From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Fri Jan 09 2004 - 21:16:53 GMT
Hi Steve, you say:During this social era, which I take to mean the era
before intellect
reached a certain degree of freedom from social control, such an explanation
of experience was still an example of intellect. Spirits seeking mother
earth has been proven to be a bad intellectual pattern, but it is still an
intellectual pattern, a pattern of thought.
DM: I see what you're saying. I think Bo's point is that it is only once
the SO divide is being used by thinking that is has the sort of power/use
that we would now call intellectual. Any other suggestions for a sort
of thinking that is intellectual but does not use SO divide?
Also you say: mathematics for example does not require the supposition of
material
> substances interacting with mental substances.
See the possibility of an argument that maths does exactly this via
its use of the concept of space as a form of experience:
http://www.geoffreyread.org/fate.html
regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "Steve Peterson" <peterson.steve@verizon.net>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Friday, January 09, 2004 8:23 PM
Subject: Re: MD The MOQ: An expansion of rationality
> Hi Bo,
>
> Steve said:
> >>... in my understanding of the MOQ,
> >> it is itself an intellectual pattern. That is to say that for me,
> >> intellect goes all the way down when we talk about the static
> >> levels.
> >
> > Your opening statement of intellect "going all the way (one you share
> > with all "subjectivists" around here) can't be correct if the MOQ is
> > supposed to be something different from the SOM.
>
> Steve says:
> To be different from SOM, the MOQ need not be different in every possible
> way.
>
> PIRSIG (SODV): "The Metaphysics of Quality follows
> the empirical tradition here in saying that the senses are the starting
> point of reality..."
>
> Do you think that the SODV Pirsig is part of the "subjectivist" camp? I
> suspect you do.
>
> The issue here is our different understandings of intellect. To me
intellect
> is simply thinking as I can't imagine how you can have a metaphysics
before
> thinking, while one can think before acknowledging a metaphysical
position.
> So for me, the MOQ is a part of intellect. You use a different definition
> of intellect and come to different conclusions about the placement of the
> MOQ in the static hierarchy. To me the fact that the MOQ doesn't fit in
the
> static hierarchy as you've defined the intellectual level should tell you
> that you've made a mistake. According to Pirsig nothing is left out.
>
>
> >> Any talk of patterns
> >> relies on intellect to infer the pattern.
> >
> > Yes if this condition is observed. Talk of patterns relies on the MOQ
and
> > it is not an intellectual pattern, but the MOQ ...employs reason for its
> > own purpose without being subordinate to it (see my last "intellectual
> > level" post)
>
> > Your above makes everything intellect and it assumes the same role as
> > SOM's "mind".
>
> I think Pirsig would agree that that intellect in the MOQ plays a similar
> role to that of mind in SOM, but everything is not intellect. Any talk of
> patterns is intellectual discourse, but some patterns that are discussed
are
> thought to exist independently of thought and are classified as inorganic,
> biological, and social patterns.
>
>
> >> But there
> >> is another high quality intellectual pattern of value that says that
> >> "gravity" is a description of experience that exists outside
> >> thought--that if I weren't thinking about gravity, I'd still be
> >> experiencing it.
> >
> > Regardless, both these "patterns" carry the S/O mark, in the first
> > example the experience/the idea, and in the second the
> > description/experience.
>
> Steve says:
> In the MOQ, an idea is an intellectual pattern of experience but
experience
> is not limited to ideas. The SOM experience/idea distinction you mention
> translates into MOQ terms as intellectual description of social,
biological,
> and inorganic patterns.
>
> Distinguishing thoughts from physical sensations does not require SOM, the
> MOQ does just fine at making such distinctions.
>
> >> Steve said: Within the broader context of the MOQ we can take out the
old SOM
> >> intellectual patterns and give them another look and see which ones
> >> are still any good.
>
> >Bo said: It's my opinion too, but the said rejection of the SOM is of
utmost
> > importance.
>
> Steve:
> What the MOQ rejects is the view of a 3-component reality based on
material
> substances, mental substances, and sensed data where sensed data is a
> secondary by-product of the interaction between the first two components.
> Instead the MOQ takes a more radically empirical stance than previous
> empiricists who took either material or mental substance as a starting
> point. The MOQ and says that mental and material substances are merely
one
> way of explaining experience and definitely not the best one for
explaining
> values. In Lila, Pirsig suggested the dynamic/static dichotomy as a
better
> choice for a "first cut."
>
>
> >Pirsig says that the SOM will find a place inside the MOQ,
> > but it's only the S/O left. He places it in the known manner across the
> > static hierarchy (inorg+org=object ...etc) while you see some S/O
> > patterns place within intellect ...but I see the S/O dichotomy as
intellect
> > ITSELF!
>
> The metaphysical position that reality is composed of mental substances
and
> material substances in interaction (SOM) is certainly not a good
definition
> of intellect since intelligent thought is not limited to thinking in terms
> of mental and material substances. As Pirsig responded to your SOL thesis
> in LC, mathematics for example does not require the supposition of
material
> substances interacting with mental substances. How do you respond to
> Pirsig's critique?
>
> > The pick and chose of SOM patterns is not possible, ALL intellectual
> > patterns are S/O at their core.
>
> Steve says:
> Only because you've defined intellect that way. The way Pirsig describes
> intellect this is not so.
>
> >For instance the phenomenon of apples
> > falling to the ground. This got its S/O quality (of a force working upon
> > matter) with the intellectual level. In a crude form with the strange
> > physics of the old Greeks to Newton's system which is still valid, but
> > notice that with Einstein the S/O-pattern is "shaken" ...General
> > Relativity is a beginning of the end of an era.
> >
> > In the social era (the observation of apples falling was described to
> > some apple spirit seeking mother earth ...I guess
>
> During this social era, which I take to mean the era before intellect
> reached a certain degree of freedom from social control, such an
explanation
> of experience was still an example of intellect. Spirits seeking mother
> earth has been proven to be a bad intellectual pattern, but it is still an
> intellectual pattern, a pattern of thought.
>
> I still suggest that you stop trying to define the levels through thinking
> about historical eras and instead use the types of patterns as defined by
> Pirsig to understand history. I bet both would make more sense if you
> could see the levels not as referring to types of people, places, or times
> but rather to different types of patterns of experience. It's not that the
> MOQ does not apply to understanding people and eras. It's a matter of
where
> you start. In Pirsig's MOQ, sensing Quality is the start of reality.
>
> Regards,
> Steve
>
>
>
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