and that his theory can be used to support
resistance against it.
There's no point in principled resistance against all "group-think". Every
intellectual pattern of value in which several people participate (e.g. the
MoQ) constitutes a form of "group-think". No relevant intellectual pattern
of value (with relevance to others than its initiator) can do without.
I haven't read Rorty, but from what I read about him via others (on this
list) it may well be a fundamental premise of his philosophy that there's no
other way to justify a statement that something is 'true' than to quote
others stating the same.
Individual direct Quality experience being the fundamental absolute standard
of truth for you, me and everyone, we are still left with the task of
convincing each other of 'my truth' when 'our truths' appear to differ. So
apart from a standard of truth, we also need a way (or more ways) to justify
truth. What other ways do you see apart from "intersubjective agreement"?
A problem is also, that the range of our individual direct Quality
experience is too limited to test every statement that is presented to us as
true. If you say that the American way of life is better than the Chinese
way of life, I have no direct Quality experience to test it against (never
having been in either country). In a lot of cases we have to rely on
accounts of other people's direct Quality experiences, i.e. on
"group-think", for we cannot take all experience of all other people with a
certain situation into account. We have to select a group whose 'typical'
accounts we hold for true.
My answer to your question "Who are these inter-subjects?" is: whoever YOU
choose. It is by showing this possibility of choice, that Rorty's theory of
truth facilitates resistance against "group-think" that doesn't fit your
individual direct Quality experience.
You can of course choose not to rely on any account from anybody else and
only take your own direct Quality experience for granted, but then the
limitations of your direct Quality experience exclude you from discussion of
at least 99,99% of all 'truths' stated by others.
Apart from his clumsy and incomplete way of formulating it, I do agree with
Pirsig's statement that:
'the twentieth-century intellectual faith in man's basic goodness as
spontaneous and natural is disastrously naive. The ideal of a harmonious
society in which everyone without coercion cooperates happily with everyone
else for the mutual good of all is a devastating fiction'.
It is clumsy because any 'faith in an idea' is intellectual, any 'ideal' is
a fiction and on the social level purposes (like 'for the mutual good of
all') have no meaning (they are intellectual rationalizations). It is
incomplete, because the idea that man is basically good did arise earlier
than the 20th century. But yes, at the biological and social levels people
do compete far too much to describe their dealings with each other as
harmonious. (They do not only compete, however. Pirsig overstated his point
when he wrote: 'Studies of bones left by the cavemen indicate that
cannibalism, not cooperation, was a pre-society norm.' These same cavemen
also left bones of mammoths that must have been killed in close
cooperation... His next statement, 'Primitive tribes such as the American
Indians have no record of sweetness and cooperation with other tribes', is
simply beside the point, which is to what extent they cooperated WITHIN
their tribe.) The ideal of a harmonious society is an intellectual pattern
of value and as such it can only command a small (motivated) part of human
behavior. That 'a harmonious society' is not a description that fits the
whole of our social experience is obvious.
My definition of politics as 'working together on the future of a society as
a whole' does not imply 'working harmoniously together'. Democrats and
Republicans in the USA DO work together on the future of American society as
long as Democrats accept (however reluctantly) Republican rule until the
next elections (and vice versa). They share power (this many years for one,
that many years for the other, depending on voters favors) and believe that
(in the end) this way of balancing influence on the future of their society
best represents the will of the people and thus 'the mutual good of all'.
They are obviously NOT working together harmoniously, but competing for 'the
mutual good of all'. After a change of power a lot of investments in the
future by one party are undone by the other party, however, making these
investments into a waste of energy. So 'the mutual good of all' is not
really optimally served in this way.
Thus my ideal of politics is cooperating as harmoniously as possible on the
future of a society as a whole (given the limitations imposed by biological
and social patterns of value). Dutch models of politics (i.e. the
intellectual patterns of value guiding a small part of our behavior) fit
this ideal better than American ones (e.g. by necessitating coalition
governments).
You wrote:
'Our Founding Fathers agreed with Pirsig's assessment of man's fundamental
nature and so set up a government based on checks and balances that
controlled man's natural "fights for power."'
I do agree that PART of human 'nature' (including social patterns of value)
is 'fighting for power' and that political models (i.e. intellectual
patterns of value guiding political behavior) should include a system of
checks and balances. That's exactly why I oppose American foreign policy:
because it opposes such a system of checks and balances on a global scale
(e.g. through the UN, the international court of justice, international
agreements like the Kyoto one etc.).
'An American policy to spread democracy and freedom throughout the world' is
a great idea. If the actual American foreign policy amounts to wielding
unchecked and unbalanced power, the actual effect will differ considerably
from the professed objective (more democracy and freedom everywhere),
however. One of the effects is apparently more terrorism...
The idea that human nature is ONLY 'fighting for power' is a very dangerous
idea. It is a self-fulfilling prophesy.
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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