From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Thu Nov 13 2003 - 17:52:03 GMT
Matt,
> Matt:
> It isn't true that we can only quote others to justify ourselves. Rorty
> follows Davidson in the idea of triangulation: truth occurs in that
> muddle between us, our community, and the world.
Not sure what you mean by "muddle." If I see for myself that it's true
that's it's raining -- justification of truth by direct sensation --
what's the "muddle?"
> As Rorty put it long
> ago, it is the attempt to find "a suitable balance between respect for
> the opinions of one's fellows and respect for the stubbornness of
> sensation."
Seems here that Rorty accepts justification of truth by direct
sensation. At least he "respects" it, whatever that means.
> For Rorty, there are three ways to change your beliefs:
> inference, metaphor, and perception.
Does this mean there are three ways to establish truth? And, what
happened to "balance?"
> "Perception changes our beliefs by
> intruding a new belief into a network of previous beliefs." Following
> Davidson, perception doesn't justify our beliefs in the sense reasons,
> i.e. pointing out the inferences between beliefs.
Is there something left out of the second sentence? What does "belief
in sense reasons" mean?.
> Perception _causes_
> us to have beliefs.
No argument there. If I perceive it's raining, I certainly believe it's
raining.
>The only sense in which perception justifies our
> beliefs is the sense that we can try and help the person have the same
> perception as you, thus intruding that same belief upon that person.
Your premise is that "to justify" truth or belief involves other
persons. But not necessarily. I can justify my belief to myself by
perceiving other evidence for my belief. In fact, in any field of
study, the justification for one's own belief often depends of a number
of direct perceptions without dependence others. To take an obvious
example, Newton worked alone and justified his beliefs to himself
before the world knew or cared what he was up to. Many giant leaps
forward happen like that.
> But Davidson and Rorty want to draw a line between showing and
> reasoning.
Agree that showing and reasoning are two separate avenues to truth. I'm
happy to see Rorty allowing for other ways to establish truth besides
"intersubjective agreement." Sounds to me like you're coming close to
what I wrote previously:
"Inquiry into "the Truth" leads to more than just the
correspondence theory. In the book "Truth-a History and Guide for the
Perplexed" by Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, the author identifies several
theories that result from inquiring into Truth. 1. Apprehension of the
truth you feel.(Quality Truth), 2.The truth you are told.(Rorty
Truth), 3.Reason and sense perception. (Correspondence Truth)."
Do you see any "correspondence" between Rorty's view and Felipe's?
Platt
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Thu Nov 13 2003 - 17:50:44 GMT