Re: MD When is an interpretation not an interpretation?

From: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Thu Nov 13 2003 - 17:03:40 GMT

  • Next message: Platt Holden: "Re: MD What makes an idea dangerous?"

    Hey Paul,

    Paul said:
    Okay, we can split reality up in millions of ways for the duration of a discussion, but when you say things like "the world causes us to have beliefs" you are making a metaphysical distinction between "the world" and "beliefs" by postulating a fundamental causal relationship.

    Matt:
    No--I'm making a pragmatic distinction for the duration of our discussion. Its only if you think that all distinctions made about reality (which would be all distinctions) are metaphysical that you would say that, and that would beg the question because pragmatists don't think you have to play metaphysics.

    Paul said:
    The assertion that "the world causes us to have certain beliefs" assumes a pre-existing world, a world of causal pressures at least. I think that making this assumption lands you in metaphysics, whether you want to call it something else or not - or to put it another way, by making such claims you have started a conversation with metaphysicians whether you walk away or not :-)

    Matt:
    The only reason an assumption would land you in metaphysics is if you thought your assumption got at "the Way the World Really Is, In and of Itself, as Such". Pragmatists just think its a handy assumption to have around, helps you deal with tigers and stuff.

    And the only reason I've "started a conversation with metaphysicians" is because there are still metaphysicians around and they keep trying to butt into pragmatic conversations, kinda' like an American who thinks that because the Europeans are talking about football, they must be talking about the same thing.

    Actually, its the other way around. Pragmatists keep butting into metaphysicians' conversations because they are trying to convince the metaphysicians that their conversation isn't as useful or interesting as all these other conversations (about books and politics and stuff).

    Paul said:
    Furthermore, by engaging in the conversation and then ducking metaphysical questions about the nature of this "causal pressure," I think you run into the same problem as Niels Bohr when he refused to comment on what went into experiments. You deny objectivity, as did Bohr, but as with Bohr, objectivity is replaced by intersubjectivity which effectively collapses object into subject (or more specific to neo-pragmatism, collapses objects into language). I say this because, unless you make it a further metaphysical category, even your "causal pressure" has to be taken as a linguistically constructed notion. Pragmatists might object to this with talk of belief in an external world of stubborn physical reality but then they are quick to deny they are making an ontological claim. This is why I suggest that Rortyan pragmatism is linguistic idealism in denial.

    Matt:
    I think Bohr was right. The reason objects aren't collapsed into subjects is because only "talk of objects" are collapsed into subjects. "Causal pressure" is a linguistically constructed notion because "causal" and "pressure" are words. Pragmatists aren't sure what else you'd think they were "constructed" of. Despite this, as you say, we still get along just fine with the "external world of stubborn physical reality".

    The reason pragmatists think they can get away with this and still deny making an ontological claim is because of a piece of the puzzle I forgot to add last time: pragmatists switch from thinking of language-as-representational to language-as-a-coping-tool. Part of the switch away from metaphysics is that we stop thinking that language represents objects that are "out there". Part of the train of thought from Kant to Russell and the early Wittgenstein to Quine and Sellars is the thought that we can't seem to make anything out of "out there" in terms of representation. Pragmatists think that instead of thinking of language as analogized to a glass that we look through, like a tinted lens that colors and helps constitute what we see, we think of language as analogized to an arm or leg--language is just a helpful tool we use to get through the world. That's why pragmatists don't think we are trapped in language. That'd be like saying we are trapped in our arm or leg and th
    at just doesn't say anything all that meaningful. The only thing we are trapped in is reality, but that doesn't really say anything all that interesting.

    Matt

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