From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Mon Nov 15 2004 - 12:11:21 GMT
Hi Platt, MSH, Erin, Chuck, Dan, DM and DMB, with thanks for all the comments.
Contrary to what DMB assumes I am genuinely interested in this question, and not just looking for a
stick to beat the MoQ over the head with. If I can be persuaded that the MoQ does in fact allocate
value to people as such, then that will be a significant step forward in my understanding of it, and
that is a good thing. So in this post I am going to try and give as clear an account as I can of
what I see as the problem, and then run through some of the recent replies.
Platt quoted Pirsig, from the discussion of capital punishment in Chapter 13 of Lila:
"What makes killing him immoral is that a criminal is not just a biological organism. He is not even
just a defective unit of society. Whenever you kill a human being you are killing a source of
thought too. A human being is a collection of ideas, and these ideas take moral precedence over a
society. Ideas are patterns of value. They are at a higher level of evolution than social patterns
of value. Just as it is more moral for a doctor to kill a germ than a patient, so it is more moral
for an idea to kill a society than it is for a society to kill an idea.And beyond that is an even
more compelling reason; societies and thoughts and principles themselves are no more than sets of
static patterns. These patterns can't by themselves perceive or adjust to Dynamic Quality. Only a
living being can do that."
This quotation is part one of my problem. What Pirsig is sketching out here is a hierarchy of value,
linked to the evolutionary scale, whereby those things which are more complex (on a higher level)
are of more value than those which are simpler and on a lower level. Hence: "Just as it is more
moral for a doctor to kill a germ than a patient, so it is more moral for an idea to kill a society
than it is for a society to kill an idea."
Part two of my problem can be spelt out by considering what Pirsig says in chapter 12, viz: " static
patterns of value are divided into four systems: inorganic patterns, biological patterns, social
patterns and intellectual patterns. They are exhaustive. That's all there are. If you construct an
encyclopedia of four topics-Inorganic, Biological, Social and Intellectual-nothing is left out. No
"thing," that is. Only Dynamic Quality, which cannot be described in any encyclopedia, is absent. "
Putting these two things together, my original point was this: in considering a death, what is the
'worst thing' about it? Going from these two elements of the MoQ, ie the hierarchy of values, and
the exhaustive nature of the levels, it seems to me that the worst thing about a death is twofold:
one the loss of specific patterns of value on the intellectual level (call these IDEAS), the second
the potential loss of DQ. Now the second part of that I don't see any way to quantify or discuss; it
is inherently unknowable. So I'm ignoring it (for the time being).
So, my (deliberately provocative) assertion was: according to the MoQ, the worst thing about 9/11
was the loss of the ideas in all the victim's heads. Which seems to be morally absurd - but which
seems to me to be a logical consequence of the above two elements of the MoQ.
Now, an assumption lying behind this is that there is no 'thing' in the MoQ which corresponds to
what we would normally describe as a 'person', ie when we think of a person - Jane Doe - that which
we call 'Jane Doe' can be more accurately characterised by the breaking down of that conglomeration
of patterns of values into the constituent parts (I think Pirsig at one point talks about people
being 'forests' of patterns of value). [I've also just had a quick rummage in Lila to find where he
discusses the question of 'self' and 'identity' more explicitly, but I couldn't find it. Perhaps
it's in one of his other papers - can anyone point me to it?)
Now Erin raised the legitimate query as to whether 'gestalt' considerations should be brought to
bear, which, so far as I understand it, is a way of saying that all of reality ISN'T captured by the
four levels (plus DQ - I won't keep saying that, please take it as read). In a similar vein David
Morey said that "I think Sam's problem is solved if we look at how we value DQ and then link this to
how we understand what we mean by human beings. I.e. a certain coming together of the 4 levels and
DQ into an evolving pattern that is a greater whole, a microcosm." Now I think that this *would*
represent an answer, but I think it goes against how the MoQ is constructed, ie part one above. That
is, if we do take a gestalt/new pattern/composite approach, then this is some "thing" which is NOT
captured by the four levels. It could well be that I am missing something here, but if so, then I
think the consequences are rather disturbing, in that if we allow a composite pattern to hold here,
then why not anywhere else, eg start to say that a city or a cow or a mathematical theory is
composite in an analogous fashion? I'm interested to see if anyone wants to take this route.
