From: Mark Steven Heyman (markheyman@infoproconsulting.com)
Date: Sat May 08 2004 - 20:22:50 BST
Hi Plat et al,
Ok, Platt. I'm ready to take a crack at your question, which is:
" Do you agree with Pirsig's moral structure as exemplified in the
above quotes?"
I'll analyze those quotes, below. First, as has been said before, in
deciding to accept ANY metaphysics one necessarily accepts certain
unverifyable premises. The decision to accept these premises, for
me, is based upon two factors: how well the premises correspond
to my own experience of reality, and the overall explanatory power of
the metaphysics. So, I may accept a premise even if it doesn't
completely square with my own experience and understanding of
reality, if doing so "kick-starts" a highly explanatory and useful
metaphysics. Or, if a premise is weak but the metaphysics powerful,
I might be inclined to "tweak" the premise in order to save the
metaphysics. If a premise is irretrievably out of sync with my sense
of reality, then I'm afraid I'd have to toss the bath water, and the
baby too. Pirsig/Phaedrus himself does this in ZMM, when studying
philosophy in India, when a remark by his philosophy professor
causes him to leave the classroom, and India, and give up:
"But one day in the classroom the professor of philosophy was
blithely expounding on the illusory nature of the world for
what seemed the fiftieth time and Phaedrus raised his hand and asked
coldly if it was believed that the atomic bombs that had
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were illusory. The professor
smiled and said yes. That was the end of the exchange."
(ZMM-PB, Page 126)
Finally, a word about the quotations presented by Platt in his
original post. The first quote, In the text, is really two
paragraphs, not one. The second paragraph begins "Taken by
itself..." This is no big deal since the paragraphs are sequential,
and the context is easily determined. The second quote is fine.
But the third quote is misleading. It is presented as a single
paragraph when in fact it is composed of two paragraphs, the first
coming several pages after the second, thus placing both paragraphs
out of context. Quoting in this way gives the illusion of thought
continuity and mutual support, where in fact none may exist. I'll
try to provide context and continuity in my analysis.
ANALYSIS OF QUOTE 1
For the purpose of my analysis, I'll divide Quote 1 into three
distinct ideas. Here they are:
Pirsig Idea 1) "In general, given a choice of two courses to follow
and all other things being equal, that choice which is more Dynamic,
that is, at a higher level of evolution, is more moral. "
msh
I agree with this completely. I accept the four primary levels of
moral reality, as discussed in my previous post, as being both
consistent with my sense of reality, as well as the underpinnings of
a powerful explanatory system of thought, the MOQ. I accept that
morality increases as we move from inorganic to biological to
social/cultural to intellectual, and that where these levels come
into conflict, the higher level, being more dynamic, has moral
precedence.
Pirsig Idea 2) "An example of this is the statement that, "It's more
moral for a doctor to kill a germ than to allow the germ to
kill his patient." The germ wants to live. The patient wants to live.
But the patient has moral precedence because he's at a higher level
of evolution."
msh
Ok, this is something different. This is saying that, within the
biological level, there is at work a secondary moral hierarchy. Here
Pirsig appears to say that biological evolution, in the Darwinian
sense, is equivalent to moral evolution, so that beings at the
"lower" end of the biological spectrum have less moral "value" than
those "above." This to me is one of those unverifyable principles
that needs a little tweaking, which is why I put quotes around the
words lower, value, and above.
I think it's important, for clarity's sake, to maintain a distinction
between moral evolution, as seen in progressing through the four
primary levels or moral reality, and biological evolution. Most
evolution biologists, I think, disdain the use of the words "higher"
and "lower" in describing a species' orientation with respect to the
biological continuum. If they don't, they should. The reason is
that such a distinction invites precisely the sort of interpretation
Pirsig appears to offer, that is that some beings are axiomatically
of "higher" value than others. I think a better way of putting it is
that, within biological evolution, some beings are more complex than
others, and that this complexity, within and between species, seems
to increase over time.
So I see the action of the bear who kills the hunter who's
threatening herself and her cubs as every bit as moral as the man who
kills the threatening germ. I therefore reject the principle as
stated in the quote. However, the MOQ is so valuable that I am
unwilling to toss it out with this only murky bath water. Instead,
I'll do a little filtering. I'd like to amend this principle to
include the a priori idea that there is no need to place more "value"
on one species over another, or on one individual over another within
a species. That is, I would like to expand Pirsig's "principle of
human equality" (LILA-14) to include non-human beings as well.
But now we have a problem. If we can't say that a man is more
valuable than a germ, then how do we decide when and if it is moral
for ANY being to destroy another. In an attempt to solve this
problem, I suggest we make full use of the intellectual moral level,
and let IDEAS lead the way. If we further amend the original
principle to include the idea of reasonably perceived threat, as it
is commonly understood, the MOQ is back on its feet again. So if
it's reasonable to believe that the germ threatens the man, then it's
moral for the man to destroy the germ. But this also means that if
the germ poses no reasonably perceived threat, it is IMMORAL for
the man to kill the germ, or the housefly, or the lizard, or the
bear, or another man or group of men.
Now, of course, the question of what's reasonable, and what's not, is
a whole other philosophical issue to be explored. And, in the case
of the mother bear defending herself and her cubs, it's certainly a
mistake of anthropomorphism to say that the bear made a "rational"
decision to kill the threatening man. But we animals who
philosophize can also empathize, so we should be able to characterize
her actions as reasonable, and therefore influence any decision we
might make regarding her future.
So, with my amended principle of moral preference determination (at
the biological level) in hand, I am able to move on to Idea 3 of
Quote 1.
Pirsig Idea 3) "Taken by itself that seems obvious enough. But what's
not so obvious is that, given a value-centered Metaphysics of
Quality, it is absolutely, scientifically moral for a doctor to
prefer the patient. This is not just an arbitrary social convention
that should apply to some doctors but not to all doctors, or to some
cultures but not all cultures. It's true for all people at all times,
now and forever, a moral pattern of reality as real as H20. We're at
last dealing with morals on the basis of reason. We can now deduce
codes based on evolution that analyze moral arguments with greater
precision than before." (Lila, 13)
msh
As long as the principle of moral preference determination stated in
Idea 1 is amended to include the idea of value equality within and
between species, as well as the idea of reasonably perceived threat,
as described by me above, then I agree completely with Pirsig's Idea
3. In fact, I look forward to applying these ideas in all my
affairs.
Platt, I'll go ahead and post this response to Quote 1, and address
the other two Quotes in separate messages. Gotta go to work.
Thanks to all for any constructive feedback.
Best,
Mark Heyman
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