Re: MD Whither "direct," "pure," and "immediate"?

From: Joseph Maurer (jhmau@sbcglobal.net)
Date: Thu Mar 17 2005 - 19:41:28 GMT

  • Next message: Platt Holden: "Re: MD Contradictions"

    On Wednesday 16 March 2005 5:09 PM Ian writes to Matt:

    [Ian] I say ...
    Not sure what you mean by "trying to get rid of" - trying to deny
    that's what Pirsig meant ? I actually think I agree with Dan. However
    I tink the subtley is linguistic - the very point we recognise the
    phenomenon and put a name to it mentally - we have brought in millenia
    of cultural conditioning already, even if we didn't "think" about it.
    The name of the rose.

    [Ian] It's all linguistics / evolutionary psychology as you, Bohr and Pirsig
    sem to agree.

    Hi Ian, Matt, and all,

    A law of gravity helps us discuss the inorganic level. A law of supply and
    demand helps us discuss economic issues. I want to talk about linguistics
    morality/propaganda to another. Pirsig proposes three levels in an hierarchy
    as the basis for morality. The tsunami mixed all the levels.

    I attribute active DQ, passive SQ, or neutral DQ/SQ to a level, and morality
    changes. Propaganda is immoral in that social- active mistreats
    intellectual- passive. Intellectual- active (weapons of mass destruction)
    mistreats social-active (seeking self-determination). Neutral is a hell of a
    problem. Listen, I’ll tell you! Direct, Pure, Immediate go nine different
    ways, with 27 variations of linguistics. Man, it gets confusing.

    Joe

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "ian glendinning" <psybertron@gmail.com>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2005 4:28 PM
    Subject: Re: MD Whither "direct," "pure," and "immediate"?

    > Matt,
    >
    > You said
    > As for the idea of "pre-intellectual experience," this is the exact
    > concept I would like to get rid of in Pirsig .... that's just going
    > along with common sense, which is what Dan is trying to convince us is
    > all that Pirsig meant.
    >
    > I say ...
    > Not sure what you mean by "trying to get rid of" - trying to deny
    > that's what Pirsig meant ? I actually think I agree with Dan. However
    > I tink the subtley is linguistic - the very point we recognise the
    > phenomenon and put a name to it mentally - we have brought in millenia
    > of cultural conditioning already, even if we didn't "think" about it.
    > The name of the rose.
    >
    > It's all linguistics / evolutionary psychology as you, Bohr and Pirsig
    > sem to agree.
    >
    > Ian
    >
    >
    > On Wed, 16 Mar 2005 12:16:25 -0600, Matt Kundert
    > <pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com> wrote:
    >> Hi Ian, Dan,
    >>
    >> Ian said:
    >> IMHO - the use of pure / immefiate / direct in Pirsig / MoQ terms is to
    >> signify "pre-intellectual" experience. The more modern problem I see is
    >> that
    >> people may think it's being used to distinguish qualia from pre-cognitive
    >> experience, in which case we are generally not concerned with that here.
    >>
    >> Pre-intellectual, I'm talking raw, as in before reflective /
    >> rationalising
    >> interpretation of what is being experienced.
    >>
    >> Pre-cognitive, I'm talking raw, as in quanto-electro-chemical phenomena
    >> before their immediate interpratation as qualities like red, hot, pain,
    >> experiences.
    >>
    >> (Personally I don't think I believe in qualia, which may undermnine the
    >> distinction for me, but I think it's the distinction being confused.)
    >>
    >> Matt:
    >> If I understand you correctly here, what you call "pre-cognitive" would
    >> be
    >> something like our brain states (C-fiber stimulation, etc.) as opposed to
    >> our descriptions of them (as red, hot, etc.). If this is what you mean,
    >> then I would agree, qualia as an epistemological concept is suspect and I
    >> think "immediate" as a differentiation between the two types of
    >> description
    >> (roughly, a brain description and a mind description) is equally suspect.
    >> For pragmatists like Rorty, we can describe phenomena equally well in
    >> both
    >> types of descriptions, but neither one reduces to the other (this is the
    >> mind/brain identity thesis).
    >>
    >> As for the idea of "pre-intellectual experience," this is the exact
    >> concept
    >> I would like to get rid of in Pirsig. Sure, we can make a distinction
    >> between our "immediate" impression of something before we think about it
    >> later more. But that's just going along with common sense, which is what
    >> Dan is trying to convince us is all that Pirsig meant (with the
    >> difference
    >> between being at a baseball game and watching on TV, or watching a
    >> baseball
    >> game from wherever and thinking about it later). I don't think it's as
    >> apparent as that. I think Pirsig is trying to draw specifically
    >> philosophical consequences out of his idea of "pre-intellectual
    >> experience."
    >> It seems to me that Pirsig is trying to say that our "pre-intellecual
    >> experience" of low Quality _happens before language_, and this
    >> pre-linguistic experience is closer to Quality than post-linguistic, that
    >> language is a mediation between us and reality. As he says in the famous
    >> hot stove example, "the low value comes first, then the subjective
    >> thoughts…." (Ch 8) Value first, thoughts, i.e. language, second. As far
    >> as
    >> I can see, there is no way to draw any philosophical consequences out of
    >> the
    >> idea of "pre-intellectual experience" that does not tie you into
    >> traditional
    >> problems. For pragmatists, there is no way to unhook language from
    >> experience, just as Pirsig agrees to when he says with Bohr that we are
    >> "suspended in language." It seems to me that Pirsig equivocates between
    >> a
    >> commonsensical notion of direct experience and a specifically
    >> philosophical
    >> sense, and this equivocation is what allows him to gain plausibility for
    >> a
    >> specifically philosophical concept.
    >>
    >> At least, that's how it seems to me. If it were otherwise, I'm not sure
    >> why
    >> Pirsig would spend so much time talking about the "pre-intellectual
    >> cutting
    >> edge of reality" and how that's supposed to cure some of our specifically
    >> philosophical ailments. Its understood that common sense contains
    >> Platonic
    >> and Cartesian formations, as Dan alluded to elsewhere when he said, "Of
    >> course the [baseball] analogy is 'Cartesian theatre' in as much as our
    >> language is grounded in such a manner." But aren't we supposed to be
    >> changing such things in as much as we want our language to be better?
    >>
    >> Matt
    >>
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