From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Fri Dec 17 2004 - 13:49:17 GMT
Hi all,
This debate reminded me of something.
"One man is a convinced realist, another a convinced idealist, and each teaches his children
accordingly. In such an important matter as the existence or non-existence of the external world
they don't want to teach their children anything wrong. What will the children be taught? To include
in what they say: "There are physical objects" or the opposite? If someone does not believe in
fairies, he does not need to teach his children "There are no fairies": he can omit to teach them
the word "fairy". On what occasion are they to say "There are...." or "There are no...."? Only when
they meet people of the contrary belief.
"But the idealist will teach his children the word 'chair' after all, for of course he wants to
teach them to do this or do that, eg to fetch a chair. Then where will be the difference between
what the idealist-educated children say and the realist ones? Won't the difference only be one of
battle-cry?"
(Wittgenstein, Zettel, paras 413 & 414)
The whole idealist/realist debate is a product of subject-object metaphysics, which we need to let
go of. The more Pirsig says that the MoQ is a type of idealism, the more he regresses from his
foundational insights.
Sam
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
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