From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Sat Aug 14 2004 - 08:47:31 BST
Ham's response to Platt Holden, Thursday, August 12
Subject: Re: MD Metaphysics of Value
Platt wrote:
>
> Before proceeding further with your philosophy I'd like to get your
> response to some things I find questionable in your assertions below.
>
> You wrote:
> > Platt, I don't think it is possible to expunge "duality" from the
> > experienced world, and I don't believe the Professor has done it.
>
> Like Pirsig, I believe it is possible to expunge duality from the
> experienced world so long as one doesn't find it necessary to
> intellectualize that experience. What comes immediately to mind is the
> aesthetic experience which is complete nondual as it is experienced. Only
> in describing the experience does duality become necessary.
Platt, let me try to translate this Pirsigian epistemology in essentialist
terms.
That way, I'll understand it better, and you can tell me what's wrong with
it.
First of all, I define "experience" as "conscious sensibility of a thing or
event";
it involves the cerebro-nervous system and implies a subject/object duality.
This may be as simple as feeling an itch on my arm, in which case the
sensation
is proprioceptive and the object is my physical body. Or it may be complex,
like watching the Olympic games, in which case the object is complex and
multifold. But in either case there must be a sensible subject and a
referent
object. Now, knowing what the object of sensation is (intellection)
involves
the brain. I define this process as "cognizance", which is the image of the
object or event as perceived in time and space. Since we can't have
knowledge
without cognizance, it is always necessary to "intellectualize our
experience" in order to be cognizant of it. Note that, so far, we're
dealing
with a sensible subject relating to an object for cognizant experience
of empirical reality. If there were nothing else to be accounted for in
human experience, I would have to conclude that the nature of experience
is dualistic. But you say that we can eliminate the duality by not
intellectualizing
the experience, citing "the esthetic experience" as an example. Here's
where
we part company -- but not entirely!
What Pirsig calls "esthetic experience" I call "psycho-emotional
sensibility",
and have defined as Value. Value may be considered "experiential" in
that it may be "felt" like an itch; but it is typically "desideristic", that
is,
sensed as an affirmative response to something wanted. (This gets touchy --
and feely!) In my ontology hypothesis, I attribute Value to the Essence
negated in creation which is "affirmed" through the secondary negation (of.
beingness) by the individuated subject. For present purposes, let's just
say that Value is the "esthetic appreciation" of what is presented to
awareness.
The question is, does Value [Pirsig's Quality] depend on a subject/object
dualism? I've reviewed Pirsig's ZMM where he says "no". I've also reviewed
my own hypothesis and am inclined to answer "yes" and "no". (How's
that for honesty?)
You continue ...
> Pirsig agrees:
>
> "Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense that
> there is a knower and a known, but a metaphysics can be none of these
> things. A metaphysics must be divisible, definable, and knowable, or there
> isn't any metaphysics. Since a metaphysics is essentially a kind of
> dialectical definition and since Quality is essentially outside
> definition, this means that a "Metaphysics of Quality" is essentially a
> contradiction in terms, a logical absurdity." (Lila, 5)
What Pirsig is trying to describe here is what I call call Essence. Essence
is the
uncreated, undifferentiated and absolute Source that most people would call
God. (Sorry, Platt.) Value is man's realization of Essence, and is both
dualistic (empirical) and monistic (subjective). A metaphysics of God may
be a "logical absurdity". A metaphysics of Quality [Value] which
encompasses
the experiential and esthetic awareness of Essence is quite valid. And it's
exactly what I have postulated in my thesis!
> He goes on, as you know, to equate experience with Quality, finding it
> "indivisible, undefinable and unknowable.".
Wrong. Experience IS that which is divisible, definable, and knowable!
You then quote me again ...
> > He has stated (probably in the Magritte paper) that Quality is the
primary
> > "empirical reality" of the world. I'm saying that Value is the essence
of "man's
> > reality", which is the same thing. Note, however, that neither of us has
said that
> > "empirical reality" or "man's reality" is the Ultimate Reality.
I stand by my statement.
> In the MOQ there are no differences in the following: Experience, Quality,
> Value, Reality.
That's a generalization I can't accept Does it make sense to you, Platt?
> But there is a distinction between those synonyms and
> "man's reality." As soon as you introduce "man" you introduce the duality
> of man and not man. Pirsig's reality of Quality comes prior to that
> duality. Also, Pirsig has said that Quality is the ultimate reality:
It's pretty tough to exclude man when he is the subject of everything
experienced.
Again, he's defining God. Man's reality is a dualism. But it has an a
prori source.
If Pirsig would accept Essence as the source of Quality, he'd have a
complete
hypothesis. It would be called the Philosophy of Essence or, perhaps even,
Essentialism.
Platt, this has been a lengthy exercise, but it's given me the opportunity
to learn,
and hopefully demonstrate, not only the major difference in our philosophies
but how close we really are.
Thanks for the workout. I await your critique.
Essentially,
Ham
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