From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Sat Jan 29 2005 - 20:44:44 GMT
Scott, Sam, etc.,
I think Sam and Scott are essentially right (though, predictably enough, I
think Scott's characterization of pragmatism is a little off). In
particular, I would bring together Sam's point that Quality is a
redescription of experience with Scott's polemics against the empirical
verifiability of the Quality thesis. I think the Quality-as-redescription
thesis is at the heart of that polemic.
Scott said:
So in some cubic millimeter ten miles below the earth's surface there must
be experiencing/value, or else we must say that the inorganic matter in that
cubic millimeter does not exist. How is either statement justified
empirically? ... Pirsig does support his claim by invoking quantum
mechanics, and saying that probability can be seen as value, that is, that
the subatomic entities are showing preferences for some states over others.
This may well be a good way of thinking about it, but there is no empirical
way to conclude it.
Matt:
If "Quality" is viewed as an empirical discovery, as Pirsig sometimes seems
to characterize it, then there must be clear ways with which to determine
its _non-existence_. There must be a clearly delineated set of criteria in
which Quality could be proven not to exist and it must be a real possiblity.
This is one of the first laws of scientific discovery, what I might
characterize as the first rule for deciding whether the "vocabulary of
discovery" is an appropriate language to use. As Scott says, "[Viewing
probablity in quantum mechanics as value] may well be a good way of thinking
about it, but there is no empirical way to conclude it." The basic gist is
that as long as the ubiquity of Quality remains, as long as Pirsig says that
Quality is reality is experience is everything, then there is no way to
_prove_ or _disprove_ the existence of Quality. It becomes a working
concept in a philosophical vocabulary with which we can work out certain
philosophical consequences.
Scott said:
There are good reasons ... for saying that value is neither in the subject
nor in the object. However, to go on from this and claim that the value
exists prior to the distinction into subject and object has no empirical
basis, as far as I can see. Instead, it appears that Pirsig makes this
second claim based on mystical reports. But why those mystical reports and
not others? For example, another kind of mystical report says that
experience (or value), subject and object are all three created together in
a kind of tri-unity. This has different philosophical consequences than the
first one. What is the basis for choosing one over the other? Whatever it
is, it is not empirical. It looks to me much more like a case of choosing
one authority over another.
Matt:
Scott is saying here what my point was in bringing up Peirce and
"metaphysical dogmatism" (in my original post). If there is no criteria for
determining whether Quality is what experience really is, then it must be
based on something else. One of those possible suggestions is a mystical
experience. Mystical experiences here are what I called (using Peirce)
"intuitive cognitions". 1) I think mystical experiences face infinite
regress problems for determining certainty and 2) (which Scott says very
well) if we grant certainty to mystical experiences, what do we do about
differing mystical experiences? Here we face the "metaphysical dogmatism"
to which Kant reacted, where we have various assertions of what the true
reality is beyond appearances (i.e. assertions based on mystical
experiences), but without any way of determining which of them is true. You
simply make your stand and assert the Truth, which makes followers "a case
of choosing one authority over another."
However, there is another option for determining whether Quality is what
experience really is, and Scott comes close to suggesting it, though he
doesn't for an important reason. That option is the option Pirsig takes:
our critieria are its (philosophical) consequences. This, however, is a
pragmatist set of criteria: truth is what is good in the way of belief. If
what I've been saying about pragmatism is true, however, the assertion of
instrumentalist criteria eats away at the very presuppositions of the
original question, "What is experience really?", in particular the "really"
part. After nixing the "really" part, however, we can still assert answers
to questions like "What is experience?" because, once we accept
instrumentalist, pragmatic criteria for truth, the conversation then becomes
about what is the best characterization for our purposes (what Hans
Blumenburg, in his magesterial The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, calls the
difference between Descartes' project of "self-grounding" and Bacon's
project of "self-assertion"). For instance, our conversation about
experience becomes a conversation about what characterization of it, what
description, helps us relieve us of the most philosophical problems or
hang-ups.
Now, while I think Sam, Scott, and I are basically all (in the last few
posts, at least) arraying the same type of criticisms, there are certainly
going to be differences between us, most noticeably between Scott and Sam
and I (though Sam and I have our differences, too). This comes out foremost
in the fact that Scott accepts (I believe) some sort of appearance/reality
distinction, whereas I know I do not (at least in my own characterizations),
and I'm pretty sure Sam does not. This does not mean, however, that we
cannot all reach for the same weapons in this instance (well, at this point
it doesn't mean that, though naturally I have my suspicions about Scott).
Though Scott, Sam, and I, I think, are all wielding the same weapons, our
agreement is at a different level than our disagreements. I think we might
say that we agree (at this juncture) in our metaphilosophy, whereas the
philosophical language we will couch such points in (and then branch out
with in making other points, such as Scott's supposed post-pragmatist
appearance/reality distinction) will differ. For instance, I make my points
using explicitly linguistic formulations, i.e. with reference to language,
whereas Scott made his points more with a reference to experience (i.e. his
use of "empirical").
This difference between reference to language and reference to experience is
one way of characterizing the difference between philosophy done by analytic
philosophers (or, rather, philosophers having taken the "linguistic turn")
and by metaphysicians. I think the important point to see is that we can
agree on important metaphilosophical points, despite different formulations.
How we characterize what we are doing is a different matter.
This is one reason why I don't see the problem of switching points Pirsig
makes from one idiom to another: I think the points are the same much of the
time. Its just a matter of how we characterize them and if there are any
problems in our characterizations. For instance, Sam and I think that,
without dropping reference to "experience" as a philosophical concept (e.g.,
when talking about mysticism), one will tend to fall into bad, SOMic
philosophy. Sam and I are arguing Paul and Pirsig don't escape these
pitfalls, but I for one am not sure about Scott.
Matt
p.s. Scott, I think you are absolutely right in your characterization of the
ambiguous nature of Pirsig's use of "subject" (and vicariously of "object,"
too). This is one very important reason why I've periodically asserted
(most recently in October's MF discussion) that Pirsig conflates his
problems with SOM with Cartesian epistemology (indicative of his attack on
Plato's method of dialectic) and materialism (which I think he also subtly
conflates with his problem with corpuscularianism and his problem with
consumerism, partially because I see people here do it all the time).
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