From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Sat Aug 21 2004 - 15:13:37 BST
Hi Ham, Paul:
> And I have to agree with Platt that the fault lies with the
> author in failing to provide us with a formal exposition of his
> metaphysics.
If I left you with the impression that I desire a "formal exposition" of
the MOQ, I apologize for being inarticulate. I do not fault the author on
that score. In fact, I generally find formal expositions extremely boring
and often unnecessarily difficult to decipher. I'm a radical advocate of
plain English.
> I think Paul captured the "essence" of Pirsig's concept when he wrote (in
> another thread to Scott): > I think there is a basis for a philosophy of
> mind in the MOQ. First, the > evolution described in the MOQ is an
> evolution of value patterns, not > substance. Substance is a description
> that may be applied to the bottom > two levels but the levels are not
> continuous. This resolves the > metaphysical obstacle of how mental reality
> may evolve from physical > reality by grounding both in value. In other
> words, there is no > metaphysical imperative to explain mind in terms of
> matter.
I agree with Paul. In the MOQ, both mind and matter are values at
different levels.
> Even if you do not accept that
> proposition, your statement is poles apart from Platt's idea of physical
> reality.
Again, I've apparently misled you. I consider physical reality to be
inorganic and biological value patterns.
> Platt says:
> > I have no argument with Pirsig's
> > proposition that a subject is not the starting point of experience. I am
> > arguing that by using the word "experience," which in common, everyday
> > meaning conveys the idea of a subject having an experience, Pirsig is
> > unnecessarily muddying his philosophy. As I suggested, if he were to use
> > "Quality event" as the starting point of the MOQ, then positioning his
> > examples, like the hot stove anecdote, as a "low Quality" event might
> > make it easier for readers to relate to his overall philosophy. Most
> > people can accept that Quality events can take place without a human
> > being experiencing them, like the entire process of evolution up to the
> > emergence of human beings with their chattering, observational,
> > linguistic ways.
>
> Platt is holding out for the object of experience (SOM?) as the ultimate
> reality from which "mind" evolves as a "product"
No. I fully support the MOQ's version of evolution as being an evolution
of values, not just bones, muscle and nerve tissue.
> I don't
> believe for a minute that Pirsig would publicly endorse the proposition
> that "Quality events can take place without a human being experiencing
> them". (Please show me where he has.)
That's easy: "Biological evolution can be seen as a process by which weak
Dynamic forces at a subatomic level discover stratagems for overcoming
huge static inorganic forces at a superatomic level. They do this by
selecting superatomic mechanisms in which a number of options are so
evenly balanced that a weak Dynamic force can tip the balance one way or
another. The particular atom that the weak Dynamic subatomic forces have
seized as their primary vehicle is carbon. (Lila, 11)
> If physical reality is grounded in
> Value (Quality?), its subsistence depends on the experience of it on the
> same ground. Which bears out Tolstoy's observation that "There is no
> reality except for our experience of it".
That's Idealism, pure and simple.
> Hence, Platt, he
> has stopped short of providing us with the logical conclusion to his
> theory. His Quality -- even as a "dynamic system"-- doesn't measure up to
> the Absolute Source we're looking for. And you folks are all left hanging.
"Platt's theory" is the same as Pirsig's theory. My only quibble is with
Pirsig's use of the word "experience" which implies a subjective, human
"experiencer." Paul has explained why Pirsig felt it necessary to bring
experience, and thus SOM, into the picture:
Paul:
Perhaps, but I think he emphasises that Quality events *are* experience
because he wants the MOQ to be accepted as an empirical system and to
distance it from supernatural or ethereal connotations and thus defend his
system from the usual logical positivist attack. This is a recurring theme
in his correspondence since LILA, e.g. his response to Ham's Essentialism:
"My problem with "essence" is not that it isn't there or that it is not
the same as Quality. It is that positivists usually deny "essence" as
something like "God" or "the absolute" and dismiss it experimentally
unverifiable, which is to say they think you are some kind of religious
nut."
If, as Pirsig says, the world (reality) is a "moral order," I see no need
for an "essence." The moral order is the essence. No pre-essence of
essence is required.
Best,
Platt
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