From: Ron Winchester (phaedruswolff@hotmail.com)
Date: Sun Jan 30 2005 - 02:26:43 GMT
Matt;
This is one reason why I don't see the problem of switching points Pirsig
makes from one idiom to another: I think the points are the same much of the
time. Its just a matter of how we characterize them and if there are any
problems in our characterizations. For instance, Sam and I think that,
without dropping reference to "experience" as a philosophical concept (e.g.,
when talking about mysticism), one will tend to fall into bad, SOMic
philosophy. Sam and I are arguing Paul and Pirsig don't escape these
pitfalls, but I for one am not sure about Scott.
Hi Matt and all,
It would seem to me that you are stuck on Newtonian-Kantian
conceptualization reality, and that anything I might offer is going to sound
like jibberish.
I will leave you to your philosopholgy, and appologize for trashing the
previous threads with my non-intellectual ramblings.
Just for my own sanity, I would like to ask if any of you have read Anthony
McWatt's thesis?
Ron
>From: "Matt Kundert" <pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com>
>Reply-To: moq_discuss@moq.org
>To: moq_discuss@moq.org
>Subject: Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic
>Date: Sat, 29 Jan 2005 14:44:44 -0600
>
>Scott, Sam, etc.,
>
>I think Sam and Scott are essentially right (though, predictably enough, I
>think Scott's characterization of pragmatism is a little off). In
>particular, I would bring together Sam's point that Quality is a
>redescription of experience with Scott's polemics against the empirical
>verifiability of the Quality thesis. I think the Quality-as-redescription
>thesis is at the heart of that polemic.
>
>Scott said:
>So in some cubic millimeter ten miles below the earth's surface there must
>be experiencing/value, or else we must say that the inorganic matter in
>that cubic millimeter does not exist. How is either statement justified
>empirically? ... Pirsig does support his claim by invoking quantum
>mechanics, and saying that probability can be seen as value, that is, that
>the subatomic entities are showing preferences for some states over others.
>This may well be a good way of thinking about it, but there is no empirical
>way to conclude it.
>
>Matt:
>If "Quality" is viewed as an empirical discovery, as Pirsig sometimes seems
>to characterize it, then there must be clear ways with which to determine
>its _non-existence_. There must be a clearly delineated set of criteria in
>which Quality could be proven not to exist and it must be a real
>possiblity. This is one of the first laws of scientific discovery, what I
>might characterize as the first rule for deciding whether the "vocabulary
>of discovery" is an appropriate language to use. As Scott says, "[Viewing
>probablity in quantum mechanics as value] may well be a good way of
>thinking about it, but there is no empirical way to conclude it." The
>basic gist is that as long as the ubiquity of Quality remains, as long as
>Pirsig says that Quality is reality is experience is everything, then there
>is no way to _prove_ or _disprove_ the existence of Quality. It becomes a
>working concept in a philosophical vocabulary with which we can work out
>certain philosophical consequences.
>
>Scott said:
>There are good reasons ... for saying that value is neither in the subject
>nor in the object. However, to go on from this and claim that the value
>exists prior to the distinction into subject and object has no empirical
>basis, as far as I can see. Instead, it appears that Pirsig makes this
>second claim based on mystical reports. But why those mystical reports and
>not others? For example, another kind of mystical report says that
>experience (or value), subject and object are all three created together in
>a kind of tri-unity. This has different philosophical consequences than the
>first one. What is the basis for choosing one over the other? Whatever it
>is, it is not empirical. It looks to me much more like a case of choosing
>one authority over another.
>
>Matt:
>Scott is saying here what my point was in bringing up Peirce and
>"metaphysical dogmatism" (in my original post). If there is no criteria
>for determining whether Quality is what experience really is, then it must
>be based on something else. One of those possible suggestions is a
>mystical experience. Mystical experiences here are what I called (using
>Peirce) "intuitive cognitions". 1) I think mystical experiences face
>infinite regress problems for determining certainty and 2) (which Scott
>says very well) if we grant certainty to mystical experiences, what do we
>do about differing mystical experiences? Here we face the "metaphysical
>dogmatism" to which Kant reacted, where we have various assertions of what
>the true reality is beyond appearances (i.e. assertions based on mystical
>experiences), but without any way of determining which of them is true.
