From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Thu Mar 17 2005 - 18:58:42 GMT
In my most recent essay, “Philosophologology,” I attempted to unearth a
certain mood in Pirsig’s writings, a mood I called at various times, for
various reasons, “antiauthoritarianism” and “antiestablishmentarianism.” I
didn’t really distinguish between the two, and used them fairly
interchangeably, but I’d like to distinguish them now, along with a third
strand, in the hopes of illuminating the functionings and general goings-on
of the Moq.org Disscussion Group (the “MD”).
Antiauthoritarianism is a specifically philosophical thesis that says that
people are not bound to any non-human authority. In this sense, for
example, Protestantism was a step in the West towards antiauthoritarianism
by locating the House of God within each person, rather than through a
priest caste that had a special relation to God. This forced authority to
be reconstituted on the other side as something that was generated by
humans’ interactions with each other (otherwise there would be something
like theological anarchy).
Pirsig’s key message to us is his recitation of Socrates’ message to
Phaedrus: “And what is good, Phaedrus,/And what is not good—/Need we ask
anyone these things?” This strikes two chords. First is a kind of
antiauthoritarianism that mimics the Protestant move. No one has a special
relation to the Good over and above anyone else. But notice that not only
is one caste’s special authority destroyed, _anyone else’s_ authority is
destroyed. By internalizing our relation to the Good—Quality—Pirsig has
basically told us that each of us has a special relation to Quality that no
one can override. Pirsig almost gives us a thorough-going
antiauthoritarianism, but not quite. This is because of the second chord
that is struck by Socrates’ rhetorical question: antiprofessionalism.
Antiprofessionalism is a special case of the populist rhetoric I talked
about in the earlier essay. It specifically rests on the assumption that
each person has a general, though specific, special relation to the subject
matter (whatever it may be). In Pirsig’s case, every person has a special
relation to Quality. Because of this assumption, the believer is then
caused to rail against professionals masquerading as authorities over the
subject material, in this case professional philosophers. Pirsig’s
antiprofessionalism comes out most strongly with his introduction of the
term “philosophology.” For Pirsig, contemporary philosophers have barred
“amateurs” from the field, despite the fact that the subject material they
think about is open to all.
The effects of antiprofessionalism towards philosophy, however, are
catastrophic. If the problems of philosophy are conspicuous and problematic
to all, then it is of utmost importance that everybody solve them. But if
we’ve disbarred authorities from the field, because we are our own
authorities based on our own special relation to Quality, then what would
count as a successful solution to the problems of philosophy? Who would
decide? If we aren’t supposed ask _anyone_, then we are our own judges,
meaning that whenever we aren’t bothered by the problems, by whatever
solution we’ve come up with, then presumably we’ve solved them. But most
people are _naturally_ not bothered by the problems of philosophy, though
Pirsig thinks we should be because it would seem that he identifies many of
the problems of contemporary society, our “spiritual crisis,” with problems
of philosophy. But, again then, how would we know if we’ve solved our
spiritual crisis if we’ve barred all authorities from the field, how would
we know if we’re not bothered by philosophical problems because we’re
ignorant of them, or because we’ve actually solved them?
So after dispatching the reigning authorities over philosophical problems
with his strong sense of antiauthoritarianism-cum-antiprofessionalism, we
are left wondering who’s going to tell us when our search for the solutions
of the problems of philosophy is over, particularly if we could be wrong.
This is where Pirsig’s antiprofessionalism turns naturally, ironically, and
paradoxically (though entirely predictably) into antiestablishmentarianism.
Pirsig wants to knock out the reigning establishment, but somebody has to
fill the void. Pirsig’s philosophy is exactly what fills this void. While
cheering Pirsig on in his railing against the evil, egg-headed
establishment, we are concurrently, subtly, and slyly won over to Pirsig’s
philosophy. But this creates another establishment and another profession,
this time under the authority of Pirsig, rather than Plato, Descartes, and
Kant. The problem with antiprofessionalism (in all of its forms) is that
its rhetoric is aimed at destroying professional work, but its very act
relies on professionalism because there is no “work” outside of
“professional work.” Pirsig uses antiprofessionalist rhetoric (like all
others who use it) to destroy prevailing attitudes, but only to replace them
with his own.
.....continued in Part II (Matt)
_________________________________________________________________
Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE!
http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Thu Mar 17 2005 - 19:04:21 GMT