From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Mon Aug 02 2004 - 11:15:42 BST
Hi Platt
Platt said:
Nothing contains patterns? Then what are the levels all about?
Paul:
Value contains patterns.
The levels are an intellectual device to categorise different types of
value.
Platt said:
Also, are you suggesting by your word "analogous" that the mind *is* the
memes, nothing *contains* memes?
Paul:
I think memes are "contained" in language, habit and ritual.
Platt said:
Finally, how does "symbolic manipulation" fit in to your mind=patterns
definition?
Paul:
Mind is symbol manipulation.
Platt said:
Values may have Lila, but Lila is an individual:
"There is Lila, this single private person who slept beside him now, who
was born and now lived and tossed in her dreams and will soon enough die
and then there is someone else -call her lila-who is immortal, who
inhabits Lila for a while and then moves on. The sleeping Lila he had
just met tonight. But the waking Lila, who never sleeps, had been
watching him and he had been watching her for a long time." (Lila, 1)
Paul:
I think Pirsig is using "single private person" as an expression to
refer to, primarily, the biological organism that lives, sleeps and will
die.
I am not denying that "individual" is a useful term for a collection of
static patterns existing together over time. I am denying that, in the
MOQ, "individuals" have a discrete metaphysical significance that is
somehow essential in enabling a distinct level of static quality to
latch. I don't find this anywhere in Pirsig's work. The physical,
individual biological brain, a society that has created and maintained
symbolic language and Dynamic Quality are what is required for
intellectual patterns to latch.
Platt said:
I do not identify the individual "I" with intellect alone or make it the
"central reality." I do give the "I" or individual dominance over social
patterns of conformity and the status quo.
Paul:
It is only an individual's *intellect* which should dominate social
patterns. We are going round in circles.
Platt said:
I also deny an existence of self that is independent of inorganic,
biological, social or intellectual patterns. But each human being is a
"self" that contains these patterns.
Paul:
Then tell us what this self is, other than static patterns.
Platt said:
Otherwise, an observation such as the following makes no sense:
"The reason there is a difference between individual evaluations of
quality is that although Dynamic Quality is a constant, these static
patterns are different for everyone because each person has a different
static pattern of life history. Both the Dynamic Quality and the static
patterns influence his final judgment. That is why there is some
uniformity among individual value judgments but not complete
uniformity."
(SODV)
Paul:
I would rephrase this as "these static patterns are different for
everyone because each "person" [*is*] a different [set of evolving]
static pattern[s]."
Platt said:
If the individual is an empty concept, then Pirsig ought to take back
this sentence:
"Lila individually, herself, is in an evolutionary battle against the
static patterns of her own life." (Lila, 29)
Paul:
Firstly, note that the word individually is not at all related to one
level here. In the same paragraph, Lila is described as a "complex
ecology of patterns moving towards Dynamic Quality."
Secondly, I think Pirsig denies the existence of an essential
"autonomous individual," but does not deny that static patterns can be
said to compose individuals. In the same way, the MOQ denies objects as
things-in-themselves but does not deny that static patterns can be
usefully called things like trees, or rocks.
As such, the static patterns from all levels involved in an
"evolutionary battle" can be said to occur individually without
contradiction to the denial of an autonomous self. That is, this
evolutionary battle does not occur because of individuals, rather that
individuals occur because of evolutionary battles.
Platt said:
I love being in philosophical quandaries. One of my favorites, thanks to
Ken Wilber:
"If sensations are something I have, I have a self. But, who is the I
that has a self?. Another self. And who has the sensation of another
self? A third self. How many selves must I postulate?"
Paul:
This is a SOM deduction - sensations are assumed to be the object of a
pre-existing subject. Not so.
Platt said:
Or, try this one: Dynamic Quality that created patterns is by patterns
created.
Paul:
I think the quandary here is that you are confusing an experience with a
phrase and using "Dynamic Quality" to refer to both.
Regards
Paul
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