RE: MD Objectivity, Truth and the MOQ

From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sun Feb 15 2004 - 22:18:04 GMT

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    Matt, Paul and all:

    Matt said:
    ...For instance, the whole idea of a "linguistic turn" in philosophy. Rorty
    thinks that switching from talk about experience to talk about language
    focused our conceptual clearing ability, which helped us get rid of a lot of
    these crappy conceptual moves. So, for the post-analytic, neopragmatist,
    "empirical experience" is simply translated into "language" and nothing is
    really lost.

    dmb replies:
    I think Pirsig's epistemology is significantly different from Rorty's. It
    seems to me that "empirical experience" and "language" are very different
    things for Pirsig and so one cannot be translated into another. The MOQ adds
    a sense of value to traditional empiricism, which says that the biological
    senses are the primary gatekeepers, the "starting point of reality"...

    Pirsig said in his SODV paper:
    "The Metaphysics of Quality follows the empirical tradition here in saying
    that the senses are the starting point of reality, but -- all importantly --

    it includes a sense of value. Values are phenomena. To ignore them is to
    misread the world. It says this sense of value, of liking or disliking, is a
    primary sense that is a kind of gatekeeper for everything else an infant
    learns."

    dmb continues:
    But there's more to it than just the senses. To this biological level
    starting point Pirsig adds culture. (This is where language itself plays
    such a large role.) In the MOQ, both the biological senses and the social
    level linguistic customs are necessary pre-requites for our intellectual
    descriptions, so the the levels act as a series of filters...

    "Our intellectual description of nature is always culturally derived. Nature
    tells us only what our culture predisoses us to hear. The SELECTION of which
    inorganic patterns to observe and which to ignore is made on the basis of
    social patterns of value, or when it is not, on the basis of biological
    value." LILA CH24

    Matt said:
    Pragmatists can and still do talk about experience, like experiencing a rose
    or a heavy metal concert. But when we start doing conceptual things, we
    start thinking in terms of language instead of experience. We do this for
    the same reason we don't use the word "ontology," "epistemology,"
    "metaphysics," "correspondence," or "objectivity": we think conceptual
    accidents are more prone to happen when using these words. ...

    dmb replies:
    I don't mind using words like "epistemology" or "metaphysics" because I have
    excellent "conceptual accident" insurance. I hope Matt is well covered
    because his putting Rorty and Pirsig on the same track is bound to cause an
    awful trainwreck. But seriously, I think Pirsig differs here too. Not just
    because experience and language aren't translatable, as already discussed,
    but also because makes a distinction between reality and our intellectual
    descriptions of it, between the data and the language we use to talk about
    it...

    "In a value-centered MOQ this 'scientific reality' platypus vanishes.
    Reality, which is value, is understood by every infant. It is a universal
    starting place of experience that everyone is confronted with all the time.
    Within a MOQ, science is a set of static intellectual patterns descriing
    this reality, but the patterns are NOT the reality they describe" LILA CH8
    (Emphasis is Pirsig's)

    "It may sound a little awkward, but that's a matter of linguistic custom,
    not science. The language used to describe the data is changed but the
    scientific data itself is unchanged. ...Particles 'prefer' to do what they
    do. An individual particle is not absolutely commited to one predictable
    behavior. What appears to be an absolute cause is just a very consistent
    pattern of preferences. Therefore when you strike 'cause' from the language
    and substitute 'value' you are not only replacing an empirically meaningless
    term with a meaningful one; your are using a term that is more appropriate
    to actual observation." LILA CH8

    OK. Maybe "trainwreck" is too strong. But trying to fit Rorty's 'linguistic
    turn' into Pirsig's ideas is like putting a square peg in a round hole. At
    the very least, its noisey and frustrating. And there is the danger of
    destroying the peg, the hole, the hammer, or one's will to live.

    Thanks,
    dmb

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