>You simply make your stand and assert the Truth, which makes followers "a
>case of choosing one authority over another."
>
>However, there is another option for determining whether Quality is what
>experience really is, and Scott comes close to suggesting it, though he
>doesn't for an important reason. That option is the option Pirsig takes:
>our critieria are its (philosophical) consequences. This, however, is a
>pragmatist set of criteria: truth is what is good in the way of belief. If
>what I've been saying about pragmatism is true, however, the assertion of
>instrumentalist criteria eats away at the very presuppositions of the
>original question, "What is experience really?", in particular the "really"
>part. After nixing the "really" part, however, we can still assert answers
>to questions like "What is experience?" because, once we accept
>instrumentalist, pragmatic criteria for truth, the conversation then
>becomes about what is the best characterization for our purposes (what Hans
>Blumenburg, in his magesterial The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, calls the
>difference between Descartes' project of "self-grounding" and Bacon's
>project of "self-assertion"). For instance, our conversation about
>experience becomes a conversation about what characterization of it, what
>description, helps us relieve us of the most philosophical problems or
>hang-ups.
>
>Now, while I think Sam, Scott, and I are basically all (in the last few
>posts, at least) arraying the same type of criticisms, there are certainly
>going to be differences between us, most noticeably between Scott and Sam
>and I (though Sam and I have our differences, too). This comes out
>foremost in the fact that Scott accepts (I believe) some sort of
>appearance/reality distinction, whereas I know I do not (at least in my own
>characterizations), and I'm pretty sure Sam does not. This does not mean,
>however, that we cannot all reach for the same weapons in this instance
>(well, at this point it doesn't mean that, though naturally I have my
>suspicions about Scott). Though Scott, Sam, and I, I think, are all
>wielding the same weapons, our agreement is at a different level than our
>disagreements. I think we might say that we agree (at this juncture) in
>our metaphilosophy, whereas the philosophical language we will couch such
>points in (and then branch out with in making other points, such as Scott's
>supposed post-pragmatist appearance/reality distinction) will differ. For
>instance, I make my points using explicitly linguistic formulations, i.e.
>with reference to language, whereas Scott made his points more with a
>reference to experience (i.e. his use of "empirical").
>
>This difference between reference to language and reference to experience
>is one way of characterizing the difference between philosophy done by
>analytic philosophers (or, rather, philosophers having taken the
>"linguistic turn") and by metaphysicians. I think the important point to
>see is that we can agree on important metaphilosophical points, despite
>different formulations. How we characterize what we are doing is a
>different matter.
>
>This is one reason why I don't see the problem of switching points Pirsig
>makes from one idiom to another: I think the points are the same much of
>the time. Its just a matter of how we characterize them and if there are
>any problems in our characterizations. For instance, Sam and I think that,
>without dropping reference to "experience" as a philosophical concept
>(e.g., when talking about mysticism), one will tend to fall into bad, SOMic
>philosophy. Sam and I are arguing Paul and Pirsig don't escape these
>pitfalls, but I for one am not sure about Scott.
>
>Matt
>
>p.s. Scott, I think you are absolutely right in your characterization of
>the ambiguous nature of Pirsig's use of "subject" (and vicariously of
>"object," too). This is one very important reason why I've periodically
>asserted (most recently in October's MF discussion) that Pirsig conflates
>his problems with SOM with Cartesian epistemology (indicative of his attack
>on Plato's method of dialectic) and materialism (which I think he also
>subtly conflates with his problem with corpuscularianism and his problem
>with consumerism, partially because I see people here do it all the time).
>
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