Re: MD Whither "direct," "pure," and "immediate"?

From: ian glendinning (psybertron@gmail.com)
Date: Thu Mar 17 2005 - 00:28:32 GMT

  • Next message: Sam Norton: "Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic"

    Matt,

    You said
    As for the idea of "pre-intellectual experience," this is the exact
    concept I would like to get rid of in Pirsig .... that's just going
    along with common sense, which is what Dan is trying to convince us is
    all that Pirsig meant.

    I say ...
    Not sure what you mean by "trying to get rid of" - trying to deny
    that's what Pirsig meant ? I actually think I agree with Dan. However
    I tink the subtley is linguistic - the very point we recognise the
    phenomenon and put a name to it mentally - we have brought in millenia
    of cultural conditioning already, even if we didn't "think" about it.
    The name of the rose.

    It's all linguistics / evolutionary psychology as you, Bohr and Pirsig
    sem to agree.

    Ian

    On Wed, 16 Mar 2005 12:16:25 -0600, Matt Kundert
    <pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com> wrote:
    > Hi Ian, Dan,
    >
    > Ian said:
    > IMHO - the use of pure / immefiate / direct in Pirsig / MoQ terms is to
    > signify "pre-intellectual" experience. The more modern problem I see is that
    > people may think it's being used to distinguish qualia from pre-cognitive
    > experience, in which case we are generally not concerned with that here.
    >
    > Pre-intellectual, I'm talking raw, as in before reflective / rationalising
    > interpretation of what is being experienced.
    >
    > Pre-cognitive, I'm talking raw, as in quanto-electro-chemical phenomena
    > before their immediate interpratation as qualities like red, hot, pain,
    > experiences.
    >
    > (Personally I don't think I believe in qualia, which may undermnine the
    > distinction for me, but I think it's the distinction being confused.)
    >
    > Matt:
    > If I understand you correctly here, what you call "pre-cognitive" would be
    > something like our brain states (C-fiber stimulation, etc.) as opposed to
    > our descriptions of them (as red, hot, etc.). If this is what you mean,
    > then I would agree, qualia as an epistemological concept is suspect and I
    > think "immediate" as a differentiation between the two types of description
    > (roughly, a brain description and a mind description) is equally suspect.
    > For pragmatists like Rorty, we can describe phenomena equally well in both
    > types of descriptions, but neither one reduces to the other (this is the
    > mind/brain identity thesis).
    >
    > As for the idea of "pre-intellectual experience," this is the exact concept
    > I would like to get rid of in Pirsig. Sure, we can make a distinction
    > between our "immediate" impression of something before we think about it
    > later more. But that's just going along with common sense, which is what
    > Dan is trying to convince us is all that Pirsig meant (with the difference
    > between being at a baseball game and watching on TV, or watching a baseball
    > game from wherever and thinking about it later). I don't think it's as
    > apparent as that. I think Pirsig is trying to draw specifically
    > philosophical consequences out of his idea of "pre-intellectual experience."
    > It seems to me that Pirsig is trying to say that our "pre-intellecual
    > experience" of low Quality _happens before language_, and this
    > pre-linguistic experience is closer to Quality than post-linguistic, that
    > language is a mediation between us and reality. As he says in the famous
    > hot stove example, "the low value comes first, then the subjective
    > thoughts…." (Ch 8) Value first, thoughts, i.e. language, second. As far as
    > I can see, there is no way to draw any philosophical consequences out of the
    > idea of "pre-intellectual experience" that does not tie you into traditional
    > problems. For pragmatists, there is no way to unhook language from
    > experience, just as Pirsig agrees to when he says with Bohr that we are
    > "suspended in language." It seems to me that Pirsig equivocates between a
    > commonsensical notion of direct experience and a specifically philosophical
    > sense, and this equivocation is what allows him to gain plausibility for a
    > specifically philosophical concept.
    >
    > At least, that's how it seems to me. If it were otherwise, I'm not sure why
    > Pirsig would spend so much time talking about the "pre-intellectual cutting
    > edge of reality" and how that's supposed to cure some of our specifically
    > philosophical ailments. Its understood that common sense contains Platonic
    > and Cartesian formations, as Dan alluded to elsewhere when he said, "Of
    > course the [baseball] analogy is 'Cartesian theatre' in as much as our
    > language is grounded in such a manner." But aren't we supposed to be
    > changing such things in as much as we want our language to be better?
    >
    > Matt
    >
    > _________________________________________________________________
    > Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE!
    > http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
    >
    > MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    > Mail Archives:
    > Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    > Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    > MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
    >
    > To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    > http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
    >
    >

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html

    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Thu Mar 17 2005 - 00:32:08 GMT