From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Wed Jan 29 2003 - 22:35:59 GMT
Dear Steve, Platt, Matthew and David B.,
I wrote 9 Nov 2002 11:42:23 +0100:
'I know how to categorize patterns of values: by the way they are
maintained/latched. (inorganic: unequal probability distributions in the
quantum behavior of subatomic particles; biological: DNA stabilized by
protein structures around it; social: unconscious copying of behavior;
intellectual: conscious motivation/justification of actions in a way that is
acceptable to others). I can categorize values indirectly by interpreting
them as the value of maintaining a pattern of values of one of these types
(i.e. as static quality) or as the value of changing a pattern of values
away from disintegration (i.e. as Dynamic Quality).'
I wrote 21 Jan 2003 15:34:30 +0100:
'I don't think it very useful to think of an individual (human) as either a
social or an intellectual pattern of value. Such an individual is a subject
or an object (depending on your point of view) and can be an element in all
kinds of patterns of value.
...
I think Pirsig isn't making things clearer by talking about
"biological/social/intellectual entities". It would be better, I think, to
stress that thinking in terms of patterns of value is to be distinguished as
clearly as possible from thinking in terms of subjects and objects. Equating
objects with inorganic and biological patterns of value and subjects with
social and intellectual patterns of value (which Pirsig did explicitly in
his SODV-paper; see on www.moq.org) is only excusable as a crude rule of
thumb or short introduction to SOM for SO-thinkers. It's a fallacy, I
believe, to try to categorize "things" (usually visualized as subject or
object) as a pattern of value of one of the levels.
We should first be clear about what we mean with a 'pattern of value' (and
how it is to be distinguished from a subject or an object). Only then can we
categorize patterns of value.'
Steve agrees but asks 21 Jan 2003 20:30:30 -0500:
'Could you help me make this distinction between subjects/objects and
patterns of value. ...
If we can't categorize "things", then what can be categorized? Patterns,
obviously, but I'm not sure what is meant by "pattern" in the moq sense.
Perhaps it probably needs to be an undefined term. Could you then give me
some examples? Would the following qualify as patterns in your
understanding: gravity, photosynthesis, sex, dancing, democracy, laws,
terrorism?'
And 23 Jan 2003 08:23:27 -0500:
'My problem is that I'm not sure how to categorize patterns of value any
better than subjects and objects.'
Matthew largely agrees 24 Jan 2003 12:31:55 +0000, but points to the risk
that classifying patterns of value makes them into objects and thus
re-introduces SOM. He would like to avoid all classification as much as
possible.
David at first neither understands nor agrees 19 Jan 2003 14:49:06 -0700:
'I found Wim's formulation so confusing, so wrong, and so bizzare that I'd
hardly know where to begin to untangle it.'
25 Jan 2003 14:30:46 -0700 he quotes Pirsig ('Lila' ch. 24) against me:
'The MOQ resolves the relationship between intellect and society, subject
and object, mind and matter, by embedding all of them in a larger system of
understanding. Objects are inorganic and biological values; subjects are
social and intellectual values.'
Platt doesn't understand, but is 'not prepared to say it's wrong just
because I don't understand it.' (22 Jan 2003 07:39:47 -0500) He does
disagree that 'the intellectual level has to be "acceptable to others." As
soon as you bring in "others" you're into social level patterns.'
He does like simplistic categorizations: 'Call me simplistic.
Crime-biological. Democracy-social. Terrorism-biological. Communism-social.
Capitalism-social. Dancing monkeys-biological.'
The problem (of Steve and Matthew) is, that if we are going to describe
patterns of value in order first to distinguish them from subjects & objects
and then to classify them, we have to use words that usually indicate
subjects and objects. If we are categorizing words without very carefully
explaining how they are indicating patterns of value for us, we may well end
up re-enforcing the subject-object thinking in which these words are usually
applied.
So, if you ask me:
'Would the following qualify as patterns in your understanding: gravity,
photosynthesis, sex, dancing, democracy, laws, terrorism?',
I want to stress first that these words (as any word) primarily qualify as
'symbols ... that stand for patterns of experience' (part of Pirsig's
definition of the intellectual level in a footnote of 'Lila's Child'). The
problem is, that in subject-object thinking they ALSO 'stand for'
interactions of subjects and/or objects that we have deduced from this
experience. And in Subject-Object Thinking (SOT) ANY symbol can be defined
as describing an objective phenomenon (even the symbol 'I').
The patterns of experience these words stand for all qualify as patterns of
value, as repetitive experience. If we describe these patterns of value by
the interactions of subjects and/or objects that -in SOT- explain that
repetition, we run the risk to which Matthew pointed of re-introducing or
re-enforcing SOM. So it would be better to describe more directly what
elements of our experience are exactly repeating themselves. These
repetitive experiences can than be classified (in the 4 levels) by asking
ourselves how the repetition (the static aspect) is maintained.
