From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Sat Aug 28 2004 - 08:36:59 BST
Ham Priday to Paul Turner
Sent: Saturday, August 28, 2004 3:30 AM
Subject: MD The empirical verifiability of value
Hi Paul:
In response to my assertion that Essence transcends empirical existence, you
said:
> The MOQ is founded on the assertion that value or quality *is* empirical
> and therefore *does not* transcend the empirical world. Pirsig doesn't
> think he is speculating about a deduced, transcendental entity such as
> Essence or God.
If Pirsig's Quality is not derived from an unconditional
(uncreated/undifferentiated) source, then it cannot be the equivalent of
what I call Essence, and the author is faced with having to posit Quality as
the Creator of existence. As a metaphysical concept this strains
credibility. In addition to the quotation you provided below, I looked for
other LILA statements that might lend support to a creative source beyond
Quality. I also wanted to see how he defined the individual within his
Quality strategem. Pirsig seems to have avoided any reference to a "higher
source", although I found these comments with self-contained definitions of
man in Chpt. 5:
< "There isn't any 'man' independent of the patterns. Man is the patterns."
< "So what the Metaphysics of Quality concludes [?] is that all schools are
right on the mind-matter question.
< Mind is contained in static inorganic patterns. Matter is contained in
static intellectual patterns. Both mind
< and matter are completely separate evolutionary levels of static patterns
of value,
< and as such are capable of each containing the other without
contradiction."
This looks like a simple explanation but I find it very difficult to
comprehend. If mind and matter are completely separate, each contained in
its own pattern type, how are they "capable of each containing the other
without contradiction"? Does this even make sense? Also, "mind" as used
here refers to "mental activity" in general, rather to individual
consciousness.
(It would appear that the individual is insignificant in the MOQ, as Pirsig
never mentions it.)
< "Mental patterns do not originate out of inorganic nature. They originate
out of society,
< which originates out of biology, which originates out of inorganic
nature."
Again, the author's conclusion contradicts his premise. Mental patterns do
originate out of organic nature. But "mental patterns" do not define the
individual as a proprietary self any more than "mind" does. His use of
these terms alludes to societal behavior, an objective phenomenon.
Now to your quotation:
> "[The Metaphysics of Quality] says that values are not outside of the
> experience that logical positivism limits itself to. They are the
> essence of this experience. [That is "right on" and could have come from
my own thesis!]
> Values are more empirical, in fact, than
> subjects or objects. [I think almost anyone would challenge that
statement]
> Any person of any philosophic persuasion who sits
> on a hot stove will verify without any intellectual argument whatsoever
> that he is in an undeniably low-quality situation: that the value of his
> predicament is negative. [Again the "hot stove" metaphor. I think it's
silly!]
> This low quality is not just a vague,
> woolly-headed, crypto- religious, metaphysical abstraction. It is an
> experience. [I can't deny that -- even though I'm a person of a
philosophic persuasion who has never sat on a hot stove!]
> It is not a judgment about an experience. It is not a
> description of experience. The value itself is an experience. As such it
> is completely predictable. It is verifiable by anyone who cares to do
> so. It is reproducible. [Let's not!] Of all experience it is the least
ambiguous,
> least mistakable there is." [True, I guess, if he's talking about pain --
interesting that never uses the word]
>
> "When it is seen that value is the front edge of experience, there is no
> problem for empiricists here. It simply restates the empiricists' belief
> that experience is the starting point of all reality. [I guess it accounts
for the origin of the individual]
> The only problem is for a subject-object metaphysics that calls itself
empiricism. [This confused me when I first read it. It still does. Can you
tell me what this sentence is supposed to mean?]"
> [LILA, Ch 8]
Paul, I hope you will excuse my remarks [in brackets]. They're not intended
so much as citicism but to indicate the kind of reaction the author might
expect from people outside of the MOQ group to some of these propositions.
As you've probably surmised, after re-reading LILA I'm not as convinced as I
was before that MOQ parallels Essentialism. My philosophy is centered on
the individual, whereas MOQ ignores the individual and approaches reality
from a historical/evolutionary perspective. There is certainly a
commonality in Pirsig's development of Quality and Value. What troubles me,
however, is the absence of man's role in the MOQ, the author's insistence on
an empirical basis for it (despite his rejection of SOM), and, of course,
what seems to be a deliberate avoidance of an a priori source. I'm
presently inclined to regard MOQ as an existential philosophy with a
psychical component that is promoted (erroneously, I think) as empirical.
I would be interested in your comments on my analysis.
Sincerely,
Ham
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