From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Tue Nov 18 2003 - 22:34:31 GMT
Dear Platt,
You wrote 12 Nov 2003 13:13:48 -0500:
'I see your point [that European immigrants starting to participate in
American social patterns of value did not automatically imply changing
social patterns of value] but would argue human participation is required
for social and intellectual values, but NOT for biological or inorganic.
Falling, procreating and such were happening long before humans appeared on
scene. But only after humans evolved did social and intellectual patterns of
values (as defined in the MOQ) emerge. Agree?'
I agree, but don't see the relevance of that for our discussion whether
social patterns of value can change dramatically in a short period of time.
Your 'social pattern chang[ing] dramatically for the immigrant's children'
was not a change OF social patterns of value. The fact that human
participation is required for American social patterns value to exist, does
not imply that additional participants (i.e. immigrant's children) changed
them. It changed the participants, not the patterns.
You wrote further on:
'What concerns me about attributing this or that characteristic to early man
is the amount of speculation necessitated by lack of hard evidence.'
The hard evidence is limited, indeed. Not only bone structures, by the way,
but also tools, bones of hunted animals, camp places etc. The limited amount
of hard evidence necessitates a lot of deduction (not speculation, but
Pirsig's 'thinking about what the senses provide') and implies that a little
bit of extra hard evidence can lead to relatively large changes in deduced
characteristics of early man.
Well, we'll just have to accept the limited amount of hard evidence and the
relativity (to these sense data) of the deduced 'truth'. Without deduction
we couldn't say anything at all about the origins of the different levels.
You wrote further on:
'If it's raining outside and if someone questions the truth of my assertion
that it's raining outside, I don't need to quote others to justify the truth
of whether it's raining or not. I can simply say, "See for yourself."'
If I question your assertion that it was raining wherever you live at 12 Nov
2003 13:13:48 -0500, I cannot see for myself anymore. If I am lucky some
meteorologist registered it (probably not), but even then it's your quote
against the meteorologist's one and not direct experience that justifies the
truth of that statement for me.
This bit of sense data is not likely to start an intellectual pattern of
value, anyway, because it has no relevance whatsoever for anyone living
elsewhere (and even very little for you and others living near you). Whether
Scotland scored 1-0 against the Netherlands in the football match yesterday
afternoon WILL start an intellectual pattern of value. (Dutch and Scottish
football fans will be able to tell you the answer for scores of years to
come. Especially if it -against the expectations before the match- keeps the
Dutch team out of the European Championship tournament.) Hardly anyone
participating in it will have taken the pains to see for him/herself at the
spot, however. Television representation of what happened can have been
manipulated. (Most of what appears on television is fiction or manipulated
reality anyway.) And whoever missed the match will have to rely on reports
by others.
According to you '[individual direct Quality experience being the
fundamental absolute standard of truth for you, me and everyone, we are] not
necessarily [still left with the task of convincing each other of "my truth"
when "our truths" appear to differ', because you 'feel no overwhelming
obligation to convince [me] of "[your] truth".'
Then your truth is not very likely to start an intellectual pattern of value
that's relevant for me. It will just die with you (or before).
I agree that 'direct experience of the matter in dispute' is a way to
justify truth in some cases, but in the overwhelming majority of cases (i.e.
intellectual patterns of value) there's a lot of deduction and 'thinking
about what other people's sense have reportedly provided' involved.
But that's what you already agreed with when your wrote further on:
'No argument there. It's a matter of who do you trust and keeping a weather
eye open for the grinding of group axes that tend to spin the facts to suit
their goals, like political groups on both left and right.'
in reply to my:
'In a lot of cases we have to rely on accounts of other people's direct
Quality experiences, i.e. on "group-think", for we cannot take all
experience of all other people with a certain situation into account. We
have to select a group whose "typical" accounts we hold for true.'
You continued with:
'I'd venture to say most people's interest in other than there own direct
experiences is fairly limited, and
discussion of what's true and what isn't rarely crosses their minds..'
I disagree with the first part: people ARE interested in a lot of 'truths'
which they cannot base on own direct experiences (e.g. sports news).
I agree with the second part: As I wrote: intellectual patterns of value are
maintained by copying of reasons for behavior (and usually not by
consideration/discussion of what's true or not).
You also wrote:
'I would say "faith" is a willingness to believe falsehoods promulgated by
intersubjective agreement among certain groups, primarily religious and
political. So I would say faith is anti-intellectual. "Ideals" are
interesting. I'm not sure what they mean but they must have some meaning
because your "Economics of Want and Greed" sets forth an ideal. Not so?'
You interpretation of "faith" doesn't seem to be the sense in which Pirsig
or I used the term. Pirsig's statement can be translated without change in
meaning into: 'the twentieth-century intellectual [trust] in man's basic
goodness as spontaneous and natural is disastrously naive'. It doesn't imply
'falsehoods'. In my definition all ideas (trustworthy or not, true or false)
are part of the intellectual level.
