From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Thu Mar 17 2005 - 04:13:41 GMT
Hi Anthony,
I was going to remain in purdah until after Easter, but this deserved a
quick reply.
> Sam Norton responded March 12th 2005:
>>That's not quite right, so far as I understand it (and I'm only just
>>beginning to study Schleiermacher, so I could well be wrong). The 'divine'
>>for Schleiermacher comes before the splitting up into phenomena and
>>noumena; it is pre-intellectual, and those categories are intellectual
>>applications.
>
> Ant McWatt replies:
> Sam,
> Your description of Schleiermacher's thought in your December essay
> clearly indicates that he thinks that the Divine is found in the noumenal
> i.e.
> "It immediately brought forth a response, which, whilst retaining the
> Kantian epistemology, argued that in certain circumstances IT WAS POSSIBLE
> TO HAVE A 'PURE' EXPERIENCE, I.E. TO EXPERIENCE THE 'NOUMENA'.
My essay is just as clearly wrong on that point (and, I think, what I said
on March 12th is accurate). I told you it was 'rough and ready'. At this
point I'd be quite happy to abandon any and all references to Kant in the
paper and in the thread, because what I've always found most interesting is
the conceptual parallels between Schleiermacher, James and Pirsig, viz they
each posit an experience out of which the subjective and objective grow. You
could say that you've reacted to the sauce on top of the ice cream, not the
ice cream itself. (My fault for putting red herring sauce on ice cream in
the first place, no wonder people don't like the taste).
But I'm also reminded of something which John Beasley quoted a few years
ago:
"The 'third rate' critic attacks the original thinker on the basis of the
rhetorical consequences of his thought and defends the status quo against
the corrupting effects of the philosopher's rhetoric. 'Second rate' critics
defend the same received wisdom by semantic analyses of the thinker which
highlight ambiguities and vagueness in his terms and arguments. But 'first
rate' critics "delight in the originality of those they criticise...; they
attack an optimal version of the philosopher's position--one in which the
holes in the argument have been plugged or politely ignored."
I later said (to Marsha):
>>Secondly, I think the MOQ is a metaphysical structure that pre-dates
>>Wittgenstein. I don't think it's possible to do metaphysics in quite the
>>same way once Wittgenstein has been taken on board; it's 'status' is
>>different. This is what I'm wanting to pursue with Anthony. In other
>>words, I think that - because, so far as I know, he's never read any
>>Wittgenstein - Pirsig is still employing some residual Cartesian
>>assumptions about 'philosophical psychology'. I think that the MOQ can
>>survive the removal of these assumptions, I just think that the way the
>>levels are understood will be modified (the social level will not be
>>'subjective' in any sense, for example).
>
> When I put it to Gavin Gee-Clough (in January 2003) that Wittgenstein was
> critical of Descartes' views on the self, he noted:
>
> "Wittgenstein was just a semanticist; a semanticist moreover who said that
> semantics wasn't all that useful. He hinted at other sources of meaning
> but never really explored them - just said they were really important.
> Wittgenstein was obviously a very conflicted guy - hardly indicative of
> having broken out of SOM."
>
> I have taken Gavin's word about this as he studied Wittgenstein as a part
> of his philosophology degree and like David B and Paul, I usually find
> Gavin's thoughts helpful in clarifying the MOQ. However, if you can cite
> particular passages by Wittgenstein (NOT secondary sources) that indicate
> that Pirsig is "using residual Cartesian assumptions" then I'll certainly
> look at them.
I thought this was odd, partly because I've also got philosophological bits
of paper to show that I've studied Wittgenstein (both undergraduate - taught
by Gordon Baker, no less - and postgraduate), partly because Wittgenstein's
last words were 'tell them I've had a wonderful life', but mostly because
I'm not sure what's being asked for. Wittgenstein died before Pirsig
appeared on the scene, so there can't be anything directly talking about the
MoQ, but he did use William James as one of his principal interlocutors, and
there's quite a lot where Wittgenstein is either implicitly or explicitly
taking issue with James, especially in the Investigations. But Wittgenstein
doesn't write in analytical fashion (eg 'I think James is wrong in these
three areas, a) b) and c)') he tends to come at things from various angles
and approach his targets indirectly. The residual Cartesian assumptions, I
would say, are all tied up with the use of the language of empiricism, which
is certainly a part of what Wittgenstein was trying to undermine, but I'm
not aware of a nice pithy quote where Wittgenstein says 'the language of
empiricism is dodgy'. What he was trying to get at was more fundamental than
that - he was trying to cure us of the urge to do metaphysics. Wittgenstein
saw the search for an overarching metaphysical explanation as something
which could not be sustained philosophically. However, at the same time he
said 'Don't think I despise metaphysics. I regard some of the great
philosophical systems of the past as among the noblest productions of the
human mind. For some people it would require a heroic effort to give up this
sort of writing'. I think that he viewed metaphysical projects as akin to
religious art: 'And what's more, this satisfies a longing for the
transcendent, because in so far as people think they can see the 'limits of
human understanding' they believe of course that they can see beyond these'.
So as long as we hold Pirsig's art gallery analogy in the forefront of our
minds we're OK. As soon as we start thinking that we have discovered 'the
truth' then we're back into SOM (or, back in the fly-bottle, to use
Wittgenstein's own image).
> Finally, do remember that unlike other modern philosophies formulated in
> the West, the MOQ is guaranteed 100% SOM free. If you look closely at
> LILA you will see that anyone who can clearly prove otherwise will be
> given a free Honda CB750 signed by Robert Pirsig himself. I just don't
> believe anyone has successfully put forward a good enough argument to
> claim a free motorbike yet!
What an interesting proposal. I'll see what I can do.
Now, back to purdah.
Sam
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