Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic

From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Mon Feb 14 2005 - 19:50:04 GMT

  • Next message: Scott Roberts: "Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic"

    Hey Ian,

    You mentioned that, though you don't like the definitions I was using, you
    liked that I was "honest enough to introduce them as your working
    definitions for the purpose of debate." I think this is the most important
    point to understand about pragmatism and its reversion to the Socratic/Greek
    meaning of philosophy (as opposed to what turned into Platonism) and I just
    wanted to expand on it for a moment. All of our definitions are "working
    definitions" because we follow Wittgenstein in thinking that there is
    nothing more to the meaning of a word than how it is used. In the
    conversation known as philosophy, all we can do is find better and better
    ways of saying things, which means proposing theses and definitions and
    hashing out their pluses and minuses. Even if you think that philosophy (or
    some other activity) can get at the way things really are, the activity of
    having a conversation is nothing more than this. Scott reflects this in a
    recent reply to Ron when he says that philosophy is the "activity of
    evaluating, challenging, and reshaping the philosophic vocabulary."
    Depending on what we are trying to do, we'll use different definitions. If
    a person is doing history, they'll dig around and try and find out what
    people from a particular time period were doing and how they defined their
    words. If a person is actively trying to change the course of a
    conversation, they'll find creative redescriptions of old words (and maybe
    create some new ones) to get their point across. The technique that works
    the best, I think, is balancing between the two, summing up the past and
    trying to move beyond it.

    Oh, and I don't have any interesting definitions of natural science or
    physics. Pragmatists like myself are moved to call a science "a vocabulary
    that is good at predicting and controlling." Obviously such a definition
    like that is in dire need of some further qualification (like "physical
    stuff" or "by using microstructural explanations"), but I don't have the
    energy to work up something appropriate right now, and there isn't really
    any pressing need to. But Scott pretty much sums up a pragmatist view of
    science when he responds to Ron when Ron suggested that the sciences are
    much different now then they were, say, when the logical positivists were
    around:

    "I don't see any 'real science' changing in all this. All the disciplines,
    scientific or otherwise, would be just the same whether they are called
    "empirical" or not. What counts for physics and chemistry are that
    experiments are reproducible, that theories are testable, and so on. What
    counts for, say, economics is if the theories make good predictions. If it
    works, it is good. If it doesn't, it is not good."

    The thing that Scott brings out nicely here is how disciplines create their
    own problematic and what counts and does not count as a satisfactory
    disciplinary production. Physics, chemistry, and economics are all in the
    game of predicting and controlling and, based on their different purposes,
    they've come up with ways in which to tell a good theory from a bad theory.
    Like the idea that "intelligent design" is a scientific theory. I'm not
    sure how Scott feels about it (based on his feelings about Darwinianism),
    but as far as I can see, from what I've read, "intelligent design" isn't so
    much a theory whose purpose is to displace evolutionary theory, as an
    attempt to block the road of inquiry (by saying, "nah, nah, evolution won't
    explain the things you want it to"). Pragmatists have very little truck
    with blocking the road of inquiry, we'd rather let inquiries die out on
    there own. People will simply stop doing them when they are found to not be
    profitable anymore. And from what I've read (like Micheal Behe's
    "biochemical attack" on evolution), there just isn't enough evidence to
    warrant a stop to evolutionary theory. But we'll see. That's the best
    thing about inquiry: we'll more than likely never know whether we're right
    or wrong in our predictions or suggestions about what is better or worse.
    Its up to the historians of a couple generations down the line to sum up
    those things, who was wrong and who was prescient beyond their years.

    Matt

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