From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Tue Feb 03 2004 - 18:53:29 GMT
Bo
Could you say something about the relationship
between truth/objectivity/subjectivity/reality in the
context of scientific theory rather than truth vs opionion.
I think post-modernists have suggested that when you consider scientific
revolutions like that from Newton to Einstein the
terms are such a matter of creativity and so incomensurate
that you cannot say which one corresponds to reality. I disagree with this
approach altogether but what do you think?
regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: <skutvik@online.no>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Tuesday, February 03, 2004 7:29 AM
Subject: RE: MD Objectivity, Truth and the MOQ
> Paul and All.
>
> 30 Jan. you wrote:
>
> > Bo said:
> > OK, we may be reconciled here if you accept Truth in the sense of (ZMM
> > "Truth. Knowledge. That which is independent of what anyone thinks of
> > it. The ideal that Socrates died for. The ideal that Greece alone
> > possesses for the first time in the history of the world."
>
> > Paul:
> > That was their definition of truth after it was separated from belief
> > and placed higher than the good.
>
> Wrong, this is P. of ZMM's definition of what took place at that
> time. Socrates, Plato or Aristotle did not know any subject/object
> distinction. Socrates definition was TRUTH ...not separate from
> belief, but different from OPINION (that the Sophists kept
> manipulating) but note that Pirsig feels the need for strengthening
> it by his: "That what is independent of ...etc." which is what we
> define as OBJECTIVE. Plato's permanence were IDEAS, only
> with Aristotle did something resembling S/O (form/substance)
> emerge.
>
> The kernel of all this is: It's the MOQ's interpretation of the past
> we talk about, and my assertion is that everything Pirsig writes
> points to a S/O definition of intellect. How Socrates, Plato and
> Aristotle defined their own struggle is almost irrelevant, Socrates
> did NOT (in his own words) place truth higher than good. Truth
> was his highest good. It's in a MOQ context that the old good
> (aretê) becomes REALITY ITSELF and the new search for a truth
> (permanence) beyond aretê becomes a travesty. Get this clear or
> your interpretation goes haywire.
>
> > Bo said:
> > Still I wonder why the "objective" term so inedible?
>
> > Paul:
> > Because it implies the possibility of correspondence to
> > objects-in-themselves. That is one view of truth but there are others.
>
> Will you never understand? As a static level 'subjective' and
> 'objective' lose their metaphysical "in-themselves" quality they
> had in SOM and becomes the static value of such a distinction.
> "Modernity" depends upon the intellectual level NOT becoming a
> mind capable of harboring every possible idea.
>
> > Bo said:
> > "Truth" is often reinforced by putting an "objective" in front of it
> > to indicate something more than just plain truthfulness.
>
> > Paul:
> > Well, you need to be precise about the way you are using "objective."
> > When it is used to describe good journalism, for instance, it has more
> > in common with "impartial."
>
> Yes impartial, that's it. In ZMM Pirsig writes (in describing the
> emergence of SOM): "...But now as the result of the growing
> IMPARTIALITY of the Greeks to the world around them ...etc."
>
> > It is often linked in with a scientific
> > approach of being careful when making inferences. Epistemologically,
> > it assumes the pre-existence of facts that can be known or unknown.
>
> Yes, and this is the way the the S/O distinction must be
> understood in the MOQ; the value of an objective reality versus
> opinion. This is something else than Joseph Goebbels: "Truth is
> what is repeated often enough".
>
> > Bo said:
> > Knowledge is "objective", and "..independent of what anyone thinks of
> > it".
>
> > Paul:
> > That's your definition of knowledge, inherited from the Greeks.
>
> No, this definition and conclusion are Pirsig's interpretation of
> what took place in Greece.
>
> > In
> > Plato's dialogues, you often find his characters using the "analytic"
> > truths of mathematics to demonstrate this "objectivity" but even those
> > have been shown to be one from a possible many, as described by Pirsig
> > in the section on Poincare in ZMM.
>
> Yes, Plato's permanent (objective) entities: Ideas (numbers,
> mathematical and geometrical truths included) had no apparent
> subjective counterpart EXCEPT the reality they replaced. About
> "one from a possible many" (many what?) you have to spoon-
> feed me.
>
> More than enough.
>
> Bo
>
>
>
>
>
>
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