From: Steve Peterson (peterson.steve@verizon.net)
Date: Mon Nov 17 2003 - 20:04:24 GMT
Hi Nathan,
You said:
> Here is a quote from one of my favourite authors on the subject of the brain.
> Do the questions it asks have answers in using the ZMM framework?
>
> "Unless you accept the idea that there is an immortal human soul injected into
> the human body by God at the time of birth, there is no conductor of the
> psychological orchestra, so to speak, just billions of neurons forming systems
> that feel like a self.
>
> The absence of such a conductor even as we experience changes in our
> psychological outlooks undermines the belief that we (i.e., through a
> controlling self) “can change what we don’t like about ourselves.”
>
> But, “Who or what is the ‘we’? If the ‘we’ doing the remaking are just other
> hunks of matter in the biological world, then any malleability of behavior we
> discover would be cold comfort, because we, the molders, would be biologically
> constrained.
>
> It appears that a human is like an onion; if you strip away the layers there
> is nothing there at the center.
Ok, you've finally convinced me. I don't actually exist.
On second thought, there is no argument at all let alone a convincing one to
be found in the above. Excuse my irritability, but I've spent a lot of time
explaining to you why I think it doesn't make sense to reduce existence to
material and how a metaphysics of quality is more consistent with experience
than a mind/matter metaphysics, and here you just come back with "look, here
is another real smart guy who thinks he doesn't really exist, either."
We already know there are plenty of people who think the way you do. That's
why Pirsig wrote his books and why we are all here.
Can you tell me where my arguments fell flat for you? Seriously, I'm glad
to discuss this with you, but remember the issue is about the assumptions we
make about reality and where they lead us. I don't think Pinker has
anything to say about our assumptions. He probably doesn't not even know
he's making the ones were talking about. If he actually does have something
to say about why a value-based metaphysics is misguided, then by all means
bring his arguments into the discussion.
We agree that a substance-based metaphysics leads one to conclude that you
don't really exist. The question is whether a substance-based metaphysics
makes more sense than a metaphysics of quality. I've tried to point out
where I think a metaphysics of quality is better. I hope you'll tell me why
you think I'm wrong so we can move forward.
Regards,
Steve
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