'Gravity' can then be seen to stand for repeatedly experiencing 'falling'
(on a small scale) and 'collective movement around common centers of
gravity' (on a celestial scale). It can be explained by the unequal
probability of subatomic particles moving away from and towards each other.
So it can stand for an inorganic pattern of value.
'Photosynthesis' can be seen to stand for repeatedly experiencing growth in
complexity of chemical substances and simultaneously experiencing light. It
can be explained by the vegetable DNA and surrounding protein structures
that catalyze these chemical processes. So it can stand for a biological
pattern of value.
'Sex' can be seen to stand for repeatedly experiencing behavior that brings
together different types of cells (ovum and semen) that can fuse and combine
their DNA. It can be explained as one of the most complex behavioral
patterns explainable in terms of DNA and proteins (involving pheromones for
instance). So it can stand for a biological pattern of value.
'Sex' can also be seen to stand for repeatedly experiencing behavior (mainly
among humans) that -even while strongly resembling the biological pattern of
value- is much too complex to be explained in the same way. It often stops
far short of bringing together ovum and semen (or even involves only one of
these types of cells, as in homosexual sex), while still being recognizably
'sex'. It then stands for a different type of repetitive behavior, that can
be explained by (usually) people copying behavior from each other.
'Dancing' can be seen to stand for repeatedly experiencing (different) sets
of movements that are internally repetitive; not necessarily only human
movements, because also something like waving grain can be recognized to be
'dancing'. Depending on context it can be explained in all 4 different ways.
It can stand for inorganic, biological, social and intellectual patterns of
value.
'Democracy' can stand for a social or for an intellectual pattern of value.
The social pattern of value can for instance be described by human behavior
of a group that conforms itself to the behavior of a majority of that group.
(Some even use it to stand for a behavior of a group that conforms itself to
the behavior of a minority, if the group can be seen to be distinguishable
in subgroups and the minority is a majority in a majority of the subgroups.)
The intellectual pattern of value can for instance be described by sets of
reasons that can be heard or read among a lot of people for accepting
majority decisions and acting as if you agree even if you don't.
'Laws' can again stand for all possible patterns of value, depending on
context.
'Terrorism' can be seen to stand for repeatedly experiencing that people
fall into biologically 'hard-wired' fright/flight/fight reactions and while
other people die or are severely injured. It is again a very complex
behavioral pattern of groups of people that nevertheless can still be
explained in terms of DNA and proteins and DNA-programmed, protein-catalyzed
chemical reactions in fearful situations.
'Terrorism' can also stand for a pattern of behavior that is too complex to
be DNA-programmed and protein-catalyzed. Recognizably fear-related behavior
is then copied between people. Some people can be seen to start the chain
reaction. Their behavior can also be recognized as 'pecking order' behavior,
behavior that moves people up a status hierarchy or prevents others from
doing so. Some 'terrorists' are inciting fear-related behavior among higher
status people, disrupting the status hierarchy and moving 'up' in the
process. Other 'terrorists' are inciting fear-related behavior among lower
status people, keeping them 'down'.
'Terrorism' can even stand for sets of reasons that can be heard or read
among people inciting fear-related behavior in others.
|The words Platt uses (crime, democracy, terrorism, communism, capitalism,
dancing monkeys) can stand for different types of patterns of value,
depending on context. Communism understood as theory is something quite
different from communism as practice. Whether the difference is a difference
in level, depends on your definition of the levels of course. David B. uses
different definitions of the social and intellectual levels than I do.
I don't agree with Platt (as does David B.) that 'as soon as you bring in
"others" you're into social level patterns'. I simply don't know how to
explain the stability of intellectual patterns of value if I don't bring in
'others'. The ideas in my head which are never expressed in conversation or
correspondence with others are not very stable at all... I usually forget
them much faster than the ones I repeat in conversation and correspondence
or the ones that are repeated at me. I don't exclude the possibility of sets
of ideas that keep popping up in my without being consciously associated
with social interaction, but to me it seems the exception that proves the
rule, that makes it into a 'pattern' rather than a 'law of nature' (a
pattern of value that is latched at a lower level).
To David B. I would say that Pirsig disagreeing with me (in a text he wrote
before he could have know of my adaptations to his MoQ), doesn't prove that
my version of the MoQ is wrong. His "crude rule of thumb" may accomplish a
lot compared with SOM. Alone it is not enough, however, to retain the
insight from ZAMM that subject-object thinking is wrong and that thinking in
terms of Quality constitutes an alternative view on reality and not just an
addition, not just a wider perspective in which subject-object thinking is
'embedded'.
I'm not politically conservative at all, but I don't agree with you either,
David, that political conservatism is at a lower level in the sense that it
stands for a social pattern of value, whereas 'our' pet -isms stand for
intellectual patterns of value. Pirsig agreed on that! (But I haven't time
to look it up any more.) For me all -isms that stand for sets of ideas stand
for intellectual patterns of values. Ideas can't be passed on and latched by
copying of behavior only. I know you define the social level differently and
if I take your distinction between social and intellectual patterns of value
to denote a distinction within my intellectual level I often agree with you.
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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