From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Fri Aug 20 2004 - 18:55:12 BST
Ham Priday to Platt and Paul, Friday, Aug. 20
Subject: MD The individual in the MOQ
Hi Guys:
I've been following your Quality debate which has mainly involved the
linguistics of the author's presentation rather than the underlying
metaphysical concept. I suppose that's what this forum is for -- an endless
game of "Pirsig Says". Yet, it's discouraging to me that the circularity of
these word games brings us no closer to what the author had in mind. And I
have to agree with Platt that the fault lies with the author in failing to
provide us with a formal exposition of his metaphysics. (Have you ever
considered that leaving room for so much speculation could have been
intentional on Pirsig's part, thus prolonging the popularity of his novels
and this august forum?)
Since my personal interpretation of Pirsig's Quality is no better or worse
than anyone else's, with the possible exception that I come to it from a
different perspective, I'd like to comment on two statements from this
debate that reveal to me how far apart you two are from a conceptual
standpoint. Then, I'll try to demonstrate why I believe Essentialism can be
an extension of Pirsig's philosophy as opposed to an adversarial thesis.
I think Paul captured the "essence" of Pirsig's concept when he wrote (in
another thread to Scott):
> I think there is a basis for a philosophy of mind in the MOQ. First, the
> evolution described in the MOQ is an evolution of value patterns, not
> substance. Substance is a description that may be applied to the bottom
> two levels but the levels are not continuous. This resolves the
> metaphysical obstacle of how mental reality may evolve from physical
> reality by grounding both in value. In other words, there is no
> metaphysical imperative to explain mind in terms of matter.
Paul's statement clearly places mind outside the realm of matter (physical
reality), giving it a valuistic basis. Correct me if I'm wrong, Paul, but
are you not saying that this "grounding in value" is common to both "mind"
and "physical reality"? If that is true, and physical (material) reality is
what the mind experiences, does it not follow that our reality is
essentially the "ground of Value"? Even if you do not accept that
proposition, your statement is poles apart from Platt's idea of physical
reality.
Platt says:
> I have no argument with Pirsig's
> proposition that a subject is not the starting point of experience. I am
> arguing that by using the word "experience," which in common, everyday
> meaning conveys the idea of a subject having an experience, Pirsig is
> unnecessarily muddying his philosophy. As I suggested, if he were to use
> "Quality event" as the starting point of the MOQ, then positioning his
> examples, like the hot stove anecdote, as a "low Quality" event might make
> it easier for readers to relate to his overall philosophy. Most people can
> accept that Quality events can take place without a human being
> experiencing them, like the entire process of evolution up to the
> emergence of human beings with their chattering, observational,
> linguistic ways.
Platt is holding out for the object of experience (SOM?) as the ultimate
reality from which "mind" evolves as a "product" . As I've told him before,
this is existentialism, the postivist philosophy of the scientist. I don't
believe for a minute that Pirsig would publicly endorse the proposition that
"Quality events can take place without a human being experiencing them".
(Please show me where he has.) If physical reality is grounded in Value
(Quality?), its subsistence depends on the experience of it on the same
ground. Which bears out Tolstoy's observation that "There is no reality
except for our experience of it".
It's only conjecture on my part, of course, but I think Pirsig "wants" to
posit an "esthetic" reality but is afraid to do so because it will label him
an Idealist -- or even worse, "a religious nut" -- and our peripatetic
author has ample reason to be sensitive on that score. Hence, Platt, he has
stopped short of providing us with the logical conclusion to his theory.
His Quality -- even as a "dynamic system"-- doesn't measure up to the
Absolute Source we're looking for. And you folks are all left hanging.
Okay, now put on your boxing gloves!
Essentially yours,
Ham
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