From: Valence (valence10@hotmail.com)
Date: Sun Nov 16 2003 - 17:56:11 GMT
Hey Platt, Matt, Scott and all:
> > Scott said:
> > Thus you miss the point when you give examples that are true by
> > correspondence. Truth by correspondence only works when the example
> > consists of sense-perceptible particulars, as is the case in your
> > examples. But as soon as generalities are involved, truth by
> > correspondence doesn't work.
> >
> > Matt:
> > I want to thank Scott for this. Many times I get overzealous in my
> > eschewment of "correspondence". Scott's right when he says "truth by
> > correspondence only works when the example consists of sense-perceptible
> > particulars". What the pragmatist balks at is analogizing all truth to
> > sense perception. We don't know what it means for Truth to be an object
> > the same as a tiger; we think the analogy very bad.
PLATT
> Maybe Scott and Matt balk at "analogizing" (now there's a word for you)
> all truth to sense perception. But Pirsig has no such hesitation:
>
> "The Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to what is call empiricism. It
> claims that all legitimate human knowledge arises from the senses or by
> thinking about what the senses provide." (Lila, chp 8)
RICK (momentarily emerging from lurker-mode)
Hi Platt. I am curious to know why you think this quote is inconsistent
with what Matt and Scott were saying. Pirsig says that all legitimate
knowledge arises from the senses OR by thinking about what the senses
provide. Matt and Scott are simply pointing out that the correspondence
theory of truth works only with knowledge of the former type and not with
knowledge of the latter type. How do you see Pirsig's quote as
contradicting that?
take care
rick
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