From: David R (elephant@plato.plus.com)
Date: Sat Nov 22 2003 - 20:02:15 GMT
Scott,
Thanks for your first answer to the puma question. You preface it by
complaining once again that you can't see why anyone would think that it is
in the least bit important, so I will deal with that.
Look, this is really simple.
If you explain what 'correspondence' means by reference to something called
'sense perceptible particulars' ("correspondence works for sense perceptible
pariculars") then, obviously, in order to understand what you are saying
about correspondence (whatever it is you are saying about correspondence),
we will have to understand what you mean by 'sense perceptible particulars'.
Clear?
Now, you offer an explanation of 'sense perceptible' as 'physical sight', as
contrasted with 'insight or understanding'. Ok. Fine. So tell me how this
applies to actual cases of seeing things, and I will know what you mean by
the contrast between 'physical sight' and 'insight'.
That's all I want to do, understand what you are saying. My request for
application of your distinction to actual cases is a reasonable one. The
physical sight/ insight distinction is what your explanation of
'correspondence' has come down to, and it it turns out that you can't apply
the 'insight'/'physical sight' distinction in practice we will have to start
over.
You may think (you seem to suggest this) that it is so increadibly simple to
clarify this fantastically easy point that it's not worth even raising it
unless one is preternaturally stupid.
Ok, in that case, there's nothing to be lost by *showing* me how simple it
is to clarify the point, namely, by actually clarifying it. Wouldn't that
be the simplest way of dealling with me?
So let's come to the answer which you now reluctantly give to my question.
Here was the question again:
David R (previously):
Scott has offered the following outstanding clarification of 'sense
perceptible':
> Sense-perceptible particulars are the objects and events we see, hear,
> touch, smell, and taste. By "see" (to refer to your later post) I mean
> physical sight, not insight or understanding.
[...]
What makes something a case of "physical" sight as opposed to "insight"?
Try some actual cases of 'I see'.
I'm walking home about 5pm in the deepening winter gloom in the dark eyes of
the forest, and I look up into the branches. I'm startled. I *see* the
silouette of a long catty tail hanging down, and the mass of a couched
animal. Immediately, without any pause for thought, I find myself stopped
and looking up, expecting a growl to emminate - Oh no, that myth about the
puma on the prowl: no myth.
But no low growl comes. And no flash of eyes. And the movement in the
coiling 'tail' is the same for all the trees, just wind. And now I *see*
that it's just a knarled branch in a welsh forest, not a hungry killer.
Ok, help me out. Is this a case of "physical sight", or of "insight"?
> Scott answers:
> It was a hallucination. Call it neither, or call it a case of physical sight
> that got corrected. What difference does it make?
David R:
(1) if the two cases of seeing in the example are *neither* physical sight
nor insight/understanding, then your theoretical contrast between 'physical
sight' and 'insight' doesn't apply to seeing in the real world.
That's a difference it makes.
(2) if we treat the seeing of the puma as a case of hallucination (an
erroneous understanding) and the seeing of the branch as 'corrected'
physical sight, then it appears that we will have no way of explaining the
fact that factors of *insight and understanding* are involved in realising
that it's a branch (we recall the wind, we get no growl).
That's a difference it makes.
(3) if neither case is in fact a case of 'physical sight', then it will seem
that we can get by perfectly well without the concept of 'physical sight',
and the distinction upon which you base your explanation of 'correspondence'
will have to be abandoned.
That's a difference it makes.
More generally, my motivating concern is that you may (for all I know) be
unable to disentangle 'physical sight' from 'insight', and that being
incapable of this, you will turn out not to have meant anything in
particular by either 'sense perceptible' or 'correspondence'.
Thus, there is no call for you to ask *me* whether I deny the existence of
'sense perceptible particulars', since I have no clear idea of what you mean
by the term, and rather good reasons for thinking that you mean nothing at
all by it.
Prove me wrong by successfully applying your 'insight and understanding' v.
'physical sight' contrast to some actual examples of seeing.
David R
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