From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Tue Feb 01 2005 - 05:13:16 GMT
Matt,
I'd like to get a clearer picture of where we agree in general (i.e., not
necessarily about the MOQ). I realize that where you're unsure if we agree
or not is because I have been inconsistent in the vocabularies I use. In
particular, I sometimes use a vocabulary I don't really like just to make
some point in a discussion that is using that vocabulary. (Though I am also
sometimes just plain inconsistent.)
> I think Sam and Scott are essentially right (though, predictably enough, I
> think Scott's characterization of pragmatism is a little off).
You're probably right, but I'd like to know what you mean specifically.
> However, there is another option for determining whether Quality is what
> experience really is, and Scott comes close to suggesting it, though he
> doesn't for an important reason. That option is the option Pirsig takes:
> our critieria are its (philosophical) consequences. This, however, is a
> pragmatist set of criteria: truth is what is good in the way of belief.
You're right that I didn't suggest it, but I think I have in the past, so
I'm wondering what my "important reason" is. But a more general question:
I agree with Rorty's statement that you quoted a while back: "[philosophy
being] the greatest game of all precisely because it is the game of changing
the rules." [where is this from, BTW?] So philosophy in general proceeds by
coming up with new rules (new ways of using existing words, mainly) and then
seeing how one's understanding is improved, with no attempt to define
"improved" -- one just likes where one has gotten to in conceptual space.
Or is what I just said metaphilosophy, while when one does attempt to define
"improved", one has moved into philosophy proper? That is one thing I'd like
your take on, namely, where the boundary is between metaphilosophy and
philosophy. In particular, do you consider metaphilosophy to be, so to
speak, included within philosophy or not. I assume it differs from
"methodology", especially given that methodology usually pretty much
determines one's philosophical position, and often enough is worked out in
order to justify that position. (Maybe that's too cynical -- let's say that
one's position and one's method mutually reinforce one another.)
In particular, do you see the rejection of metaphysics as a
metaphilosophical move or a philosophical move? I see it as the latter, but
let me forgo that argument for now -- this being, or leading to, a point
where we disagree. In fact, pretty much anything else I say at this point
gets into disagreement territory, so let me stop here and jump to:
>...whereas the
> philosophical language we will couch such points in (and then branch out
> with in making other points, such as Scott's supposed post-pragmatist
> appearance/reality distinction) will differ. For instance, I make my
points
> using explicitly linguistic formulations, i.e. with reference to language,
> whereas Scott made his points more with a reference to experience (i.e.
his
> use of "empirical").
I think these were cases of buying into the vocabulary of the discussion.
For me, "experience" is pretty much another word for "consciousness", and
since that is what most intrigues me, I do not see experience as the basis
for collecting data on which I will philosophize, but as the thing on which
my inquiry is directed. And just to complicate things further, I think (that
is, the hypothesis I am working with is) that all experience is semiotic. As
to how I go about philosophizing, I think it is mostly a matter of working
on linguistic formulations. But in my case, I am seeking formulations that
flesh out the hypothesis, rather than working toward removing
pseudo-problems. In some cases the two overlap, though.
But to the A/R distinction. I would like to give up on using the word
"reality" philosophically, since in normal usage, it applies more to what
"appearances" originally meant, that is, sense phenomena. But I do see the
need for two distinctions that have been called A/R distinctions. One is in
quantum physics, where one needs to be able to refer to the unmeasured. The
whole philosophical problem with QM is that we cannot fit what is going on
subatomically into the categories of sense phenomena. Pirsig (in the SODV
paper) calls it the Conceptually Unknown, but I think this is backwards. It
is (to some extent) conceptually known, that is, with mathematical concepts.
Instead, it is perceptually unknowable. In any case, it is different from
the phenomenal world, and that difference needs to be recognized.
The other distinction needed is in the philosophy of mysticism. Somehow one
needs to refer to the difference between "what it is like to be the Buddha"
and "what it is like to be me". To make this distinction, I would give up on
both appearance and reality, and I don't think that "illusion" works very
well either. Merrell-Wolff uses "absolute consciousness" versus "relative
consciousness", and I think one can go places with that, though not without
the logic of contradictory identity, in which the absolute is not other than
the relative, and the relative is not other than the absolute. Otherwise,
one ends up reifying the absolute, and one has an A/R distinction again, or
dualism. (This is my complaint about how DQ is treated mystically in the
MOQ.)
> For instance, Sam and I think that,
> without dropping reference to "experience" as a philosophical concept
(e.g.,
> when talking about mysticism), one will tend to fall into bad, SOMic
> philosophy. Sam and I are arguing Paul and Pirsig don't escape these
> pitfalls, but I for one am not sure about Scott.
I pretty much agree. I say "mystical experience" a lot because I don't want
to get sidetracked with qualifying it. I would like to have an X-out key to
express that it should be "under erasure". But, then, how does one refer to
a time period in someone's life about which they say "it was timeless", or
in some way indicate that it was completely out of the ordinary?
- Scott
P.S. This is a lot to deal with, so if you just want to comment on one or
two points, that's fine with me. The rest will probably come back around
anyway.
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