MD Linguistics (Was Kantian etc ...)

From: Ian Glendinning (ian@psybertron.org)
Date: Tue Feb 15 2005 - 10:58:57 GMT

  • Next message: Ian Glendinning: "Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic"

    Matt ...
    You said
    I think this is the most important point to understand ... we follow
    Wittgenstein in thinking that there is nothing more to the meaning of a word
    than how it is used.

    I agree
    It's a couple of years since we enganed in any correspondence, but there is
    lttle doubt you and I are aligned on this pragmatic point. You make another
    point of mine too, about the point of "debate". No-one "wins an argument by
    intoducing logical analysis to undermine their "opponent" (unless their
    opponent happens to agree) - that's destructive - what is needed is
    synthesis, not analysis - careful with that razor Aristotle / Occam /
    Eugene - choose your weapon. Creative addition of the two views, changing
    the words if it helps. All life is problems (Popper / Wittgenstein) - all
    problems are lingusitic (Ian / Matt) - all life is linguistic (any
    logician).

    Actually you do have an interesting definining of science - just another
    vocabulary you say. Agreed.

    Philosophy / Physics, Meta or not - the question is the same, "how does that
    work ?" - the answer ought to be the same the closer we get to agreement,
    the only difference being the language used IMHO. This "great convergence"
    is often pooh-poohed by expert / specialists, but I think it is real in
    these days of mass communication. Rightly or wrongly, we all use / misuse
    jargon (with our own understood meaning) arising from walks of life beyond
    our own, daily - the ultimate lexical soup.

    I'm reading Searle's "Mind - A Brief Introduction" - I impatiently crticised
    him in some earlier blog posts, but I have to say he talks about as much
    common sense as I've seen in a long time. I don't think he'd disagree with
    the synthesis above, even if you feel I may be stretching it.

    Ian

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Matt Kundert" <pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    Sent: Monday, February 14, 2005 7:50 PM
    Subject: Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic

    > Hey Ian,
    >
    > You mentioned that, though you don't like the definitions I was using, you
    > liked that I was "honest enough to introduce them as your working
    > definitions for the purpose of debate." about pragmatism and its
    > reversion to the Socratic/Greek meaning of philosophy (as opposed to what
    > turned into Platonism) and I just wanted to expand on it for a moment.
    > All of our definitions are "working definitions" because we follow
    > Wittgenstein in thinking that there is nothing more to the meaning of a
    > word than how it is used. In the conversation known as philosophy, all we
    > can do is find better and better ways of saying things, which means
    > proposing theses and definitions and hashing out their pluses and minuses.
    > Even if you think that philosophy (or some other activity) can get at the
    > way things really are, the activity of having a conversation is nothing
    > more than this. Scott reflects this in a recent reply to Ron when he says
    > that philosophy is the "activity of evaluating, challenging, and reshaping
    > the philosophic vocabulary." Depending on what we are trying to do, we'll
    > use different definitions. If a person is doing history, they'll dig
    > around and try and find out what people from a particular time period were
    > doing and how they defined their words. If a person is actively trying to
    > change the course of a conversation, they'll find creative redescriptions
    > of old words (and maybe create some new ones) to get their point across.
    > The technique that works the best, I think, is balancing between the two,
    > summing up the past and trying to move beyond it.
    >
    > Oh, and I don't have any interesting definitions of natural science or
    > physics. Pragmatists like myself are moved to call a science "a
    > vocabulary that is good at predicting and controlling." Obviously such a
    > definition like that is in dire need of some further qualification (like
    > "physical stuff" or "by using microstructural explanations"), but I don't
    > have the energy to work up something appropriate right now, and there
    > isn't really any pressing need to. But Scott pretty much sums up a
    > pragmatist view of science when he responds to Ron when Ron suggested that
    > the sciences are much different now then they were, say, when the logical
    > positivists were around:
    >
    > "I don't see any 'real science' changing in all this. All the disciplines,
    > scientific or otherwise, would be just the same whether they are called
    > "empirical" or not. What counts for physics and chemistry are that
    > experiments are reproducible, that theories are testable, and so on. What
    > counts for, say, economics is if the theories make good predictions. If it
    > works, it is good. If it doesn't, it is not good."
    >
    > The thing that Scott brings out nicely here is how disciplines create
    > their own problematic and what counts and does not count as a satisfactory
    > disciplinary production. Physics, chemistry, and economics are all in the
    > game of predicting and controlling and, based on their different purposes,
    > they've come up with ways in which to tell a good theory from a bad
    > theory. Like the idea that "intelligent design" is a scientific theory.
    > I'm not sure how Scott feels about it (based on his feelings about
    > Darwinianism), but as far as I can see, from what I've read, "intelligent
    > design" isn't so much a theory whose purpose is to displace evolutionary
    > theory, as an attempt to block the road of inquiry (by saying, "nah, nah,
    > evolution won't explain the things you want it to"). Pragmatists have
    > very little truck with blocking the road of inquiry, we'd rather let
    > inquiries die out on there own. People will simply stop doing them when
    > they are found to not be profitable anymore. And from what I've read
    > (like Micheal Behe's "biochemical attack" on evolution), there just isn't
    > enough evidence to warrant a stop to evolutionary theory. But we'll see.
    > That's the best thing about inquiry: we'll more than likely never know
    > whether we're right or wrong in our predictions or suggestions about what
    > is better or worse. Its up to the historians of a couple generations down
    > the line to sum up those things, who was wrong and who was prescient
    > beyond their years.
    >
    > Matt
    >
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