Re: MD The individual in the MOQ

From: David Morey (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Tue Aug 31 2004 - 20:21:16 BST

  • Next message: Scott Roberts: "RE: MD Plotinus, Pirsig and Wilber"

    Thanks Arlo, very useful.....and so the MOQ begins
    by suggesting a new metaphysics that wil uncover/re-cover
    a whole new world of restrictions/possibilities, helping us escape the old
    SOM ones.

    Hey, Arlo have you read Marcuse's One Dimensional Man?
    Interesting links to P's SOM criticisms....

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Arlo J. Bensinger" <ajb102@psu.edu>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 2004 3:11 PM
    Subject: Re: MD The individual in the MOQ

    > Hello Ham (all)...
    >
    > Ham answered my "feral human" hypothetical...
    >
    > > Sensibility to Value, unlike empirical knowledge, is probably present to
    > > some degree in all living creatures; but only man has the discriminative
    > > capacity (and intellectual freedom) to choose those values which give
    > > meaning to his life-experience.
    >
    > My question is, restated, from where does man get this "discriminative
    capacity"
    > and ability to "give meaning to his life-experience"? Is it "hard wired"
    into
    > the brain (a biological affordance), or does it arise out of "learning" a
    > symbolic system?
    >
    > Affordance, sorry, a term used in critical theory, means what you have
    surmised,
    > something that is made "doable" by something else.
    >
    >
    > I have stated in my thesis that realization
    > > of conditional (existential) value is not universal but is unique for
    each
    > > individual and will vary in accordance with the individual's "personal
    > > tastes and proclivities". These contingencies would of course include
    > > influences from the "social milieu" in which the individual is raised;
    >
    > If the individual's personal tastes and proclivities "includes influences
    from
    > the social milieu", does it include things that are not? If so, how?
    >
    >
    > > so that in your hypothetical example one would expect to see less
    > > discrimination in the feral human's choice of values and a less finely
    tuned
    > > sense of value.
    >
    > But one would see a measurably "human" discrimination of Value?
    >
    >
    > I would certainly
    > > hope that Wolfman's values would be different from your own, if that's
    what
    > you're getting at.
    >
    > Oh, absolutely.
    >
    >
    > > I must confess that I'm not up on semiotics, and I really don't see
    their
    > > relevance to this concept.
    >
    > Semiotics, which I think are quite relevant, extends that "man" thinks
    through
    > (not "with") symbols. And these symbols, a semiotic system, not only shape
    and
    > skew one's "individual cognition", they are the entirety of his cognition.
    >
    > Simply, as Wittgenstein proposed, man cannot think outside his language,
    because
    > he thinks *through* his language. Any internal system (memory, cognition,
    ego,
    > whatever you want to call it) is a symbolic representation of reality, as
    > filtered through one's semiotic systems (language).
    >
    > This is discussed when Pirsig states in ZMM:
    >
    > "We take a handful of sand from the endless landscape of awareness and
    call that
    > handful of sand the world." Pirsig continues, "Once we have the handful of
    > sand, the world of which we are conscious, a process of discrimination
    goes to
    > work on it. This is the knife. We divide the sand into parts. This and
    that.
    > Here and there. Black and white. Now and then. The discrimination is the
    > division of the conscious universe into parts." And importantly, "it's
    > necessary to see that part of the landscape, inseparable from it, which
    must be
    > understood, is a figure in the middle of it, sorting sand into piles. To
    see
    > the landscape without seeing this figure is not to see the landscape at
    all."
    >
    > You can only divide "experience" into "black and white" if you have a
    language
    > (semiotic system) that values (1) these categories, and (2) their polar
    > opposition. To use the snow example, an Eskimo could easily divide
    "experience"
    > into "qanik" and "anijo", since their language makes this categorization
    > salient. Pirsig continues in LILA discussing the "green flash of the sun",
    > something he only saw once it became salient, or valuable, to him.
    >
    > Your categorizations of "individual" and "collective" are defined through
    your
    > language and culture, because our culture makes these terms salient. But
    they
    > are illusory, as are the the categorizations of "black and white" and
    "qanik
    > and anijo". They exist only within the semiotic system. This is what
    Anthony
    > and Pirsig were discussing about the "killing of the self", to see these
    > categories as illusory. The greatest goal is to see that these walls,
    primarily
    > the one that separates the individual from "the world" are imaginary.
    >
    > That is not to say that they have no value within a particular culture as
    useful
    > ways to organize experience. But that is all they are, useful constructs
    not
    > absolute categories.
    >
    >
    > As innuendos, linguistics and symbols play a
    > > role in society and the media, I guess; so do sex and rap music. But
    how
    > > does that relate to the sense of value?
    >
    > Media is entirely "symbols". To "mediate" is to stand between. This is
    > semiotics. As for "society", would it exist without semiotics? How?
    >
    >
    > I don't recognize the term
    > > "affordances" [nor does Webster's], so I'm not sure what you're asking.
    If
    > > the question is whether freedom of choice is restricted by the
    traditions of
    > > a specific culture, the answer is yes.
    >
    > Restriction is the opposite of affordance. Thus, "traditions" (something
    that
    > can only exist through a semiotic system) both restrict and afford certain
    > activities and perceptions.
    >
    >
    > However, except for the culture's
    > > influence on values, intellectual freedom is not affected.
    >
    > Intellectual freedom is not a process of valuation?
    >
    >
    > I recall Pirsig
    > > (who apparently likes to think of himself as an anthropologist)
    mentioning
    > > that the Eskimo has 20 words for "snow" in order to demonstrate the
    > > difference in values between cultures. The "zero vs. one" anecdote
    seems
    > > more applicable to cognitive (quantitative) knowledge than to Value.
    >
    > Systems of "quantitative knowledge" represent what is "valued" in any
    particular
    > culture. It also demonstrates that we are blind to what is not valued. Was
    no
    > one in Europe capable of seeing the number zero? Or did it not exist
    because
    > the "persons sorting the sand into piles" had not categoriztion for "zero"
    > within their semiotic systems?
    >
    >
    >
    > Again,
    > > values will differ from culture to culture as they differ between
    > > individuals, and the native language tends to reflect such differences.
    > >
    >
    > Agree.
    >
    >
    > > > Would the individual be cognizant of reality in the absence of
    > > > socially-constructed semiotic systems, or is it that partaking in
    > > > socially-constructed semiotic systems allows the individual to create
    an
    > > > internal, symbolic representation of "reality"?
    > > >
    > > > Which is pretty much a restatement of my first question.
    > >
    > > Good! Because I've answered your first question in full and wouldn't
    even
    > > attempt to decipher this one.
    > >
    >
    > Let me restate, just to be clear:
    >
    > Would an individual have any cognition of "reality" if that individual had
    not
    > semiotic system (such as language) with which to work?
    >
    > If so, how would that individual "represent" reality?
    >
    > Pirsig mentions the idea of an amoeba responding to heat with simply an
    > awareness of "low quality". Since the amoeba has no semiotic system (no
    > "language"), can that amoeba ever know the concept of "heat". Man, with a
    > semiotic system at his disposal, would respond immediately to "low
    quality",
    > but then would be able to represent symbolically this event with the word
    > "heat". Thus, man can represent reality, but only with a semiotic system.
    >
    > If you disagree, how else does one do it?
    >
    >
    > > > Can individual sensibility exist with a social semiotic to define it?
    > >
    > > Damned if I know. If you can come up with a semiotic definition for
    > > sensibility, I'd love to see what it looks like.
    >
    > Me too. :-)
    >
    > Arlo
    >
    >
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