Re: MD matt said scott said

From: elephant (elephant@plato.plus.com)
Date: Mon Nov 17 2003 - 14:10:16 GMT

  • Next message: David MOREY: "Re: MD When is an interpretation not an interpretation?"

    > elephant said:
    > Are there any sense-perceptible particulars?
    >
    > What do you mean by 'sense-perceptible'?
    >
    > Matt:
    > Scott, I think, might mean these things in a sophisticated philosophical way,
    > but I surely don't. As a good, pragmatic, unsophisticate, I simply mean that
    > if I see a tiger, I can go, "Hey, there's a tiger," and people will stop and
    > go "Hey, you are right. How very perceptible of you. That is true," as I run
    > away from the tiger to let it eat them.
    >

    'Perceptive', you mean. OK. So Matt, I suppose what you are saying is that
    you don't have much reason to talk about 'sense-perceptible' at all, not
    normally anyway.

    Matt, it looks like what you are saying is 'I see what I see'. Why would
    anyone challenge that? I see all kinds of things all the time, although I
    don't see many tigers. Like, just now I see I'm going on a bit but that I
    might turn out to have a point if only I can see it through.

    So that's Matt. On the other hand, what about Scott?

    Surely he means something pretty definite by 'sense-perceptible', or he
    wouldn't have said:
    'Truth by correspondence only works when the example consists of
    sense-perceptible particulars'.

    Obviously, Scott doesn't mean:
    'Truth by correspondence only works when the example consists of tigers'.

    And nor can he mean:
    'Truth by correspondence only works when the example consists of something I
    see'

    Why not? Well because if he said that he'd mean that the truth of 'I see
    I'm going on a bit' is a matter of correspondence, and that the truth of 'I
    see the light, lord, I see the light' is a matter of correspondence, and
    that the truth of 'I see your point Matt' is a matter of correspondence and,
    in short, that everything you can come to see the truth or error of is a
    matter of correspondence, and that no truth is any other kind of truth but
    correspondence.

    So, if he doesn't mean any of that, what does he mean by 'Truth by
    correspondence only works when the example consists of sense-perceptible
    particulars'?

    Perhaps I'm being dim. But there's hope. If I'm to understand this, I'll
    have to have Scott do some explaining. However helpful Matt is, it's
    Scott's help I really need.

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Mon Nov 17 2003 - 14:20:28 GMT