I didn't say that 'ideals' are meaningless (as you seem to have read), but
that 'ideals' are fiction (as 'Lila' is fiction) and that 'purposes' (like
'for the mutual good of all') have no meaning on the social level. Both
'ideals' and 'purposes' ARE very meaningful on the intellectual level: they
motivate people to deviate from social patterns of behavior. 'Individual
freedom' is a good example of an ideal that must have some meaning for you
and freeing the Iraqis from Saddam Hussein and the USA from terrorism are
examples of purposes which I guess you support.
To what extent does the ideal set forth in my "Economics of Want and Greed"
have any appeal to you?
You continued:
'Seems your adapting the same argument I used regarding social patterns vs.
individuals--you know, the level of abstraction being used.. Cooperation
would appear to be greater at the family level, less so at the tribal level,
less so the community level, less so at the state level, less so at the
national level, and certainly less so at the international level.'
My argument is quite different from yours. It has nothing to do with levels
of abstraction, but with the idea that social patterns of value hold
together societies and that any identifiable society is characterized BOTH
by internal cooperation AND by external competition. If you look at all
overlapping societies of different scales together, you may get the
impression that cooperation and competition are a matter of degree related
to
scale or level of abstraction, but a MoQ based identification of social
patterns of value and societies shows a different picture.
Your next statement is:
'Well, I'm not sure [about the American two-party system being less than
optimal]. I would hesitate to try to define precisely what is the optimal
mutual good of all. For instance, our Social Security system, thought by
many to be for the good of all, is running out of money. But, I digress.'
I was not defining the optimal mutual good of all, either. I just expressed
a feeling that something is wrong with the American political system using
an expression which I borrowed from Pirsig (via your quote). It seems
inefficient from a Dutch point of view.
The Dutch constitution plus other laws guarantee individual rights quite
well in my experience. Certainly not worse than in the USA.
You seem to become really edgy when you write:
'You're asking the U.S. to give up its sovereignty to the likes of Libya,
Sudan, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uganda. I don't think so. Would you give up
Dutch sovereignty to become a U.N. protectorate?.'
Sigh... No Platt, of course that's not what I'm asking, Platt. Could you
please manage some more subtlety in this discussion?
You have used this argument against giving the UN some real powers (equating
the UN with countries like Libya) before (7 Mar 2003 08:51:13 -0500).
I replied 18 Mar 2003 23:32:34 +0100 with:
'Of course a UN police force should enforce human rights as defined by the
UN as a whole in some democratic sort of way, in which a country like Libya
would only have a relatively small vote. Please try to represent my
viewpoints as I meant them or interpret them in the most favorable way you
can'
The 'system of checks and balances on a global scale' that I ask for no more
requires 'the U.S. to give up its sovereignty' than the (internal) system of
checks and balances which you Americans are so proud of requires Americans
to give up their individual rights.
With my statement
'If the actual American foreign policy amounts to wielding unchecked and
unbalanced power, ... One of the effects is apparently more terrorism...'
I do state that PART of the causes of terrorism directed against America are
to be found in the detrimental effects of American global power these
terrorists and their supporters perceive. Denying this makes it
unexplainable why the terrorism is aimed at the US. If there were checks on
American use of global power and counterforces to be invoked, less people
would feel the need for terrorism to check it. (Which doesn't justify
terrorism in any way, because it only destroys the fabric of society. It
gives no constructive solution for the perceived problem.)
Please recognize that this is far more subtle than your 'translation' that I
would blame terrorism on the victims. Please also note the 'if' that starts
my statement. American foreign policy IS checked to some (insufficient)
extent by the ideals of Americans themselves. American ideals stopped the
Vietnam war in the end, for instance.
Finally you state:
'Human nature is basically selfish. Acknowledging that undeniable truth is
the basis for the success of the U.S. and capitalism. Superpowers don't just
happen. But, human nature without social controls based on a shared morality
will slip inexorably toward wallowing in biological pleasures'
Selfish human nature (biological patterns of value) and social controls
(social patterns of value) enforcing some degree of unselfish/moral
behavior...? That seems a very crude picture of the biological and social
levels to me. We both know lots of instances of selfish and unselfish/moral
behavior. Blaming all the selfish behavior on biological patterns of value
and all the unselfish/moral behavior on social (or intellectual) ones cannot
be squared with the evolutionary facts as I see them. A lot of
unselfish/'moral' behavior is DNA-encoded (as shown by comparable behavior
among animals) and social patterns of value 'encode' a lot of (collective)
selfish behavior vis-à-vis 'those who don't belong' (as in Pirsig's example
of 'Primitive tribes such as the American Indians [having] no record of
sweetness and cooperation with other tribes').
Even if you do want to stick to that crude picture, however, you should be
able to see the danger implied in it: emphasizing the selfishness of human
nature may seem to justify selfishness. (As you wrote 7 Mar 2003
08:51:13 -0500: 'To act after one's own interests is not, as you seem to
suggest, inherently immoral.') The needed 'social controls' should at least
get equal emphasis, also on a global level...
Maybe (in this crude picture of yours) this 'wallowing in biological
pleasures' you rail against also includes wallowing in cheap oil and other
resources secured from the rest of the world with the help of (among other
things) military power? Should that not be socially controlled?
Justification of (collective) selfishness vis-à-vis the rest of the world
may indeed be part of the basis for the 'success' of the U.S. and of
capitalism...
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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