From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Sat Nov 22 2003 - 06:17:13 GMT
David R,
[Scott prev:]> > If you are making an inquiry into the nature of perception,
then the
> > pathological and borderline cases are important. But that was not the
> > context of my referring to "sense-perceptible particulars". If we need
to
> > precisely define all our terms in all contexts we will never get
anywhere.
> > That's why I was asking if you were serious.
>
> This won't do. You *may* not be interested in an inquiry into the nature
of
> perception, but if you make your discussion of truth rest upon a claim
about
> perception then you certainly *need* to be. What is true by
correspondance,
> and whether anything is true by correspondance, depends upon what
perception
> is like, and how or whether 'physical sight' can be distinguished from
> 'insight' in the fashion you suggest.
Sure, if one is interested in giving a complete epistemology, but I'm not. I
only wanted to point out that truth by correspondence works for statements
like "it is raining" or "there is a waterhole on the other side of the
ridge", but doesn't work for statements like "E=mc[squared]" or "It is DQ
that causes one to jump off a hot stove."
If you want to dispute this by bringing in a some theory of perception you
are free to do so. But so far you have only brought up the question of
hallucinations. Are you asking if a hallucination is a sense-perceptible
particular? I would say it is, but what difference does it make to what I
said if it is or isn't?
>
> The context of your refering to "sense-perceptible particulars" was one in
> which you were distinguishing two kinds of truth.
No. I only pointed out that "truth by correspondence" has limited
applicability. I am not trying to establish a complete theory of truth.
Your claims about
> correspondance truth were explained, by you, to rely upon the existence of
> "sense-perceptible particulars".
>
> If there are no sense perceptible particulars, then there is nothing on
your
> scheme to correspond to.
I said that truth by correspondence only applies to sense-perceptible
particulars. If my statement is true, it would still be true if there were
no sense-perceptible particulars. That would only mean that the set to which
truth by correspondence applies is empty.
But it doesn't seem to me to be a difficult thing to accept that the truth
value of the statement "it is raining" can be determined by looking out the
window and seeing rain falling. If you want to say "but I could be
hallucinating" I say, sure, in which case the truth value can be determined
by asking a bunch of people what they see.
Are you claiming that there are no sense-perceptible particulars?
>
> So if you don't know what 'sense perceptible' means, then you don't
> understand what you mean by 'correspondence' either.
I told you how I was using the term. I see no need for deeper clarification
to inquire into my statement about truth by correspondence, since I am
mainly concerned in pointing out when it doesn't apply, not when it does.
>
> *Therefore*, you cannot blithely dismiss these concerns about the
unclarity
> of "sense-perceptible" with "If we need to precisely define all our terms
in
> all contexts we will never get anywhere".
>
> That kind of remark is a justification for not thinking deeply about
> anything.
I didn't, and don't, think that we need a theory of perception to
distinguish the case of how we judge truth value in statements about
sense-perceptible objects and events, on the one hand, versus scientific or
philosophical theories on another.
In any case, long experience with "thinking deeply" about perception and
truth and the logic of definition tells me that precise definitions will
always elude us.
>
> That you deploy it now, in the middle of philosophical discourse on the
> nature of truth, is odd. Either you want an answer to the 'what is
truth?'
> question, or you don't. If you do, you need to follow that through.
> Properly.
I was not looking for an answer to "what is truth". I was pointing out the
flaw in an existing theory.
> It's philosophy here and we need to ask these questions. It
> isn't anything fantastically weird that I'm asking for, and it may be of
> general interest, since most people tend to think that there are
> sense-perceptible particulars, without really examining what they actually
> mean by that. And you've offered a bit of a clarification, namely that
> there's distinction between sense and insight. OK, follow that through.
> Tell me where that distinction fits in with actual cases of seeing.
>
> So, could you answer the simple question in my previous post, about the
> puma?
Which was: 'Is this a case of "physical sight", or of "insight"?'
It was a hallucination. Call it neither, or call it a case of physical sight
that got corrected. What difference does it make?
- Scott
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