From: Elizaphanian (Elizaphanian@members.v21.co.uk)
Date: Tue Nov 26 2002 - 12:03:47 GMT
Hi Scott, also David, Wim, anyone else interested.
I got a bit distracted yesterday when I was wanting to answer your point on
'drawing the line'.
I said to David: "I am *definitely* claiming that reason is incapable of
choice, and that therefore reason (understood narrowly, not broadly) cannot
distinguish a bad idea from a good one, cannot create a hypothesis and
provides no motive for the search for truth and meaning."
And you (Scott) commented: "I thing you are reducing 'reason' to 'logic'
which, indeed cannot create a hypothesis, etc. In my view, reason is that
which chooses among possible hypotheses, without knowing in advance whether
it will pay off, which is to say, it is DQ manifesting on the intellectual
level."
It might help if we put to one side questions of what 'reason' actually is
for a second, ie, not get into a tussle over definitional questions. It is
quite possible that I am incorrectly equating 'reason' with 'logic', but
hopefully if I explain myself a bit further things will be clearer - and
then you can say whether you agree with me or not.
Let's just talk about 'thinking' for the moment, and not try to define it
further. (After all, according to Pirsig, 'intellect is simply thinking').
I would like to discriminate between two degrees of 'thinking'. At the first
degree of thinking, we entertain (say) a proposition: "The mass energy of an
electron is 0.51 MeV". In order to think about such a proposition, we need
to understand the language in which the proposition is expressed. We then
consider whether that proposition is compatible with other propositions; so,
rather like putting a new piece in place in a jigsaw puzzle, we see whether
it 'fits'. So on this question of mass energy, we can consider empirical
evidence about quantum mechanics and the measurement of forces; we can
consider the logical and epistemological questions about whether the
proposition makes claims to sense; and so on and so forth.
So far, at this first degree of thinking, it is a matter of complete
indifference (at least to me) whether it is in fact the case that "The mass
energy of an electron is 0.51 MeV". It could be incorrect - the book from
which I have taken that sentence may be out of date. I don't even have a
full awareness of what 'MeV' refers to, in that I'm sure if I was asked to
define it in an examination paper, I would fail. But the proposition 'makes
sense' to me: I understand what sort of thing is being asserted; I
understand that an electron is something to which it makes sense to ascribe
properties (even if we must of necessity remain in a state of 'uncertainty'
about some of them); I know that an electron is something which exists at
the sub-atomic level etc etc. It is a proposition, therefore, that I can
'entertain' in the mind - it is something which I can think about and
consider. In Pirsig's language, this degree of thinking is the manipulation
of symbols.
The second degree of thinking concerns giving assent to a proposition. That
is, the proposition is no longer simply considered and thought about, but
rather the proposition is now considered to be 'true' - we take it on board
as part of our picture of the world, we 'assent' to it as something which
forms our understanding.
A scientist may have been passionately involved in sub-atomic research, and
finally have conclusively proven that "The mass energy of an electron is
0.51 MeV". Whereas at the beginning stage of the research, this was a
proposition that was entertained, at the end of the research, this is a
proposition to which the scientist gives assent. And that assent may be
accompanied by all sorts of other emotions, dependent upon the wider context
of the scientist's own personal history.
Of course, if we change the propositions here, then the distinctions can
become clearer. Consider the proposition 'it is raining in New York'. As I
am in England, I don't care whether this is true. If I was walking in
Central Park without an umbrella, I might be more interested. Consider the
proposition 'Joshua Reynolds has just had a heart attack' - if that person
was unknown to you, it is just one more fact. If that person was a close
relative, then you are rather more interested in its content. In other
words, it _matters_ to you.
So the distinction I am drawing here (which is not original to me, it's
fairly 'standard') is one between thinking as consideration (eg of a
proposition) and thinking as affirmation or assent (eg to a proposition).
My argument is that questions of logic and empirical investigation (ie what
Kuhn calls 'normal science') exist solely in thinking at the first degree;
whereas all the questions about truth and meaning, and also the generation
of hypotheses and the evolution of our static understandings etc exist in
thinking at the second degree.
I have tended in my posts so far to consider thinking at the first degree to
be 'reason' (including logic, but not just logic) and thinking at the second
degree to be 'wisdom' (or 'emotional intelligence'). But if you wanted to
say that the second degree of thinking was 'reason' proper, or 'intellect'
proper, whereas the first was (say) 'logic', then fine; as long as we agree
on the distinction then the precise labels are not something that I would
want to die in a ditch for.
However, it is a matter of fact, as I have often stated, that thinking at
the second degree involves emotional cognition. Therefore the *quality* of
the thinking is a function of moral character (if you're dishonest or
self-deceiving, you don't see clearly), and so questions of 'truth' and
'meaning' cannot be separated from the existence of such 'character'. Hence
my 'campaign'.
More specifically, with regard to Pirsig's understanding of the intellect, I
see very little evidence in his writings that Pirsig recognises this
distinction; nor that he recognises that, in particular, emotions are an
essential part of how we think. (Although it is, of course, an inevitable
corollary of making 'value' the central term in a metaphysics - that's why
I'm looking to 'amend' the MoQ, not abolish it completely). Most crucially,
most specifically, this second degree of thinking cannot be equated with the
'manipulation of symbols'. Developing a virtue, eg courage or honesty, is
not an exercise in handling concepts, it is a matter of the will.
Which is why, to return to what I said yesterday, if you take 'intellect' to
be something like Augustine's conception of 'memory, reason and will' then
calling the fourth level 'intellectual' is fine. It's just that there's not
a lot of evidence that Pirsig does that. (Or rather, there's quite a bit in
ZMM, but not in Lila or Lila's Child). I could easily have misled myself on
that point though. If someone points out where Pirsig does this then I will
change my judgement of the MoQ. But it is at least a little
counter-intuitive. If Pirsig really saw intellect as something involving
emotional wisdom, he wouldn't -on his own admission - have made Phaedrus
such a cold character, so 'overwhelmingly intellectual'. The whole structure
of Lila is built around the idea that the intellect is 'cold' in this way,
that Phaedrus is emotionally distant, that he _doesn't_ display any
emotional wisdom. So if someone (David?) wants to still defend Pirsig, they
would have to muster quite a strong case.
That's enough for now. All comments welcome, as always.
Sam
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