RE: MD Matt's Favorite Antipragmatist Statement

From: Paul Turner (paulj.turner@ntlworld.com)
Date: Sat Jan 17 2004 - 18:16:02 GMT

  • Next message: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT: "Re: MD Matt's Favorite Antipragmatist Statement"

    Hello Matt

    Matt said:
    Ya' know, everytime I read somebody reading Pirsig as a straightforward
    pragmatist, it gives me hope. I rush back to the passage they read and
    try reading it as they do. But I just can't. The first problem I see
    in your alternative interpretation is, if we are dealing with an
    evolutionary system, why would you ever say that a species will _always_
    be better able to survive than another (simply taking it from a
    biological standpoint)?

    Paul:
    It's not about ability to survive, it's about the most Dynamic. Humans
    are more Dynamic than germs.

    Matt said:
    Isn't the point of Darwinian evolution that only time will tell? The
    analogous big question being, "How do you know humans will always be
    morally higher than germs?"

    Paul:
    Because if a germ evolved into a higher organism than a human it would
    no longer be a germ, it would be an animal or something new.

    Matt said:
    And I don't think its the case that he's saying simply that "science ...
    can support ethics." He says, "We're at last dealing with morals on the
    basis of reason." Unless science is synonymous with reason, Pirsig's
    saying something more grandiose.

    Paul:
    Science is a formal application of reason. I don't think it is
    synonymous.

    Matt said:
    And where does he say, "When the distance between patterns, in
    evolutionary terms, is shorter he says it is not as clear but that the
    MOQ can help analysis of moral issues nonetheless"? Where are you
    getting your juice for spinning the passage that way?

    Paul:
    The passage that follows the one JoVo quoted. Ingenious, eh?

    "In the moral evolutionary conflict between the germ and the patient,
    the evolutionary spread is enormous and as a result the morality of the
    situation is obvious. But when the static patterns in conflict are
    closer the moral force of the situation becomes less obvious."

    And closing that section, he says:
    "Wherever he looked, whatever examples came to mind, he always seemed to
    be able to lay them out within this framework, and the nature of the
    conflicts usually seemed to be clearer when he did so."

    The nature of the conflicts *usually* *seemed* to be clearer.

    Matt said:
    No, when Pirsig says, "It's true for all people at all times, now and
    forever," I still only see some sort of transcendentalism. Because it
    nudges the door open enough for the skeptic to walk in and ask, "How do
    you know?" I'll grant you this, Paul: you have got me to see that I
    don't think Pirsig is saying (at this point) that _it always has been
    true_, before this particular point in time. That we've evolved
    historically to this point. But why put the kibash on evolution?

    Paul:
    Who is doing that? As said above, by definition, a germ will always be
    less evolved than a human.

    Matt said:
    Why think it will suddenly stop with us?

    Paul:
    I don't.

    Matt said:
    That has always been the dream of metaphysicians, that we are the last
    stop on History's train ride. Metaphysics is in the business of
    hypostatizing current common sense, they take it as what was _always_
    common sense. Those who accept an historical dialectic still run the
    risk of hypostatization by saying that it _will_ always be this way from
    now on. Metaphysicians look back on their ancestors and say they were
    wrong, that they, now, today, in this day a
    nd age, are the last metaphysicians, trying to ignore the fear that
    their descendents will do the same thing that they did to their
    predecessors.

    Paul:
    I'll take your word for it.

    Matt said:
    And this is just this one passage in Pirsig. There are more, though not
    as bad. And let me remind everyone: I'm not saying that Pirsig is or
    isn't a degenerate metaphysician (in the antipragmatist sense, not in
    any of the rehabilitated senses that many other people around here use)
    or is or isn't a good pragmatist. The one thing I've become convinced
    of in the last few years is that Pirsig is _far_ too ambiguous to say
    one way or the other. I say simply that he _sounds_ like a
    metaphysician sometimes, or he _sounds_ like a pragmatist at other
    times.

    Paul:
    I think he is a pragmatic metaphysician.

    Paul

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