From: Steve Peterson (peterson.steve@verizon.net)
Date: Fri Jan 16 2004 - 22:52:20 GMT
Hi Bo,
Steve said:
>> Patterns of behavior of humans that are "hard-wired" are
>> biological while those that are passed on through copying behavior are
>> social.
Bo said:
> Hard-wired? This and the "instinctive" term does not add
> anything, the reflexes are perception of biological value as I read
> the Hot Stove example.
Steve:
You've defined the biological level as life. I can't see how the Hot Stove
example could fit your definition. I see the pattern of getting off a hot
as instinctual and thus biological.
Bo said:
> Likewise at the social level where "copying behavior" is
> perception of social value. Societies - from the tribal kind and
> upwards - are social value patterns, no sociological (behavior) or
> physiological complications are necessary.
Steve:
Here again your definition does not identify all social patterns. Societies
(social entities) are not the only sort of social patterns.
Steve said:
>> The problem I have with "the value of life" as a definition of o
>> biological level is that I don't find such a definition useful for
>> identifying biological patterns. But for the biological level, I
>> doubt we would disagree on our categorization. I wouldn't be
>> surprised if you actually used the "maintained by DNA" idea to
>> categorize biological patterns despite your definition of the value of
>> life.
>
Bo said:
> You anticipated my response ;-)
>
>> Is this so, or do you actually get mileage out of "the value of
>> life" in deciding what sort of pattern you are dealing with?
>
> I still, don't see the need for any "value of value" definition.
Steve:
I thought that was my side of the argument? I want to get rid of your
"value of X" definitions of the levels in exchange for patterns of
experience from which value is inferred.
Steve said:
>> I agree with Paul that if you are going to use "the value of X"
>> definitions, "the value of truth" would be a much better way of
>> describing intellectual value.
>
Bo said:
> OK if truth is seen as "objectivity versus subjectivity",
See below...
>...because
> the social era preceding intellect certainly knew truth vs lies, but
> not the said duality.
Steve:
As I've suggested before, you'd do well to use the levels to help understand
history rather than to try to define the levels through identifying
historical eras. Once we have a shared understanding of the levels then we
can look back on history to see how the patterns evolved in time and give
clarity in viewing historical conflict. But to invoke some social era to
prove your case begs the question (as Matt would say).
To say that "the social era preceding intellect certainly knew truth vs
lies" is to assume the premise that you are trying to demonstrate. I said
the true/false distinction can be used to define intellect. If you can
accept that premise for the sake of argument then you must realize that you
would also need to change the way you define the social level which I do
also recommend.
Note that using your "societies" definition of the social level sheds no
light on the question of whether or not true/false distinctions existed
before intellect so perhaps you can see the need for a better way of
defining the social level as well.
>> Though Wim suggests that intellectual
>> patterns are those maintained through copying rationales for behavior,
>> I actually tend to use that idea to categorize intellectual patterns,
>> i.e., If this is something that can be judged on a true/false sort of
>> scale it is an intellectual pattern.
>
> Matter is inorganic value, life is biological value ...etc, but when it
> comes to intellect there seems to be no value that constitutes the
> level, instead one gets the impression of intellectual patterns
> defined as "thoughts"
This problem arises because you are trying to classify "things" rather than
patterns of experience. You want a type of entity to define each
level--"matter", "living things", "societies", and question "thoughts"???.
But matter is not the only sort of inorganic pattern. (Gravity is an
inorganic pattern and is not a physical object.)
Biological entities are not the only biological patterns. (For example, the
pattern of walking on two legs is a biological one but is not itself a
life.)
Societies (social entities) are not the only sort of social patterns.
(Saying gazuntheit when someone sneezes is a social pattern but not a
society. Rather it is a pattern maintained through unconscious copying of
behavior.)
I agree that "thoughts" are an inadequate way of defining intellectual
patterns. Look to patterns rather than entities to define intellect as
well. That's why Pirsig suggests patterns of manipulating of symbols for
the patterns that make up the intellectual level.
>... but if you come down to the VALUE of the
> true/false I am happy to concede.
Woo Hoo!
> We agree. Intellect is the value of the true/false
> (objective/subjective) distinction.
Doh!
The true/false distinction does not equate with objective/subjective by any
stretch. It is objectively false that I was born 1000 years ago. It is
subjectively true that my favorite color is green. Truth applies to both
objective and subjective experience.
I hope we can come to agreement on identifying and evaluating intellectual
patterns on a true/false scale of value with subjective/objective knowledge
distinctions as a subset of all intellectual truth distinctions.
Regards,
Steve
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