So, a restatement, in the interim: there is no 'thing' in the MoQ which can be recognised as
corresponding to what we would normally refer to as 'Jane Doe'. There is no 'locus of value'
corresponding to Jane Doe, and therefore, in considering what is bad about the murder of Jane Doe,
according to the MoQ, the worst thing is the loss of the IDEAS in her head. Jane Doe does not have
value in her own right, irrespective of those patterns of value of which she is composed, ie the
biological life form, the social roles, and the intellectual IDEAS. The value of Jane Doe is
derivative from those other patterns of value. To push this point, as I understand the MoQ, 'Jane
Doe' is an illusion, and one that we need to be free of. (This, I think, can actually be defended -
Chuck's point, what's wrong with accepting the implications that I am drawing out?)
Now to some more rhetorical/procedural points.
Dan commented: "There seems an assumption behind the question that we (people) in some way give
(assign) objects (people, in this case) value. I think the MOQ finds this assumption faulty. The MOQ
says that people are the patterns, and that patterns are value. So it seems to me the MOQ doesn't
give value to people, but rather the MOQ says that people ARE value."
I don't think this is true as a description of my question, nor of the MoQ. Pirsig is quite happy
for the attribution of value to be carried out - surely that's the whole point of claiming that
morality is now on a scientific footing? - and it is merely a useful form of language. It is not
that we generate the value by our description, but that we recognise the value which is present, in
its static and dynamic aspects. Furthermore, where does it say that 'people are value'? I thought
Pirsig said a) people are agglomerations of patterns of value; b) those patterns can be separately
described; and c) the value of a 'person' is an illusion. Have I misread him?
MSH also commented: I'm having trouble understanding your question. I don't see how the MOQ, or any
metaphysics, can GIVE value to anything. In the MOQ, Quality IS value, and everything derives from
Quality. Everything is composed of patterns of value, including people, so I don't understand what
you mean when you speak of "people as such", which suggests that they are something apart from the
patterns that compose them. People aren't just valuable; they ARE value.
See above, but consider this as an example. In the metaphysics of the Nazi ideology (if we can
dignify it with such a description) the üntermensch were considered of low value, so Jews,
homosexuals, gypsies etc were considered to be of less value than various Aryan exemplars. As far as
I can tell, in the MoQ ideology, there are no 'people', there are only static patterns of value,
which are arranged in a hierarchy. So IDEAS are the most important things, and other things (eg
societies, biological life) are of less value.
Let me put it like this, it is not that the MoQ GIVES or ASSIGNS value to people (or anything) it is
that it is a description of what does or does not have value, and in the MoQ 'people' have no value
(they do not exist, therefore they are precisely NOT a 'pattern of value'); whereas IDEAS etc do
have value (do exist, are patterns of value). Is that clearer?
Scott introduced the question of the mentally retarded, which is another aspect of the problem, and
I think his question is sound. What is at stake, as I understand it, is whether the retarded person
is seen as possessing an inherent Quality in and of themselves. To say that they might be the source
of ideas (in other people presumably?) is, I think, to miss the point of the concern. To use a more
familiar philosophical idiom, do people (retarded or otherwise) have value as ends in themselves, or
are they simply means to the preservation of other values (biological patterns, social patterns,
intellectual patterns)?
Finally, DMB supported Dan's point and said "Sam's bad question is predicated on a misunderstanding.
He's taken Pirsig's criticism of a particular conception of "self" and constued that to mean that
human beings are irrelevant or whatever. This cuts against the "man is the measure of all things"
attitude in Pirsig so profoundly that it strikes me as an entirely manufactured objection, one
wholly without merit."
This may well be true - and as I have said before, I'd be delighted if someone could show where I am
in fact misunderstanding the MoQ on this - but DMB's comments haven't achieved that for me. DMB
seems to be assuming the gestalt/composite point to be a true description of how the MoQ understands
persons, but he hasn't argued for it, and I don't believe it to be compatible with part two of my
problem.
Let me put it like this: if there is a pattern of value that can be classified in the MoQ schema,
which corresponds to what we call a person (eg 'Jane Doe') then my concerns are all overcome. It's
just that I don't think that there is. Consider this: "the greatest meaning can be given to the
intellectual level if it is confined to the skilled manipulation of abstract symbols that have no co
rresponding particular experience and which behave according to rules of their own" (Pirsig). This
is the highest level of value according to the MoQ - and I can't see any room for making a person
correspond to an abstract symbol.
But I could easily be wrong on this. Many thanks for the feedback.
Sam
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