From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Tue May 11 2004 - 16:05:09 BST
Hi Mark H,
> Ok, Platt. I'm ready to take a crack at your question, which is:
>
> " Do you agree with Pirsig's moral structure as exemplified in the
> above quotes?"
>The first quote, In the text, is really two
> paragraphs, not one. The second paragraph begins "Taken by
> itself..." This is no big deal since the paragraphs are sequential,
> and the context is easily determined. The second quote is fine.
>
> But the third quote is misleading. It is presented as a single
> paragraph when in fact it is composed of two paragraphs, the first
> coming several pages after the second, thus placing both paragraphs
> out of context. Quoting in this way gives the illusion of thought
> continuity and mutual support, where in fact none may exist. I'll
> try to provide context and continuity in my analysis.
Yes, thought continuity and mutual support may not exist between separate
paragraphs, but in this case, as in all good writing, it does.
> ANALYSIS OF QUOTE 1
> For the purpose of my analysis, I'll divide Quote 1 into three
> distinct ideas. Here they are:
>
> Pirsig Idea 1) "In general, given a choice of two courses to follow
> and all other things being equal, that choice which is more Dynamic,
> that is, at a higher level of evolution, is more moral. "
>
> msh
> I agree with this completely. I accept the four primary levels of
> moral reality, as discussed in my previous post, as being both
> consistent with my sense of reality, as well as the underpinnings of
> a powerful explanatory system of thought, the MOQ. I accept that
> morality increases as we move from inorganic to biological to
> social/cultural to intellectual, and that where these levels come
> into conflict, the higher level, being more dynamic, has moral
> precedence.
Agree.
> Pirsig Idea 2) "An example of this is the statement that, "It's more
> moral for a doctor to kill a germ than to allow the germ to
> kill his patient." The germ wants to live. The patient wants to live. But
> the patient has moral precedence because he's at a higher level of
> evolution."
>
> msh
> Ok, this is something different. This is saying that, within the
> biological level, there is at work a secondary moral hierarchy.
Don't think so. The 'patient' Pirsig refers to is a human being and thus
above the biological level. For that reason she is morally superior. .
> Here
> Pirsig appears to say that biological evolution, in the Darwinian
> sense, is equivalent to moral evolution, so that beings at the
> "lower" end of the biological spectrum have less moral "value" than
> those "above."
Since the patient in the example is a human, she exists at a higher moral
level (social plus intellectual) than the germ. If a human acts criminally
against society, however, his criminal act is biological in nature.
> I think it's important, for clarity's sake, to maintain a distinction
> between moral evolution, as seen in progressing through the four primary
> levels or moral reality, and biological evolution.
In the patient-germ example, Pirsig is talking about the four primary
levels of evolutionary morality, not biological evolution.
> Most evolution
> biologists, I think, disdain the use of the words "higher" and "lower" in
> describing a species' orientation with respect to the biological continuum.
> If they don't, they should. The reason is that such a distinction invites
> precisely the sort of interpretation Pirsig appears to offer, that is that
> some beings are axiomatically of "higher" value than others.
Evolution biologists, being scientists, disdain applying better or worse to
changes occurring in nature. Such judgments would admit to some
supernatural purpose and design which, of course, the scientific community
resoundly rejects.
> I think a
> better way of putting it is that, within biological evolution, some beings
> are more complex than others, and that this complexity, within and between
> species, seems to increase over time.
In your view, then, are complex creatures better than simple ones?
> So I see the action of the bear who kills the hunter who's
> threatening herself and her cubs as every bit as moral as the man who kills
> the threatening germ. I therefore reject the principle as stated in the
> quote.
Are you saying that a bear who kills a "source of thought" is as moral as
a man who kills a threatening germ? Please review Pirsig's passage about
capital punishment. (Lila, 13) I think it's relevant.
> However, the MOQ is so valuable that I am unwilling to toss it out
> with this only murky bath water. Instead, I'll do a little filtering. I'd
> like to amend this principle to include the a priori idea that there is no
> need to place more "value" on one species over another, or on one
> individual over another within a species. That is, I would like to expand
> Pirsig's "principle of human equality" (LILA-14) to include non-human
> beings as well.
This is radical equality that defies experience and common sense. But, my
comments about it will have to be postponed to a later post as this is
already too long.
> But now we have a problem. If we can't say that a man is more
> valuable than a germ, then how do we decide when and if it is moral
> for ANY being to destroy another. In an attempt to solve this
> problem, I suggest we make full use of the intellectual moral level,
> and let IDEAS lead the way. If we further amend the original
> principle to include the idea of reasonably perceived threat, as it
> is commonly understood, the MOQ is back on its feet again. So if
> it's reasonable to believe that the germ threatens the man, then it's
> moral for the man to destroy the germ. But this also means that if
> the germ poses no reasonably perceived threat, it is IMMORAL for
> the man to kill the germ, or the housefly, or the lizard, or the
> bear, or another man or group of men.
What is your moral reason for choosing the perceived threat to the man
over the perceived threat to the germ, since you say the germ is as
valuable as the man?
> Now, of course, the question of what's reasonable, and what's not, is a
> whole other philosophical issue to be explored. And, in the case of the
> mother bear defending herself and her cubs, it's certainly a mistake of
> anthropomorphism to say that the bear made a "rational" decision to kill
> the threatening man. But we animals who philosophize can also empathize,
> so we should be able to characterize her actions as reasonable, and
> therefore influence any decision we might make regarding her future.
According to Pirsig it's precisely because we are animals "who
philosophize" that puts us at a higher moral level than animals, unless we
lower ourselves, like criminals, to animal-like behavior.
> Pirsig Idea 3) "Taken by itself that seems obvious enough. But what's not
> so obvious is that, given a value-centered Metaphysics of Quality, it is
> absolutely, scientifically moral for a doctor to prefer the patient. This
> is not just an arbitrary social convention that should apply to some
> doctors but not to all doctors, or to some cultures but not all cultures.
> It's true for all people at all times, now and forever, a moral pattern of
> reality as real as H20. We're at last dealing with morals on the basis of
> reason. We can now deduce codes based on evolution that analyze moral
> arguments with greater precision than before." (Lila, 13)
>
> msh
> As long as the principle of moral preference determination stated in
> Idea 1 is amended to include the idea of value equality within and
> between species, as well as the idea of reasonably perceived threat,
> as described by me above, then I agree completely with Pirsig's Idea 3.
> In fact, I look forward to applying these ideas in all my affairs.
I think your "value equality between species" and "perceived threat" ideas
need to be further amplified and explained. "Perceived threat" raises the
question "threat to whom by whom? and on what basis do you choose that a
threat takes moral precedence over the threatening party? As for species
equality, I would agree that the only good deadly germ is a dead germ,
but not all elephants are good elephants (rogue elephants destroying
native villages) and not all people rise above the biological level in
their behavior (terrorists wantonly killing without regard for human life,
like germs.)
> Thanks to all for any constructive feedback.
Hope you consider my feedback at least partially constructive even if we
are at opposite ends of the political spectrum. :-)
Best,
Platt
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